Abstract
One peculiarity of the technologies referred to as ‘new and emerging’, such as synthetic biology, the nanotechnologies, and the converging technologies, is their visionary character. Although applications exist now and there is much applied research, much of the current ethical and political debate is focused on possible technological developments, i.e. on technological visions. Since this visionary character is frequently not acknowledged, the future of the different forms of technology is often taken for granted, which makes it appear that the ethical and political discussion has developed following a dynamic of its own, engaging in problematic speculation. What does it mean to analyse the normative implications of technological visions? After discussing the different meanings of responsibility and providing some examples taken from the current debate on human enhancement, the aim of this article is to disentangle the implications of thinking about responsibility in relation to technological visions.
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Notes
- 1.
See Coenen et al. (2009).
- 2.
Ethics in Public Policy Making: The Case of Human Enhancement (EPOCH) is a European Commission FP7 Science in Society funded project, grant number SIS-CT-2010-266660 (http://epochproject.com).
- 3.
To the present day there is no commonly shared and general definition of nanotechnology beyond a general identification of the study and control of matter at the molecular and atomic scales (i.e. a definition which gives a precise range or which refers to fields of application). With very few exceptions, it is difficult to find any kind of matter that would not qualify as an object of such nanoscale research: every branch of experimental science and technology nowadays deals with material objects structured at the nanoscale. There are various efforts in different continents to find a definition, which are influenced by the topics regarded as the most important in the local context. In October 2011 Europe adopted the ‘Recommendation on the definition of a nanomaterial’: ‘According to this recommendation, ‘nanomaterial’ means: ‘A natural, incidental or manufactured material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50 % or more of the particles in the number size distribution, one or more external dimensions is in the size range 1–100 nm. In specific cases and where warranted by concerns for the environment, health, safety or competitiveness the number size distribution threshold of 50 % may be replaced by a threshold between 1 and 50 %. By derogation from the above, fullerenes, graphene flakes and single wall carbon nanotubes with one or more external dimensions below 1 nm should be considered as nanomaterials.’ This recommendation states that, by December 2014, the EC will review the definition ‘in the light of experience and of scientific and technological developments. The review should particularly focus on whether the number size distribution threshold of 50 % should be increased or decreased.’ The absence of a commonly accepted definition of nanotechnologies has precise epistemological implications, because it influences the setting and legitimisation of scientific research areas and therefore the scope of the research. The setting of goals clearly has ethical implications, because goals and aims are shaped by society and because goals are matters of research policy-in particular through priority-setting. The definition of ‘nanotechnology’ varies depending on research priorities of different countries: (unlike the US, Asian countries such as China, Japan and Korea tend to emphasise material sciences and electronics, while African and Latin American countries focus on environmental sciences and medicine). Furthermore, the lack of a commonly accepted definition is ethically relevant because it opens the ethical discourse indefinitely and, as we will see, many authors tend to associate with nanoethics different kinds of problems (cf. Ferrari 2010).
- 4.
Since in the project of ‘converging technologies’ the level of atomic manipulation is taken as the ultimate one and as the basis for creating a new world, the ‘integration from the nanoscale’ of these technologies is seen as determining a ‘tremendous improvement in human abilities and societal outcomes’ (Roco and Bainbridge 2002).
- 5.
These arguments are: nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights (Patenaude et al. 2011).
- 6.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first use of the word ‘responsibility’ is in issue 63 of the ‘Federalist’ (1787), a text attributed to Alexander Hamilton. For a web version see: http://foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed63.htm, accessed October 2, 2012. As regards the history of the term ‘responsibility’, see Villey (1977) and Henriot (1977).
- 7.
The theme of mutual commitment is also confirmed by the Greek verb spendo, which means ‘to pour out as a drink offering’, ‘to make a solemn libation’ to the gods, hence ‘to engage oneself by a ritual act’, but also ‘to enter into an agreement’ as the gods are called to guarantee an action too (for example the victory in war).
- 8.
In this respect, it could be noted that the term responsibility may also have been derived from the Latin verb responsare, which means ‘to be able to go against the mainstream’. Consequently, responsibility is the capacity to face the difficulties that could raise in fulfilling the assumed commitment, going also against the mainstream.
- 9.
It should be noted that the expressions ‘moral obligation’ and ‘moral reason’ are not synonymous because the former expresses a stronger normative force than the latter. For a critical analysis of the use of ‘have a good reason to’ within Savulescu’s approach, see Marin (2012, pp. 113–115).
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Ferrari, A., Marin, F. (2014). Responsibility and Visions in the New and Emerging Technologies. In: Arnaldi, S., Ferrari, A., Magaudda, P., Marin, F. (eds) Responsibility in Nanotechnology Development. The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9103-8_2
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