Abstract
When orientation is lost, a research project may be carried out in order to bridge the orientation gap. This leads to a “thetic construction”—that is, an aggregation of a thesis, supported by arguments. The aim of argumentation is to investigate the suitability of a thesis to function as “new orientation.” As an illustration for the arguments surrounding a thetic construction, Christopher Columbus’ plea for the existence of a Western passage to India is presented and discussed. Since one always has to be aware of possible objections to the elements of a thetic construction, argumentation should be taken as essentially dialogical.
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- 1.
Cf. Blumenberg (1973), who tells the story of this “curiositas.”
- 2.
Cf. Popper (1968).
- 3.
Cf. Kuhn (1970).
- 4.
Cf. Latour and Woolgar (1979). According to this account, empirical natural science actually consists in creating any (seemingly arbitrary) constructions of order. But if we ask about the validity claim of this theory, and whether the theory itself is also merely a construction of some order, we receive the following instruction at the end of the book: “[…] we do not claim to have any better access to “reality” [than the scientists, H.W.] and we do not claim to be able to escape from our description of scientific activity. […] In a fundamental sense our own account is no more than fiction” (257, emphasis in the original). Hence, the scientific presentation of neuroendocrinological circumstances in the brain, for example, is described from a sociological and anthropological perspective, which regards itself as a “fiction” and thus insinuates that it is similar to what is described. As far as the latter is acceptable, it is about as relevant as the statement that both the scientist and the philosopher of science use computers. Science as a praxis, however, has felicity structures that have to do with the confirmation and progress of knowledge. Anthropologists of science, who objectify this praxis, can only grasp the outside of the process of forming a conviction. They ignore the difference between a belief of any kind (e.g. the belief formed in a research group after the approval of their grant application) and a true belief. Such a description of science, which does not care about the (implicit) validity claims of the described praxis, is actually no description of science at all. Granted, it needed to be said that scientists act just as smartly, stupidly, and brilliantly as ordinary people. But it is a helpless aberration to seriously present this as a philosophy of science. For socio-anthropological thinking in the philosophy of science, cf. also Knorr-Cetina (1981).
- 5.
Cf. Hacking (1983).
- 6.
- 7.
Kitcher (1993).
- 8.
Kitcher (1993), 390/91 ff.
- 9.
Ulrich Charpa develops a theoretical description of the research process that describes researchers’ actions as guided by rules that are typical for the “virtues” of the successful researcher; cf. Charpa (2001). Scientific knowledge is supposed to be understood as “nothing more than the knowledge of researchers” (92). Hence Charpa does not refer to theories, but—in accordance with the perspective advanced by Kitcher et al.—to “mental facts” (93). These, however, are not mere opinions (94). They are “epistemically privileged”—which is because they rest on well-founded decisions to accept a thesis (183 ff.). Charpa calls a decision well founded if accepting T is considered to be the best way to meet a research objective (established in a reputable tradition). Prima facie, this is a reasonable and plausible view. It can be reconciled with the notion that T is a thesis for which we have a clear argumentative construction in the sense of the concept of dialogical justification expounded here. It should be noted, however, that traditions, even if they are reputable and have, so far, been successful, may under certain circumstances also turn out to be shackles that need to be cast off.
- 10.
This is why Lakatos wanted to separate these parts of the history of science as “external” which, however, was met with little enthusiasm. Cf. Lakatos (1974).
- 11.
Kienpointner (1992), 318.
- 12.
Kienpointner (1992), 318.
- 13.
In Gabriel García Márquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude (cf. Márquez (1984), 286 ff.), the old blind Ursula “finds” her daughter’s lost wedding ring, because she is completely aware of all her habits—a wonderful episode!
- 14.
Cf. Watzlawick et al. (1974). In his book Change, Watzlawick distinguishes between first-order and second-order “solutions.” In the case of second-order solutions, the real challenge is how to conceptualize the problem. The book contains very enlightening descriptions. Watzlawick’s insinuation, however, that typical mental disorders are of the second-order type—and can be cured quickly and sustainably with ingenious redefinitions of problems—is likely to create illusions.
- 15.
It is quite clear that, in research, humans have to let go of their prejudices. But how this can be done is by no means clear. Great thinkers have devoted themselves to this question. Francis Bacon, for example, who introduced induction as a research method—fully aware that it is a mode of reasoning which easily leads to mistakes—advised his readers to become conscious of their “idols” and to abandon them. For this purpose, he sorted these “idols” (Lat. idola, stereotyped thinking) into four groups (Idols of the Tribe, the Cave, the Market Place, the Theater), so that one could at least catch a glimpse of the possible traps that demanded attention. Cf. Bacon (2000), Book I, § § 38–68.
- 16.
Such impediments are usually connected with received ways of framing an issue; cf. also Chap. 5. These are particularly persistent if they also mark boundaries between subjects or disciplines. It was difficult to advance the theory of heat because, among other things, heat was first analyzed in physics, then in the (nascent) field of chemistry, and finally in physics again. In this respect, research is naturally “transdisciplinary;” cf. the instructive examples in Mittelstraß (1989b, 2007).
- 17.
Cf. Gethmann (2007).
- 18.
Wittgenstein (1981) Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Sentence 1.
- 19.
Heidegger (2010), 70.
- 20.
Cf. the “free exchange” that Lueken ((1992), 294 ff.), following Feyerabend, recommends for overcoming incommensurable relations. An incommensurable relation is a relation between heterogeneous theories that has been imaginatively pushed to extremes (cf. Chap. 5). As far as this free exchange is helpful, so is the generated practical contact presented here, which subverts rigid objectifications.
- 21.
Cf. Elias (1987).
- 22.
Toulmin and Goodfield call this episode “one of the most tantalizing moments in the development of our ideas about matter.” Cf. Toulmin and Goodfield (1962).
- 23.
For the theorization of argumentation, and then especially for argumentation analysis, these conditions are essential. Without a participatory perspective, it is hardly possible to grasp, let alone assess appropriately, what is actually happening in an argument. This topic will be discussed in detail in Chaps. 7 and 9.
- 24.
Cf. Condorcet (2009).
- 25.
Cf. Walzer (1974), Saint-Just 13. November 1792.
- 26.
- 27.
After the “Donation of Constantine” the Pope owned the entire Western hemisphere. (Constantine had been cured of leprosy by Pope Sylvester. As a reward, he gave him half of the world.) The corresponding document was exposed as a forgery for the first time around the middle of the 15th century. But at the time of the discovery of the New World, it was still in effect, i.e. the Pope decided whether it was right to seize a country in and beyond the Atlantic.
- 28.
Many commentators are fascinated or repulsed by Colón’s Christianity. Cf., for example, Madariaga (1939), Chapters XI and XII, who concluded from the many peculiarities that Colón was a Jew. The Jewish journalist Wiesenthal ((1973), passim, especially 109–139) worked on this thesis extensively, only to reject it in the end. For a comprehensive description of the arguments about Colón’s alleged Jewishness, cf. Böhm (1992), where all known arguments in favor are invalidated, which caused Bucher (2006), 251, to regard the refutation as “final.”
- 29.
Cf. quotation in the introduction to Columbus’ logbook, Jane (1968).
- 30.
The most accurate by George E. Nunn; cf. Nunn (1924).
- 31.
Nunn (1924), 89, provides a list of nine different determinations of the size of the land mass. It shows that the size of Eurasia had constantly increased in the minds of experts since the early Middle Ages. Colón’s specification, however, by far exceeds all the other ones.
- 32.
Cf. Peter (1972), 40. Upon closer inspection, however, it turns out that, according to our current state of knowledge, Posidonius cannot be credited with independent measurements at all. The process of Eratosthenes’ measurement (“[…] throughout antiquity […] [the] only geodesy […] worthy of the name” Miller (1919), 16; Trans. T.P.) is difficult to comprehend today. As a result, two values circulated, namely 250,000 Egyptian stadia (39,375 km) and 252,000 Egyptian stadia (39,690 km). Cf. also Eratosthenes (1969), 99 ff.
- 33.
The information is incorrect; a longitude is 111.12 kilometers wide. What went wrong? Nunn (1924; 1, 6) still assumed that Al Farghani’s measurement of 56 2/3 miles was wrong. In the meantime, however, it has become clear that the Arabian mile (1.97 km) was longer than the Roman mile (1.48 km), so that Al Farghani was more or less right. Commentators like Venzke, who are aware of this, mock Colón’s error as a “gallop through the difficult terrain of a geographical definition of the Earth” (Venzke (1991), 72; Trans. T.P.), without noticing that their accusation is cheap. After all, nobody in the Late Middle Ages knew of this difference. This is a typical error of assessment that arises when an interventional evaluation is made in the immediate aftermath of an internal evaluation, without asking what the participants in the argument could have known (cf. Chap. 7). The really interesting question here is just how the seafarer could have been able, as he claimed, to have verified Alfraganus’ specification, even though he interpreted it erroneously (as a Roman mile). Was he no more than a braggart after all? As usual, Nunn (1924; 13–18) has something significantly smarter and more differentiated to say about this, too.
- 34.
Cf. Bucher (2006), 83–87.
- 35.
- 36.
Madariaga (1939), 75/76: “Traveller’s stories, sacred books, charts and documents, old wives’ tales, every form of lore contributed to the discussions. […] Round a kernel of direct observation there spread a circle of authority, classical and biblical, and beyond it an aura of hearsay, and still further afield a world of imagination.”
- 37.
Cf. Jane (1968), 11: logbook, entry from Sept. 17, 1492. Some interpreters, however, believe that the whole difficulty is merely an expression of the nautical ignorance of various copyists.
- 38.
“[…] the evidence shows Columbus to have been painstaking in his inquiries and to have utilized the best information available in his time.” Nunn (1924), 30.
- 39.
- 40.
Cf. Lakatos (1970), 138 ff.
- 41.
“Both Fernando Columbus and Las Casas report that, on September 23 and 24, violent riots broke out among the crew. These riots were directed at their leader. They lasted until the eve of the discovery and were accompanied by threats.” Berger (1991), Vol. II, 390 (Trans. T.P.).
- 42.
Nunn (1924), 90.
- 43.
This was a process of gradual acceptance. On his world map of 1507, Waldseemüller was the first to have recorded a new continent called “America.” But some years later, on his second map, this continent had been removed again. On this second map, things were represented according to Cristóbal Colón’s reports, i.e. Cuba was the eastern edge of Asia, etc.
- 44.
Cf. the nice explanations in Tetens (1994), 32/33.
- 45.
Cf. Wittgenstein (1956), 162.
- 46.
Cf. Lumer (1990), 6, 25, 316 ff. Lumers anti-dialogical position is partially explained by the fact that, for him, argumentative validity presupposes scientific truth. In the production of the latter, however, Lumer does not see a place for argumentation.
- 47.
Loc. cit.
- 48.
Examples of this kind are the dialogues of the Dialogue Logic, of Hamblin, Hintikka, Walton, and others.
- 49.
This is the core of the argumentation in Antony Blair’s often cited paper about the limits of the dialogue model of argument; cf. Blair (1998).
- 50.
This is the strategy of Christopher Tindale when referring to Mikhail Bakhtin. He quotes him about “the dialogical” as involving “a whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which entirely becomes an object for the other”; cf. Tindale (2004), 98.
- 51.
In the course of a dialogue about a thesis, the roles may change. If the opponent puts forward an objection which includes an assertion that is subsequently questioned, the proponent takes over the role of the opponent and vice versa.
- 52.
“Dialogue” is a derivative of “dialegesthai” which meant talking or thinking through (e.g. through a complex, even intractable idea). The prefix “dia” does not mean “two” but “through.” The protagonist of the ancient tragedy thought about a problem in a dialogue with himself/herself. The choir (as the agent of the forum) commented on these considerations. The second dialogue partner sprung from this interaction.
- 53.
Aristotle discussed these matters under the heading ethos; cf. Introduction, section “The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory”.
- 54.
Cf. Venzke (1991), 111, 144.
- 55.
Cf. Berger (1991) Vol. I, 61.
- 56.
Cf. Beck (1992).
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Wohlrapp, H.R. (2014). Research. In: The Concept of Argument. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_2
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