Abstract
Argumentation, when enlightened with theory, may achieve a more sophisticated state. Yet without a commitment to reasonableness, it remains in a condition of sophistry. In the present approach, this commitment is modeled on Paul Lorenzen’s “principle of transsubjectivity,” a principle which demands from the arguers an effort to put their subjective systems into a reflective distance. This is the precondition for an acknowledgment of the Other. In practical terms, it means the consideration of objections in argumentation. When continuously iterated, human reason exhibits a transcendent core: Trust in the potential of autonomous human reasonableness transcends our experiences and ultimately converges with religious faith.
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Notes
- 1.
A prominent example in this regard are claims about the probability of a meltdown in a nuclear reactor. Until 1986, the year of the Chernobyl accident, it was alleged that such a thing occurs only once in 10,000 years. Instead of believing after Chernobyl that we are now safe for 10,000 years, we should examine the justification for that thesis more closely. If we do, we will realize that it is based on the extrapolation of disruptions that occurred in the relevant processes. These extrapolations, then, presuppose knowing which processes are relevant for a meltdown. Yet both the processes that led to the accident in Harrisburg in 1979 and the process that led to the Chernobyl accident involved “new” combinations of situational characteristics that were not even predictable as mere possibilities and thus could not factor into calculations of probability. The fundamental lesson is that the statements of probability are deficient unless the respective web of conditions is completely transparent. But this is not possible in the case of such large-scale technologies (cf. Perrow 1984). Therefore, a sense of security, expressed by a low probability for an accident, veils and obscures our pragmatic circumstances: actually, what we display here is trust—but no longer in the rational potential of humanity. The latter is most definitely overburdened here, because it cannot achieve the necessary total control over all situational possibilities. If we really acted strictly rationally, then we would declare the following: Such a technology asks too much of us humans; hence, we better leave it alone. The fact that we do not abandon it expresses a trust in the higher potential of reason—that humanity is able to cope with the results of applying such technologies, no matter how horrible these results may be. This is a trust that deserves to be called “religious.” More on this below in Sect. 10.4 of this chapter.
- 2.
Freeman (1977), 125: Protagoras, Fragment 1.
- 3.
Cf. Plato (1964), Gorgias, 466b.
- 4.
Cf. Plato (1964), Euthydemus, 287c and 298d–e.
- 5.
Cf. Aristotle (1965), On Sophistical Refutations, 179–179 a2, b7.
- 6.
Translator’s note: The German text links these two paragraphs by continuing its analysis of different uses of the term “trust”—“Selbstvertrauen” literally means “self-trust”—while in English “self-confidence” is the more common term.
- 7.
Cf. Schneider (1996).
- 8.
Cf., for example, the absurd and capricious arguments of the prosecution in Jan Hus’ trial at the Council of Constance, as reported in Friedenthal (1977), 263–290.
- 9.
Cf. Kant (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx: “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”
- 10.
Cf. Lorenzen (1969), 82.
- 11.
Horkheimer and Adorno (2002), 93.
- 12.
Lao Tsu (2009), Chapter 78.
- 13.
Cf. Mengel (1995b). There are attempts to specify “conditions” for such deliberations or for the “cooperative search for truth.” Cf., for example, the “ideal speech situation” in Habermas (1973), where “freedom from domination” is considered as a condition. This is not a bad idea, except it is not a universal “criterion.” Moreover, the stylization of this freedom from domination by ensuring equality, when selecting speech acts, is artificial.
- 14.
Cf. Merkel (2002), 152–154. A slightly annoying feature of this publication is that Hüppe’s objection is referenced without any information about its origin, so that interested readers cannot (easily) find out about the context, the course of the overall argument, and the exact meaning of Hüppe’s specific argument.
- 15.
This is true, in particular for esoteric “knowledge,” in which case it is not clear to the impartial, interested layperson that this is, in fact, knowledge because any possible practices are initially only accessible from the outside. Thus, Rudolf Steiner, for example, constantly claims that on the path of spiritual instruction, paved by him, we we can find insights that are just as evident as those of natural sciences. To be sure, some anthroposophical practices (in agriculture, medicine, pedagogy) deserve to be taken seriously.
- 16.
Cf. Hegel (1977), Phenomenology of the Spirit, Chapter IV A: Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage.
- 17.
Kamlah (1973).
- 18.
For a discussion of this argument, cf. again Wohlrapp (1998a), Part II, especially 254 ff.
- 19.
Cf. Hobbes (1968).
- 20.
Cf. Rousseau (1998).
- 21.
There seems to be an exception to this principle: If the state is unable to protect the life and limb of its citizens (any longer), they should be allowed to defend themselves (cf. Hobbes (1968), Leviathan, Part II, Chapter 21). Sometimes this is interpreted as a “right to resist.” This interpretation, however, is inadequate, for the contract has to be considered void in such a case. Hence, the citizen does not resist the legitimate authority, but an imposed one.
- 22.
Höffe (1999) calls this a “transcendental exchange” and claims to find in it a justification for the human right to physical integrity. This has a certain plausibility only as a very abstract idea (we are, after all, neither all able nor willing to threaten each other) and may in other respects be employed as a good reason for the death penalty in cases of murder—which, to my mind, is a defect of this proposal.
- 23.
Kant’s idea of the categorical imperative is a descendant of Rousseau’s idea of the general will. Cf. Cassirer (1965).
- 24.
The idea that the self emerges from a process of mutual ascription and role-taking has been developed with admirable clarity by George Herbert Mead in his philosophy of “symbolic interactionism,” cf. Mead (1934), Part III.
- 25.
Cf. Wohlrapp (1991), where I criticize Woods (1987) and others for ignoring the pragmatic difference between a threat and an advice. Woods has later delivered another treatment of the ad baculum (Woods 1998), where he insists in the prudential character of the figure. He even cites my paper, but without any attempt at refuting the criticism.
- 26.
Cf. my pragmatic definition of religion in Wohlrapp (2010).
- 27.
The topic of the “God of the Philosophers” (and scholars), in counterdistinction to the “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob,” comes from Blaise Pascal, who carried with him a note about his epiphany, sewn into his robe, which includes these formulations. The note has been published as “Pascal’s Memorial” in Pascal (1962), 333. Wilhelm Weischedel chose the formula “The God of the Philosophers,” as the title for his informative, extended essay on theories from the philosophy of religion. Cf. Weischedel (1971).
- 28.
In the United States, there has been a new sociomedical discipline called “medicine and religion” for several decades now, which publishes studies documenting significant correlations between active religious practice and an improvement in the test subjects’ health. Cf., for example, Koenig and Cohen (2003).
- 29.
Cf. Erikson (1950), Chapter 7.1. Erikson assumed connections between this basic trust and organized religiosity, too.
- 30.
Cf. Eliade (1969).
- 31.
“Heraclitus, while warming himself at a fire, reportedly told a stranger, ‘Enter! Here, too, are gods!’” Cf. Aristotle (1972), i.5 645a17.
- 32.
To date, ethnologists document cases that elude any satisfying explanations; cf., for instance, Rösing (1990). For instances that are a bit closer to our cultural context, Thomas Mann’s reports about the occult seances in which he participated in 1922 are exemplary. Mann’s tone in these reports is one of disgust, but it is devoid of the slightest doubt about the reality of the witnessed materializations. Cf. Mann (1993).
- 33.
Paradigm cases of this belief are the corresponding formulations in Diderot’s justification for the project of the Encyclopédie. He writes that the collection and systematization of knowledge is necessary so “that our descendants, by becoming more learned, may become more virtuous and happier.” Robespierre even called the Encyclopédie “the introductory chapter to the revolution”; cf. Mittelstraß (1980b).
- 34.
In this sentence, the use of “knowledge” is not terminological, but rhetorical. These people have (doxastic) beliefs which they consider to be irrefutable.
- 35.
Cf. Küng and Schmidt (1998).
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Wohlrapp, H.R. (2014). Transsubjectivity. In: The Concept of Argument. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8_10
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