Abstract
The author describes here the development of modern and contemporary virtue ethics, concentrating on Adam Smith’s business related moral theories.
Ability will enable a man to get to the top, but character will keep him from falling.
—Chinese Proverb
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Notes
- 1.
Stoicism can be divided into Early, Middle, and Late forms. Early Stoa dates from 300 BC to the middle of the second century BC Middle Stoa dates from the middle of the second century BC and is represented by Panaetius (c. 180–109 BC) and Posidonius (c. 135–151 BC). The Stoics of the Roman Empire represent late Stoa. For more, see (Striker 1992, vol. II, pp. 1208–1213).
- 2.
In Hobbes’ words, “right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature” (Hobbes 2012, I, XIV).
- 3.
The moral theory of contractarianism claims that moral norms derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement.
- 4.
For examples, see (Hume 1983, Sect. II, Part I, 17, Sect. III, Part I, 24 f, and Sect. VII, 63).
- 5.
(Kline 2012; Vanderschraaf 1999) extend Hume’s ideas into institutions and commercial practices.
- 6.
In addition to the two books mentioned here, Smith’s other major accomplishment was (Smith 1982).
- 7.
Athol Fitzgibbons mourns the fact that few commentators on Smith write about the Stoic origins of his virtue theory, but there may be good reason for this (Fitzgibbons 1995, pp. 104–106).
- 8.
(Broadie 1991, pp. 24–25). and (Aristotle 1962, II 6 1106a 1115). Elsewhere, Aristotle claims that “well-doing (eupraxia) is the end we seek: action of some sort or other is therefore our end and aim.” (Aristotle 1995, VII 3 1325b 1319).
- 9.
Recall the Latin virtus’ rooted is vir, meaning “a man.” See also (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1976, VI.iii. pp. 1–12).
- 10.
Compare (Aristotle 1962, II 6 1106a 1115) with (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1976, III.2.1, III.5.8, III.5.9, and IV.1.1).
- 11.
(Ross 1960, p. 185). In sum, Aristotle’s Ethics begins with the arché , “the that,” and not “the because.” For more, see (Burnyeat 1980, p. 71 and 75).
- 12.
Smith asserts that the “deformed,” those not in accord with their natural form , are “monsters.” (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1976, V.1.8). Also see (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1976, III.5.6 and 5.7). and (Aristotle 1962, I 7 1097b 1030, I 1096 1096b 1034, and I 1094 1095a pp. 1016–1019).
- 13.
See “Politics as the master science of the good” in (Aristotle 1962, 1094a 1018 to 1094b 1012, glossary, pp. 1311–1313). and (Rawls 1993, p. xxi).
- 14.
MacIntyre suggests this about Homeric societies (MacIntyre 1984, p. 184).
- 15.
Broadie observes that Aristotle recognized that sometimes an agent reaches a rational choice but fails to act on it due to moral weakness or incontinence (akrasia). This incontinence is not a vice nor is its opposite, continence, a virtue, “for the continent person enacts his choice but not without a struggle against bad impulses, whereas the truly good person is free from these.” See (Aristotle 1962, VI 5 1140b 1145, VI 1149 1142b pp. 1141–1135, VI 1110 1143a pp. 1141–1117, and VI 1111 1143a pp. 1118–1124 and pp. 1129–1132; Broadie 1991, pp. 266–267).
- 16.
See editor’s comments in (Aristotle 1962, I 2 1094a 1027, f1098, 1094 and V 1091 1129a 1091, f1091, 1111).
- 17.
Aristotle uses the terms courage and self-control. However, to distinguish more easily between Aristotle’s self-control and Smith’s self-command , we follow the lead of Aquinas ’ terminology. See (Aquinas 1984, q.56 a.54 and q.60 a.54).
- 18.
For more on Aristotle’s notions of generosity or liberality, see (Aristotle 1962, IV 1). Aristotle’s notion of generosity in regard to the use of property can be found in (Aristotle 1995, II 5 1263b 1213 and II 1266 1265a 1230).
- 19.
For more on the distinction of virtues in terms of the good, see (Aquinas 1984, q.54 a.53). For Smith’s view, see (Smith 1978, A, pp. 9–15).
- 20.
“It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made. All the members of human society stand in need of each others assistance, and are likewise exposed to mutual injuries.” (Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1976, II.ii.2.1).
- 21.
See examples in (Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1976, I.xi.10, I.viii.13, IV.ii.21 and v.a.23, I.ix. pp. 16–17, II.ii.94, and I.x.c.27).
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Calkins, M. (2014). Building a Virtue Theory for Business. In: Developing a Virtue-Imbued Casuistry for Business Ethics. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 42. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8724-6_9
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