Abstract
In this paper I want to have a closer look at the connections between human rights, human dignity and human nature. I will hold that there are two aspects of human dignity that are simultaneously two aspects of human nature. One aspect concerns the normative, moral status of persons that is connected with their ability to act morally. The other aspect concerns the empirical status of persons that is connected with their neediness and vulnerability. It is this second aspect that leads us to determine the substances of human rights. There are some goods that are indispensible for a decent life. These goods should be protected by human rights. But the second aspect is connected to the first: The recognition of all other human beings as equal moral persons (of their equal moral status, of their dignity) is the foundation of the recognition of their human rights. I will develop the idea that human rights are founded in two aspects of human dignity by using the example of extreme poverty as a violation of human dignity and as a violation of human rights.
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- 1.
In the Preamble of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27 it says: “Considering that, in accordance with the principle proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United nations in 1966, it says also “Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”.
- 2.
I will not focus on what exactly these goods are in this paper. Of course, it is disputable as to what counts as a necessary or indispensible good. For my purpose here, it might suffice to determine these goods in the most general and formal way: that they are necessary for a decent life. For a position that proposes goods that are necessary for an autonomous life cf. Gewirth (1980). For a position that draws basic rights back to basic goods, the substances of these rights, cf. Shue (1996, for a critical comment see Mieth 2008).
- 3.
And self-respect is, to some degree, dependent on the basic structure of a society for Rawls. Only if the basic structure is legitimized with regard to the equal moral status of the individuals whose life-prospects are shaped by the basic structure, will self-respect be fully developable for most members of society.
- 4.
What I leave aside here is the possibility of self-instrumentalization and self-degradation which would occur as violating duties towards oneself in Kantian philosophy. For Kant and Schaber the assumption of duties towards oneself is crucial. In Kant, the possibility to disregard oneself comes from the idea that the humanity in us belongs to our “real” moral nature of the homo noumenon. By contrast, my point is to claim that there should be equal respect for the physical conditions necessary to lead a decent life and, insofar for the homo phaenomenon and his vulnerability and neediness, that is equally important for our human nature. On my account, the first aspect of dignity, the equal moral status of persons, must not be stressed at the cost of the second.
- 5.
“By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France they are necessaries neither to men nor to women, the lowest rank of both sexes appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I comprehend not only those things which nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people. All other things I call luxuries, without meaning by this appellation to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render them necessary for the support of life, and custom nowhere renders it indecent to live without them” (Smith 1776, Book 5, chapter 2, part 2, article 4).
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Mieth, C. (2014). The Double Foundation of Human Rights in Human Nature. In: Albers, M., Hoffmann, T., Reinhardt, J. (eds) Human Rights and Human Nature. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 35. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8672-0_2
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