Moral Conservatism, Distractors, and Authoritarianism

Abstract

Practical rationality involves the voters’ deliberative considerations of means to practical ends. Moral rationality involves the voter’s deeply held values, beliefs, and emotional commitments. Regarding voting decisions, moral rationality often trumps practical rationality. This chapter asks, How do the characteristics of the states, political and social attributes, and moral conservatism limit practical rationality, and what can be done to ease these limits? This chapter studies abortion and guns as key distractors and connects these sentiments to authoritarianism. It develops a set of macrolevel societal problems indicative of a state’s neglect of children and shows how these factors initially are positively related to anti-abortion sentiments; it then shows how religious traditions and participation, and a state’s human development (HD), disconnect the abortion sentiments from the indicators of child neglect. Similarly, to study support for the NRA (i.e., gun possession and use), it develops a set of macrolevel indicators of crime and incarcerations and relates these factors to sentiments about the NRA. When the HD context and the social attributes are controlled then any linkages between state crime rates and pro-gun sentiments are severed. The South and Heartland and morally conservative religious traditions and religious participation shape these pro-life and pro-gun sentiments; the other social attributes as coded have negative effects. Indicators of moral conservatism and indicators of authoritarianism have similar determinants and consequences but these constructs are not identical. But the same strategy promises to ameliorate their unfavorable consequences. Improving the quality of education could drive improvements in income, health, and politics, thereby enhancing socioeconomic status, while at the same time providing a prophylactic against any authoritarian tendencies of the voters.

The political parties, meanwhile, are unable to make sense of our condition. The main topics of national debate—the proper scope of the welfare state, the extent of rights and entitlements, the proper degree of government regulation—take their shape from the arguments of an earlier day. These are not unimportant topics; but they do not reach the two concerns that lie at the heart of democracy’s discontent. One is the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives. The other is the sense that, from family to neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unraveling around us. These two fears—for the loss of self-government and the erosion of community—together define the anxiety of the age. It is an anxiety that the prevailing political agenda has failed to answer or even address.

—Michael J. Sandel (1996, 3)

Notes

• 1. Even though voting fraud through impersonation of others is extremely rare, thirty-four states mostly in the South and Heartland have enacted voter identification laws , which may reduce the political voice of the poor and minorities (Bravin 2013; Schlozman et al. 2012, 537; Drew 2015). Minnite (2010) and Piven et al. (2009) show that voter fraud is a myth designed to limit the vote of African Americans. Popper (2014, A13) opines that voter fraud is extensive and that new voter-ID rules do not suppress the vote of minorities.

• 2. These conceptions are rooted respectively in Weber’s conceptions of zweckrationalität (i.e., pragmatism) and wertrationalität (i.e., moral absolutism). For explication see Parsons (1947, 115) and Etzioni (1988, 144–146). Coleman (1990, 13–19) develops aspects of practical rationality; Boudon ([1986] 1986, 1996, 2003) develops notions of moral rationality. Janowitz ([1960] 1971, 264–277) applies Weber’s distinction contrasting military doctrines as “pragmatic” versus the “absolutist.” Military leaders who are pragmatic view warfare as only one instrument of international relations along with ideological and economic means; they would adjust the use of violence to achieve practical political goals. Military leaders who are absolutist view war as inevitable and would use maximum force to achieve total victory.

• 3. Porter (2012, 1361–1363) characterizes many areas of the South as predisposed toward authoritarianism and these same areas also have high scores on indicators of moral conservatism. Hetherington and Weiler (2009, 39) state: “Authoritarianism is conceptually distinct from conservatism, though the two are becoming more and more intertwined in contemporary American politics.”

• 4. D’Antonio et al. (2013).

• 5. Burd-Sharps et al. (2008).

• 6. The voter-level survey data are from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (2008).

• 7. Ellis and Stimson (2012).

• 8. Hillygus and Shields (2008).

• 9. Fiorina and Abrams (2009).

• 10. Hetherington and Weiler (2009).

• 11. This book follows Daniel Bell’s (1976) conceptions: here the core indicators of postindustrial state economies include the availability of home internet usage, per pupil educational spending, spending on academic research and development, and availability of physician services.

• 12. Medical coverage for the very poor is a vital problem of many states, which many states resist ameliorating. A number of formerly reluctant conservative governors are now accepting Medicaid expansion (Kirchgaessner and Rappeport 2013, 7). To implement the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. Obamacare) 34 states mostly in the South and Heartland are relying at least in part on federal insurance exchanges. The 2010, federal law states that people qualify for subsidized health insurance if they obtain their health insurance through an exchange “established by the state.” The Obama Administration interprets this stipulation as applying more broadly to federal exchanges and not only to state-run exchanges. Without the subsidies Obamacare would be unable to insure the poor and many in the middle class. Conservatives have initiated law suits aimed at enforcing the narrow interpretation; namely, that only people insured by state-run exchanges are eligible for subsidies (Palazzolo 2013). If the Supreme Court ruled against these subsidies (which it did not do), then millions would be unable to pay for their insurance (Mathews 2015).

• 13. Lipset ([1960] 1981a, 509–510) detected a shift from an economic class-based politics that characterized the industrial period of the United States toward a more social [i.e., moral] politics that would characterize its postindustrial period. Manza (2012, 174) and Bartels (2008) still stress the importance of class-based voting.

• 14. The Republican’s staunch opposition to same-sex marriage rights has engendered efforts by large donors and party activists to shift the Republicans to a middle position. A pretested survey question emphasizing the Golden Rule: …“to treat others as we’d like to be treated, including gay, lesbian and transgender Americans” has garnered support from 89% of Republican voters (Wallsten 2013). When the sentiments of white Evangelical Protestants, a core of the Republican coalition, are broken down by age, younger people are less opposed to same-sex marriage: 80% of ages 65 or older oppose; 74% of ages 50–64 oppose; 75% of ages 35–49 oppose, but only 43% of ages 18–34 oppose. Consequently, to appeal to this younger age category some evangelical leaders are softening their stance (King 2013). The Supreme Court’s legalization of same-sex marriages may further change these attitudes.

• 15. The Affordable Care Act became a divisive wedge issue with conservative organizations running negative advertisements aiming to reduce support for its implementation. In September, 2013 a month prior to its October 1 startup, 55% of insured people disapproved and 40% approved of Obamacare, for a difference of −15 percentage points. Among the uninsured, 46% disapproved and 49% approved, for a small difference of only +3 percentage points. The negative ads are directed toward the 36% of the Independents and the 75% of the Democrats who approve of Obamacare. In the 2014 midterm elections, which the Republicans won, many Republican candidates ran against Obama’s policies. Many Democratic candidates hid their support of Obama and his administration’s policies. By 2015 at least 11.5 million have enrolled (Radnofsky 2015) and the Supreme Court voted to uphold subsidies for people enrolled in the national exchanges, thereby removing a major threat to Obamacare.

• 16. Here is the statistical model and the SAS code for a Model 5 run. There are three types of states designated tristates _i : the South, Heartland, and High Human Development; 51 states designated stname _j and 2000 voters _k . Let y _ijk denote the value of anti-women’s choice for the kth voter in the jth state in ith tristate. Let X _mijk denote a covariate m (m not equal to tristate or stim). Let stim be the macro-level social indicator of child poverty the stimulus variable. Let β _m denote a covariate’s regression coefficient. Then:

  $$ Y_{ijk} = \mu_{i} + \sum {{\upbeta}_{m} {\text{X}}_{mijk} } + {\upbeta}_{m + 1} {\text{tristates}}_{i} + {\upbeta}_{m + 2} {\text{stim}}_{ijk} + a_{j(i)} + e_{\text{ijk}} $$

  i = 1, 2, t = 3 types of state, j = 1, 2, 3,… s = 51 states, k = 1, 2, 3,… v = 2000 voters

  where

  $$ \begin{aligned} a_{j(i)} & = iid\,N\sigma^{2}_{{s\left( {\text{Tristates}} \right)}} \\ e_{ijk} & = iid\,N\sigma^{2}_{v} \\ \end{aligned} $$
  

  To get the BICs for the maximum likelihood models change the method option to Method = ML.

• 17. These BIC measures are from maximum likelihood estimates (ML) for models with the same structures as those estimated by restricted maximum likelihood (REML). The ML estimates of BICs gauge how the sequence of models fit THE data; the REML estimates of the BICs gauges how well a specific model fits ITS restricted pseudo data. The REML estimates of the variance components are superior to the ML estimates; the ML estimates of the BICs are superior to the REML estimates for models with different structures.

• 18. Key (1966, 7–9) stresses the rationality of voters; Frank (2004) opines that voters often do not necessarily align with the party that best serves their economic self-interest.

• 19. Hetherington and Weiler (2009, 36) use the term “world view ” for a sentiment structure that: “is composed of a set of beliefs and ideals that a person uses as a guide to interpret the world.” A world view is closely synonymous in meaning to ideology as used in this book. The notion of “world view” also is somewhat similar in meaning to “mindset .”

• 20. Fromm ([circa 1929] 1984) showed how the inconsistent character structure of German workers would not be sufficient to stem the tide of Nazism. The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950, 102–150, 224–287) presents the ethnocentrism E-scale gauging prejudice and the Fascism F-scale gauging implicit anti-democratic trends. Bonss (1984) and Fleck (2011) provide vivid histories of the early research on authoritarianism. Lowenthal and Guterman (1949) and Lowenthal (1987) analyze strategies demagogues employ to unleash authoritarian predispositions. Langman (2014) reviews the many accomplishments of the Frankfurt School and argues that its critical perspective is still relevant for today’s sociological analyses.

• 21. Lipset ([1960] 1981b, Chap. 5) analyzes fascism (i.e., authoritarianism) from Left to Right.

• 22. The F-scale of The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950, 228) is composed of these dimensions: Conventionalism, Authoritarian submission, Authoritarian aggression, Anti-intraception, Superstition and stereotypy, Power and “toughness”, Destructiveness and cynicism, Projectivity, and Sex. Altemeyer (1996, 6) defines right-wing authoritarianism as comprising authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism.

• 23. Adorno et al. (1950, 230–231) include items about childrearing in the Authoritarian Submission dimension of their F-scale. Here is a clear example: “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.” Lipset ([1960] 1981a, 114) and Houtman (2004, 151–153) link class, education, and cultural capital to authoritarianism. In numerous studies Melvin Kohn and colleagues study how social structure and personality development are intertwined. Citing 13 studies, Smith (2008, 48–49, 289–290) provides an overview of some of Kohn’s work. As Kohn writes (in Smith 2008, 49):

  Social structure continues to affect the personality development of the offspring, as did the offspring’s parents, in a continuing cycle of social stratification and culture affecting personality development: the cultural part of the process being the transmission of values from parents to offspring; the social structural part being the effects of educational experience and, later, occupational experience.

• 24. This pole of the index of authoritarianism is tapping Lakoff’s ([1996] 2002, 33) Strict Father mentality.

• 25. This pole of the index of authoritarianism is tapping Lackoff’s ([1996] 2002) Nurturant Parent mentality.

• 26. African Americans are socially liberal on the measures of this present chapter suggesting that authoritarianism and moral conservatism are distinct concepts. Moreover, Pérez and Hetherington (2014) show that the child-rearing measure does not validly classify African-Americans. Given the many problems of the inner city it is very rational for African Americans to desire obedient children and social order—minimal gang warfare, drug use, gun possession, and murders. Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009, 48–50, 52–58) evidence supports the validity of their index for white Americans. They do not report the index’s reliability but they do present reliable trend data (Tables 3.1, 52, 7.1, 141, 7.2, 143 and 7.3, 144).

• 27. Bishop and Cushing (2008, 288–289) report that some younger people have left strict fundamentalist congregations because of the authoritarian tendencies of the congregations. Their informant says: “I grew up in an Assemblies of God church, and it was rigid. …People were telling me how to think, how to dress, how to vote. Here [in a small basement congregation] I can state my opinion and not have people jump down my throat.” Marsden (1991, 117) suggests that fundamentalists are militant Evangelicals who have authoritarian tendencies. These are indicated by their overly simplistic polarized views of good versus evil—the moral versus immoral, tight-knit congregations under control of authoritarian preachers, and anti-intellectualism, which sorts out evidence to fit the preordained religious beliefs.

• 28. To obtain a Spearman’s r _s assign equal-interval ranks to the proportions of an attribute for authoritarianism and moral conservatism and then calculate the r _s to measure the concordance of the assigned ranks. For the method and formulas see Hays (1988, 834–836).

• 29. The proportions morally conservative by education for minorities are: less than high school = 0.549; high school degree = 0.443; some college = 0.454; college degree = 0.443; and graduate degree = 0.356. For the white majority the proportions are: less than high school = 0.530; high school degree = 0.570; some college = 0.565; college degree = 0.532; and graduate degree = 0.432.

• 30. The dispute between a racist rancher , who will not pay the federal government for grazing privileges, resulted in an armed standoff involving a thousand armed “Patriots” and armed federal officials from the Bureau of Land Management . The Economist (2014, 33) reports that: “Supporters drove hundreds of miles in pickup trucks bearing patriotic stickers, bringing with them an awesome armory. After a brief but tense stand-off, during which the protesters trained assault rifles on their adversaries, the officials released the 400-odd cattle they had rounded up and beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind a jubilant mob and a rancher secure in his defiance.”

• 31. Schlozman et al. (2012) probe relationships between socioeconomic status and political voice.

• 32. In the 2014 midterm elections, in which the Republicans won the Senate, the faithful overwhelmingly voted for Republican congressional candidates: Seventy-eight percent of evangelical Christians voted for Republicans to only 20% for Democrats. Sixty-two percent on those voters never attending religious services voted for Democrats compared to only 36% for Republican (Pew Research Center 2014). Moral considerations matter!

• 33. Lakoff ([1996) 2002, 25–26, 98–102, 135–136) implies that anti-abortion sentiments stem from a Strict Father mentality and pro-choice sentiments stem from a Nurturant Parent mentality.

• 34. Smith (2004) shows that in 1992 the Right resembled today’s Tea Party taking consistently negative positions on issues bearing on social equality, economic equity, the environment, and voting choice, whereas the Center and Left took more nuanced positions.

• 35. Linz (1978).