Abstract
Most discussions about someone terminating her own life tend to focus either on utilitarian considerations or rights. For the latter, a number of people argue over whether we have a right to die , which I take to mean an entitlement to choose to end one’s own life. I see at least two problems with the right to die approach. Unfortunately, many arguments and positions are based primarily on the intuitions of those engaged, and therefore often turn into intuition pump battles. Secondly, basing arguments on rights gets us mired in the same problems that any rights talk encounters including, but not limited to, whether they are positive or negative, whether they can be overridden, and what justifies such a right. In this chapter, I am going to argue for a position that makes worries about a right to die moot. If there is an obligation at certain times and in certain circumstances to die, then a right to die is irrelevant. Moreover, if an obligation to die is possible, then it necessarily follows that choosing to die is morally right on some occasions. Doing what is right generally cannot be proscribed by others so it does not matter if there is a right to die.
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Notes
- 1.
Islam, for instance, prohibits all euthanasia “because it deprives the person of the right to life and the possibility of action”. (Muwahidi 1989, 48).
- 2.
A more standard way to approach death is to argue that it is permissible to die or that there is some sort of right to die. Lebacqz and Engelhardt , for example, argue that there is a prima facie right to die (Lebacqz and Englehardt 1986, 85).
- 3.
I will later argue that allowing oneself to die is generally a form of suicide.
- 4.
Of course, it is probable and plausible to believe that there are far more instances of shortened life being permissible than rising to the level of a moral obligation.
- 5.
I might be asserting too strong a position for Davis, but it seems in keeping with her arguments.
- 6.
If there is an afterlife, then the force of this and other arguments depending on a total cessation of existence will have to be rethought. After all, if the afterlife is likely to be much better, then it would be rational on at least egoistic grounds to pursue self-death.
- 7.
Poverty is not merely about financial wherewithal. Some people are raised in a financially poor situation but have flourishing lives.
- 8.
Hardwig could agree with Overall, and then state that his criteria already include a condition that the person will not have the flourishing life Overall describes.
- 9.
This ambiguity is a mistake: To leave a central term of this importance too vague or ambiguous will make disagreements rife as people talk past each other instead of discussing the same issue.
- 10.
Some will argue for the permissibility of the four taking resources from the fifth, possibly on the grounds of maximizing utility, but the quantitative versus qualitative issue is not fundamental to this discussion.
- 11.
Even in cases in which there are insufficient resources, Overall has an optimistic outlook for society’s ability to overcome this difficulty.
- 12.
It should be noted that if we are going to have discussions about redistribution, then there cannot be a privileging of developed countries over developing countries. The mere fact the former has great wealth and power does not mean that individuals lucky enough to be born in them deserve the resources they take for granted as a right. I take it this is a point that Battin makes in her argument for some people to no longer take resources if they have already had their fair share.
- 13.
The approach I am taking here is similar to Peter Windt’s (1980) Wittgensteinian analysis.
- 14.
These are not desires formed intentionally, but rather desires that commit the agent to carrying out the intention.
- 15.
This is also relevant to suicides and other takings of life.
- 16.
I am not going to argue that there is one definition of suicide.
- 17.
Part of this argument appears in my review of Cholbi’s Suicide at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- 18.
This lack of time objection can also be used against Chisholm and Sidgwick’s position. It is difficult to see that there is an intention formed in these cases.
- 19.
Sometimes, there seems to be confusion about what palliative care is. If it is merely a treatment or management of various kinds of pain from various sources, then it is not a form of euthanasia. Palliative care, in this sense, will also apply to a number of non-terminal cases, and is generally preferred by the Practical Principle if everything that is intrinsically valuable is respected as such and it is likely to result in the best outcome. However, if palliative care means an alternative to prolonging life, and that seems to be what it is in many proponents’ arguments (Pereira 2011; Omipidam 2013), then it is a form of passive euthanasia even if its primary intentions are directed toward managing pain and making the person feel positive about herself (Steffen and Cooley 2014). The main difference between it and active euthanasia is the difference between passive and active euthanasia.
- 20.
A question arises as to what “true” suicides from acts of commission actually intend. My suspicion is that they intend the cessation of pain and suffering or some other end rather than their deaths. If this is true, then it becomes even clearer that these cases are morally identical and therefore should be labeled as suicides.
- 21.
Gavin Fairbairn argues that refusal of treatment is a case of suicide, whereas jumping on a grenade is not (Fairbairn 1995, 114–7). What makes the two morally different is that in the latter, the agent really has no choice in the method of saving his friends; therefore, he was compelled in a significant way. Of course, the problem with Fairbairn’s ‘only one method’ argument is that the grenade jumper had the option of preserving his own life, even though that would have resulted in his friends’ deaths. Therefore, the grenade jumper committed suicide because there was a different, legitimate option open to him at the time.
- 22.
Some writers argue that there is a moral distinction between the two. J.P. Bishop, for instance, claims that since voluntary active euthanasia’s purpose is to die, then there is no meaningfulness in the dying process as there is in passive euthanasia (Bishop 2006, 223).
- 23.
I think that this difference is what motivates some to use the Doctrine of Double Effect to distinguish cases of permissible and impermissible actions when they are really considering better or worse situations and people.
- 24.
The mere fact that a person is mentally ill in regard to an unrelated condition or at risk of suicide does not automatically render the person incompetent when it comes to making decisions about medical treatment or suicide. Moreover, it does not automatically permit outside agents, such as physicians or the state, to interfere in legitimate decision making (Callaghan et al. 2013, 384).
- 25.
Neill Allen argues that “suicidal citizens have the right to require public authorities to take reasonable precautions to avoid their death if they ought to know of a real and immediate risk to life.” (Allen 2013, 356). Apparently being suicidal is sufficient to eliminate autonomy, but not the positive rights associated with remaining alive the individual is uninterested in having fulfilled.
- 26.
Jeanette Hewitt notes that the rationality of suicide seems to be linked to whether it is performed to alleviate extreme physical or mental suffering. Suicide to stop extreme physical disorders are more likely to be justified than are those from mental suffering, in which it is automatically assumed that psychological conditions render the person incompetent. As a result, intervention is more often thought to be obligatory in the latter when not justified in the former (Hewitt 2013).
- 27.
Brandt’s approach has the same problem as Prado’s: “The basic question a person must answer, in order to determine which world-course is best or rational for him to choose, is which he would choose under conditions of optimal use of information, when all of his desires are taken into account.” (Brandt 1975, 69).
Although an ideal way to make a decision, Brandt’s standard is far too high for humanity. It is asking us to act as we would as perfectly rational people in a perfect society, but we are clearly not perfectly rational creatures with perfect access to all relevant information, yet we are still moral agents.
- 28.
I think this example might be too simplistic. In order to have the different mental states, other states would have to be altered between the worlds so that the former mental states can exist.
- 29.
I have argued in “Crimina Carnis and Morally Obligatory Suicide” that those who would engage in murder, terrorism, rape, pedophilia, genocide, and other morally horrific actions can lose their moral lives.
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Cooley, D.R. (2015). Is There a Duty to Die?. In: Death’s Values and Obligations: A Pragmatic Framework. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 62. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-7264-8_7
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