Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Attacks on Judgments: Impugnazioni

  • Chapter
Civil Procedure in Italy

  • 99 Accesses

Abstract

After discussing rules that apply to attacks on judgments generally (10.01— 10.03), this chapter considers correction of errors that appear on the face of a judgment (10.04), regolamento di competenza (10.05), appeals (10.06), review by the Corte di cassazione (10.07), proceedings on remand (10.08), revocation (10.09), and third party opposition (10.10).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. The following statistics show the frequency of appeals and proceedings to obtain review in the Corte di cassazione. I. Sentenze rendered by tribunals acting as courts of first instance: 60,814 in 1901; 54,026 in 1910; 53,063 in 1920; 108,442 in 1930; 55,003 in 1940; 40,079 in 1950; 56,454 in 1960. II. Sentenze rendered by courts of appeal in proceedings on appeal from tribunals: 11,444 in 1901; 11,163 in 1910; 11,101 in 1920; 18,892 in 1930; 13,193 in 1940; 10,194 in 1950; 17,283 in 1960. III. Decisions in civil and commercial matters rendered by the Corte di cassazione: 3,410 in 1901; 2,930 in 1910; 2,190 in 1920; 3,679 in 1930; 3,329 in 1940; 3,071 in 1950; 3,323 in 1960. See T. Ascarelli, Litigiosità e ricchezza, I SCRITTI GIURIDICI IN MEMORIA DI P. CALAMANDREI 57, 60–61 (Padova, Cedam 1958). Statistics are published annually in the ANNUARIO DELLE STATISTICHE GIUDIZIARIE (Roma, Istituto Centrale di Statistica).

    Google Scholar 

  2. On the means of attacking judgments, see, in addition to the manuals and commentaries on civil procedure, R. Provinciali, Sistema Delle Impugnazioni Civili (Padova, Cedam 1943); R. Provinciali, Delle Impugnazioni In Generale (Napoli, Morano 1962); N. Giuidiceandrea, Le Impugnazioni Civili (Milano, Giuffrè, 2 vols., 1952); P. Calamandrei, Vizi della sentenza e mezzi di gravame, I P. Calamandrei, Studi Sul Processo Civile 167 (Padova, Cedam 1930).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 337, para. 1. See 9.11 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 65, para. 1, provides: “The Supreme Corte di cassazione, as the supreme organ of justice, assures the exact observance and uniform interpretation of the law, the unity of national law...”. Centralization was first accomplished by Royal Decree of March 24, 1923, No. 601. See generally P. Calamandrei & C. Furno, Cassazione civile, Ii Novissimo Digesto Italiano 1053 (Torino, Utet 1957).

    Google Scholar 

  5. P. Calamandrei, La funzione della giurisprudenza nel tempo presente, Vi P. Calamandrei, Studi Sul Processo Civile 89 (Padova, Cedam 1957).

    Google Scholar 

  6. Constitution art. 111. See 10.07.a infra.

    Google Scholar 

  7. This assertion is widespread in Italian writings. However, a statistical analysis made by Ascarelli indicates that litigiousness, rather than being a national trait, may be related to economic underdevelopment. In the years 1901 to 1955, if due account is taken of the population increase, the rate of civil litigation decreased considerably. Litigation has decreased to the greatest degree in areas of Italy that have witnessed the largest measure of economic development. T. Ascarelli, op. cit. supra note 1, at 57 et seq.

    Google Scholar 

  8. The absence of juries permits appellate courts to redetermine factual issues.

    Google Scholar 

  9. See 8.04.a supra. While appellate judges reconsider questions of fact as well as of law, the record of the lower court is often relied upon and no new evidence introduced. On the other hand, the inadequacy of the fact-finding procedures in the lower courts encourages litigants to retry their luck on appeal. Crocioni, comparing English to Italian procedure, writes that the English trial “is a potent instrument of search: a machine to reconstruct the truth.... It is almost inconceivable that it will fail to throw light upon the most obscure issues of the case. Therefore there is a great scarcity of appeals from cases tried.” P. Crocioni, Fase Preliminare E Dibattimento Nel Processo Civile Inglese 35 (Padova, Cedam 1939).

    Google Scholar 

  10. A citation initiates an appeal (Codlce Di Procedura Civile art. 342), revocation (Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398), and third party opposition (Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 405). An application initiates a proceeding for regolamento di competenza (Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 47) and for review in the Corte di cassazione (Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 360). Unlike a citation, an application (ricorso) does not contain an invitation addressed to the adversary to make a formal appearance. Since an application must nevertheless be served on the adversary, the difference is only formal. 1 M.T. Zanzucchi, Diritto Processuale Civile 435 (Milano, Giuffrè, 5th ed. Vocino, 1955).

    Google Scholar 

  11. See 9.13 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 110 (by implication).

    Google Scholar 

  13. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 1 1 1, paras. 3, 4. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto Processuale Civile 316–17 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. reprint 1957); E. T. Liebman, Appunti Sulle Impugnazioni 12–13 (Milano, La Goliardica 1959); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso Di Diritto Processuale Civile 231 (Milano, Giuffrè 1960). On the power of the pubblico ministero to attack a judgment, see 5.10 supra. See also 10.07.b; 10.09.d infra

    Google Scholar 

  14. See 10.10 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  15. On the rules governing ordinanze, see 8.02 supra. Under the Code of 1865, rulings that now must be cast in the form of ordinanze, were issued in the form of sentenze. This resulted in numerous appeals and other attacks on interlocutory rulings. See 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 228.

    Google Scholar 

  16. See 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 256; 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso Di Diritto Processuale Civile 266–67 (Milano. Giuffrè 1959).

    Google Scholar 

  17. According to article 325, an appeal, revocation, and third party opposition pursuant to article 404, para. 2, must be initiated within ten days in case of attack on a judgment of the conciliatore, and within thirty days in case of attack on a judgment of a tribunal, pretore, or court of appeal. An application for review in the Corte di cassazione must be made within sixty days. A proceeding for regolamento di competenza must be initiated within thirty days of notice (comunicazione) of the judgment or within thirty days of service of any other ordinary kind of attack on the judgment. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 47, para 2; art. 133 para 2

    Google Scholar 

  18. Although service of the judgment is not mandatory, it is often made to shorten the period within which an ordinary attack on the judgment may be made. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale Di Diritto Processuale Civile (tome 1) 238–39 (Milano, Giuffrè 1959); 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 176. See 9.08 supra. For the running of time to commence regolamento di competenza, see note 17 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 327, para. 1; art. 133, para. 1. The one year limitation does not bar a party who is in contumacia and who had no notice of the proceeding because of (1) voidness of the citation, or void service of the citation, and (2) voidness of service of all other procedural acts, including the judgment, upon him. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 327, para. 2. If the judgment has been properly served on such a party, the shorter (ten to sixty days) period applies. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 243.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 328. See 11.14–11.19 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  21. There is one exception: Third party opposition based on Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 404, para. 1, is not barred by the passage of time. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 7; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 241.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 326. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 7; 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 311.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 330, 331, 332. See 7.10–7.13 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  24. An extraordinary form of attack can be waived only by a party who has knowledge of the facts giving rise to his right to initiate the attack. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 329, para. 1. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni Del Processo Civile Italiano 134 (Roma, Foro italiano 5th ed. 1956); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 245. The rules of waiver of the right to attack are applications of the principle of party disposition. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 327; 1 M. Cappelletti, La Testimonianza Della Parte Nel Sistema Dell’OralitÀ 398 (Milano, Giuffrè 1962).

    Google Scholar 

  25. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 329, para. 2. On waiver of attack, see generally E. Minoli, L’Acquiescenza Nel Processo Civile (Milano, Vallardi 1942); P. D’Onofrio, Acquiescenza, I Novissimo Digesto Italiano (tome 1) 232 (Torino, Utet 1957); E. Minoli & A. Bergomi, Acquiescenza (diritto processuale civile), I Enciclopedia Del Diritto 496 (Milano, Giuffrè 1958).

    Google Scholar 

  26. If there are more than two parties to the proceeding, special provisions govern service On all parties. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 331, 332. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 336–45; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 250–52; T. Carnacini, Il Litisconsorzio Nelle Fasi Di Gravame (Padova, Cedam 1937).

    Google Scholar 

  27. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 334. See 2 F. Carnelutti, op. cit. supra note 24, at 134–35. The rationale of this rule is to prevent unnecessary appeals. For example, if A sues B to recover 1,000,000 Lire and receives judgment for 500,000 Lire, both parties, although dissatisfied with the result, may be willing to accept the judgment. However, in the absence of the right to make a belated cross-attack, each party might attack the judgment as a precaution against his adversary’s attacking at the last possible moment and thus leaving insufficient time for an independent attack.

    Google Scholar 

  28. These articles are applicable to ordinanze as well as sentenze.

    Google Scholar 

  29. See 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni Del Processo Civile Italiano 345 (Roma, Foro italiano 5th ed. 1956); 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 264; 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 18, at 239; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 176–77; Funestauri v. Rabbito, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 28, 1958, No. 215, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Sentenza, ordinanza e decreto in materia civile No. 7 (1958).

    Google Scholar 

  30. For other examples, see 1 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 29, at 345; 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 264 (the plaintiff’s name is used in a context where the defendant was meant); Manzoni v. Mazzocchini, Corte di cassazione, July 17, 1956, No. 2754, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Sentenza, ordinanza e decreto in materia civile Nos. 41–42 (1956) (the heading of the judgment names a party who was a stranger to the proceeding).

    Google Scholar 

  31. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario Al Codice Di Procedura Civile (part 1) 361 (Milano, Vallardi 1959–60). See also 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 310 (the corrected judgment is the same judgment and is not changed in effect).

    Google Scholar 

  32. Molinari v. Parascani, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 19, 1943, No. 399, Repertorio Giurisprudenza Italiana, heading: Sentenza civile No. 73 (1943) (in a proceeding to correct an error on the face of a judgment, neither the decision nor the proceedings before judgment are attacked). See also 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 18, at 240; 2 S. Satta, op. cit. supra note 31, at 361.

    Google Scholar 

  33. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale op. cit. supra note 18, at 240; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 16, at 177. Satta is of the opinion that a proceeding to make a correction may be brought only after the judgment has become res judicata. 2 S. Satta, op. cit. supra note 31, at 361.

    Google Scholar 

  34. However, the court may not make a correction on its own motion. 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 265.

    Google Scholar 

  35. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 18, at 240; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 178.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 288. This article also provides that, after correction, the parts of the judgment that have been corrected may be attacked within the ordinary time limitations for attack. The time limitations run from service of the ordinanza of correction. See 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 266. Service of the ordinanza correcting the judgment is governed by Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 121.

    Google Scholar 

  37. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 287.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Mannori v. Voltolini, Corte di cassazione, July 16, 1956, No. 2700, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Sentenza, ordinanza e decreto in materia civile No. 13 (1956); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op cit. supra note 18, at 240; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 177.

    Google Scholar 

  39. See Bardaro v. Comune Aquilonia, Corte di cassazione, July 14, 1958, No. 2554, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Sentenza, ordinanza e decreto in materia civile No. 12 (1958); 2 E. T. Liebman, Manuale, op. cit. supra note 18, at 240; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 177. The contrast between rules governing the pendency of an appeal and rules governing the pendency of an application for review in the Corte di cassazione is explained by the contrasting nature of appeal and cassazione. An appeal involves the total reconsideration of a case, and the appellate court substitutes its judgment for that of the court below; cassazione involves merely review of specifically alleged errors of law.

    Google Scholar 

  40. See 4.33 supra. At 4.13 supra, the special procedure to determine giurisdizione was discussed. This latter procedure is not a means to attack a judgment since no judgment is necessary for the procedure to be invoked. See 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 308, 309; 1 G. A. Miciheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 16, at 152.

    Google Scholar 

  41. For procedural details on this special procedure not supplied at 4.33 supra, see the commentaries on civil procedure under articles 42–50 of the Code. The proceeding is ordinarily brought by an application made to the Corte di cassazione. The time limitations are shorter and the procedures less formal than for other proceedings before that court. See 1 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 16, at 158; 1 E. T. Liebman, Manuale Di Diritto Processuale Civile 126 (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. 1957).

    Google Scholar 

  42. If the proceeding below is discontinued, a decision made of regolamento di competenza binds a successor proceeding brought on the same cause of action. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 310, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  43. See generally M. Vellani, Appello (diritto processuale civile), Ii Enciclopedia Del Diritto 718–56 (Milano, Giuffrè 1958); P. D’Onofrio, Appello (diritto processuale civile), I Novissimo Digesto Italiano (tome 1) 725–50 (Torino, Utet 1957).

    Google Scholar 

  44. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 341.

    Google Scholar 

  45. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 262–63.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Errors appearing on the face of the judgment that may be corrected pursuant to the procedures discussed at 10.04 supra, may also form a ground for appeal.

    Google Scholar 

  47. See, e.g., S. Satta, Diritto Processuale Civile 348, 354 (Padova, Cedam 6th ed. 1959).

    Google Scholar 

  48. See 10.06.e infra.

    Google Scholar 

  49. See 10.03.c supra.

    Google Scholar 

  50. It is generally stated that new grounds for appeal cannot be advanced later. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 162; 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 394, 399–400; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 264; Podestà v. Ferretti, Corte di cassazione, May 30, 1962, No. 1317, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Appello civile No. 36 (1962); Continenza v. Ciofanni, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 24, 1962, No. 3196, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Appello civile No. 54 (1962). However, the tendency of the courts is to attenuate the impact of this rule. Forcignanò v. Ferrovie Sud-Est, Corte di cassazione, Sept. 8, 1962, No. 2755, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Appello civile No. 45 (1962); Soc. Metallurgica Cobianchi v. Sostero, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 8, 1962, No. 3093, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Appello civile No. 46 (1962) (when the citation indicates that the appellant intends to attack the judgment below in its entirety, a rigorous analysis of the grounds for appeal need not be stated).

    Google Scholar 

  51. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 342. For a specification of the requirements to be met by a citation, see Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 163. See also 7.08 supra. The citation is served pursuant to the usual rules regulating service (See 7.10–7.13 supra) as modified by Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 330.

    Google Scholar 

  52. See 10.03.f supra.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 343.

    Google Scholar 

  54. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 339, para. 2. See also 9.05 supra; M. Cappelletti, Il giudizio d’equità e l’appello, Vii Rivista Di Diritto Processuale (part Ii) 143 (1952); C. Furno, Sul regime d’impugnazione delle sentenze equitative, Cv Giurisprudenza Italiana (part I, sec. 2) col. 35 (1953); id., Invalidità e impugnazione delle sentenze equitative ex art. 114 cod. proc. cio. processualmente illegittime, Cvi Giurisprudenza Italiana (part Iv) col. 1 (1954).

    Google Scholar 

  55. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 339, para. 3; Law of June 18, 1956, No. 760. However, when the ground for appeal is lack of competence or giurisdizione, even these judgments may be appealed. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 339, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  56. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 339, para. 1; art. 360, para. 2. These include certain social welfare cases involving small sums. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 452, 466.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Constitution art. 111; Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 360.

    Google Scholar 

  58. See 9.09 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 339, paras. 1, 2; art. 340 (before 1950 amendments).

    Google Scholar 

  60. See, e.g., 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 249.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Similarly, an application for review by the Corte di cassazione of a partial judgment rendered by an appellate court may be made immediately. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 340, 361. See, e.g., M. Cappelletti, La riserva di appello o di ricorso per cassazione “anche immediato,” X Rivista Di Diritto Processuale (part I) 215 (1955).

    Google Scholar 

  62. If the decision of the lower court that disposes of the proceeding is contingent upon the partial judgment that has been appealed, and the appellate judgment is favorable to the appellant, the contingent judgment of the lower court falls even if it has acquired formal res judicata effect. E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 31; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 281–82. Contra, 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 423.

    Google Scholar 

  63. If a party exercises his option to reserve his right to appeal, he must appeal from the partial judgment at the same time he or any other party appeals from any subsequent judgment in the proceeding. He may not elect to reserve his right to appeal if any other party presents an immediate appeal from the partial judgment. Codice Di Procedura Crvile art. 340. The election to reserve one’s right to appeal may be made in writing or orally at a hearing. Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 129, paras. 1, 2; art. 133. In the event of discontinuance of a proceeding in which a party has reserved his right to appeal from a partial judgment, the complex rules of art. 129, para. 3, of the Disposizioni apply.

    Google Scholar 

  64. On what constitutes a new claim, see 8.03 supra. See also 2 F. Carnelutti, op. cit. supra note 24, at 158–59; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 360; V. Andrioli, Appunti Di Diritto Processuale Civile: Processi Di Cognizione E Di Esecuzione Forzata 140 (Napoli, Jovene 1962); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 267–68; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 22.

    Google Scholar 

  65. The opportunity to introduce new matter on appeal was granted by the 1950 amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the amendments, for example, either the appellant or appellee may for the first time raise the defense of the statute of limitations. However, defenses that are precluded by law may not be raised. For example, Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 38, para. 3, provides that the defense of territorial incompetence of the lower court may be raised only in the initial answer in the proceeding of first instance. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 23.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 345, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 345, para. 2; art. 92. See 9.10 supra. When a party merely challenges his adversary to take a decisory oath in the appellate proceeding, the rule allowing reallocation of costs does not apply. The rule is of little practical effect in reducing the introduction of new evidence and defenses. See V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 141; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 269.

    Google Scholar 

  68. This rule does not bar defenses that the court is required to notice on its own motion. Such defenses are affected by a public interest and may not be waived. See 8.04.e supra; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 270.

    Google Scholar 

  69. See 8.03.c supra.

    Google Scholar 

  70. 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 399–400; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 270. The rules stated in the text must be considered in relation to the rule that the grounds of appeal must be stated in the citation and not later. See 10.06.c supra.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 344. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 163–64; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 270–71 and cases cited. For a more expansive interpretation of article 344, see S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 356–57. On the rights of third parties to intervene in proceedings in the first instance, see 5.06–5.09 supra. On parties entitled to invoke third party opposition proceedings, see 10.10 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 347. See 7.17 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  73. See V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 146. But see Ditta F.a.t.a. v. Finanze, Corte di cassazione, May 15, 1963, No. 1205, Lxxxviii Foro Italiano (part I) col. 2246 (1963) (in the absence of a timely objection by appellee, filing of an unauthenticated copy of the judgment does not vitiate the appeal).

    Google Scholar 

  74. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 347, para. 2; art. 58. Civil judgments of courts other than the conciliatori are usually subject to a registration tax, which is frequently progressive, dependent upon the value of the subject matter. See G. Greco, Le Imposte Nei Procedimenti In Materia Civile, Penale E Amministrativa 99 et seq. (Milano, Giuffrè 1963). Since article 117 of the Royal Decree of Dec. 30, 1923, prohibits the clerk from issuing the original, a copy, or extract of a judgment until the judgment has been registered, an appellant is foreclosed from appealing duly until the tax has been paid. If his adversary objects, the appeal will be dismissed pursuant to art. 348 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Corte di cassazione has expressed doubts concerning the constitutionality of this result. However, the Constitutional Court has not ruled on the question. This issue is but one aspect of the “fiscal cloud” that often overhangs Italian civil proceedings and hampers a prompt, simple, and frank joinder of issue. For another aspect of this “fiscal cloud”, see 11.10 infra. See also P. Calamandrei, Il processo civile sotto l’incubo fiscale, Iii P. Calamandrei, Studi Sul Processo Civile 75, 91 et seq. (Padova, Cedam 1934).

    Google Scholar 

  75. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 347, para. 3; art. 168. See 7.25–7.26 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  76. See 11.08 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  77. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 26; 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 404–05; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 135–37.

    Google Scholar 

  78. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 348, para. 2. See 11.08 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 358.

    Google Scholar 

  80. See 11.08; 11.27 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 359; Disposizioni Di Attuazione art. 132.

    Google Scholar 

  82. He is appointed pursuant to the same rules that prevail in courts of first instance. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 168 bis. See 7.27 supra; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 273.

    Google Scholar 

  83. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 350–352. These include the power (1) to determine whether the parties have duly appeared; (2) to determine, in cases in which the issue is not contested (if the issue is contested, the determination is made by the adjudicating panel), whether the appeal is inammissibile, has become improcedibile, or has been discontinued; (3) to determine whether the appellee is in contumacia; (4) to attempt to achieve a settlement between the parties; (5) to grant or revoke the right to provisional execution of the judgment below. His determinations are made by ordinanze. The aggrieved party may move (reclamare) that the adjudicating panel modify or vacate an ordinanza. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 357.

    Google Scholar 

  84. See 8.01–8.03 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  85. It is anomalous that the giudice istruttore has this power in courts of first instance but not in appellate courts. For criticism of this anomaly, see 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 165–66. But see 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 411–12. The anomaly derives from the Code as originally in effect in 1942 under which no evidence could be taken on appeal except on “serious grounds.” In 1950, the Code was amended to allow de novo proof-taking; however, the powers of the giudice istruttore were not correspondingly amplified. When an appeal is taken from the judgment of a conciliatore to a pretore, since the pretore hears and decides the case alone, the rule stated in the text is inapplicable.

    Google Scholar 

  86. An ordinanza issued by the panel binds the examining judge, but may be modified or vacated by the panel. See 8.02, 8.04 at note 60 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  87. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 356.

    Google Scholar 

  88. See 8.04–8.50 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  89. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 352. See 8.03.c., 9.01–9.02 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  90. Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 131. See 9.03 supra. In the tribunal, the panel consists of three, and in the court of appeal of five, judges.

    Google Scholar 

  91. A judgment of affirmance, for purposes such as execution, takes the place of the judgment of the lower court. Naturally, a judgment upholding the appellant’s attack also displaces the judgment of the court below. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 282; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 28.

    Google Scholar 

  92. These determinations may also be made in the form of ordinanze by the giudice istruttore. On the effects of a determination of inammissibilità or improcedibilità, see 10.06.j supra. On the effects of discontinuance, see 11.27 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  93. See 9.09 supra; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 280.

    Google Scholar 

  94. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 353–354. The courts have held consistently that remand is proper only in the statutorily enumerated cases. Lazzarini v. Coop. La Previdente postelegrafonica, Corte di cassazione (sez. un.), July 28, 1962, No. 2208, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Appello civile No. 242 (1962). For arguments favoring a more expansive interpretation, see, e.g., 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 170; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 368–69. Remand is permitted so as to insure the fundamental right to a complete adjudication on two levels. See 10.01 supra; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 169; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 355, 368. Remand is permitted in cases in which there has been no complete adjudication below.

    Google Scholar 

  95. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 353.

    Google Scholar 

  96. The limitation of this ground to judgments of conciliatori is explained by the rule that judgments by courts other than conciliatori to the effect that they are incompetent may be attacked only by regolamento di competenza and not by appeal. See ch. 4 text at note 181 supra. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 42, 46.

    Google Scholar 

  97. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 354, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  98. This ground for remand does not apply when the voidness has been cured by the defendant’s appearance below or by subsequent valid service. Consequently, this ground for remand is available only when the defendant was excusably in contumacia. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 419; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 170; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 30; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 368; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 283.

    Google Scholar 

  99. See 5.08 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  100. In this instance, the court below, rather than conduct the entire proceeding de novo, needs merely to correct its error. After correction, the judgment may again be appealed. See 2 E. Redenti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 418; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 283.

    Google Scholar 

  101. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 354, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  102. See 11.24 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  103. A case is reactivated pursuant to Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 125. See 11.19 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  104. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 353, paras. 1, 2; art. 354, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  105. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 307, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  106. On review in the Corte di cassazione, see generally P. Calamandrei, La Cassazione civile (Torino, Bocca, 2 vols., 1920) (vol. 1 describes the history of review in cassazione and provides a comparative discussion); G. Calogero, La Logica Del Giudice E Il Suo Controllo In Cassazione (Padova, Cedam 1937); P. Calamandrei, Cassazione civile, Ii Nuovo Digesto Italiano 981 (Torino, Utet 1937); P. Calamandrei & C. Furno, op. cit. supra note 4; S. Satta, Corte di cassazione (diritto processuale civile), X. Enciclopedia Del Diritto 797 (Milano, Giuffrè 1962); E. Fazzalari, Il Giudizio Civile Di Cassazione (Milano, Giuffrè 1960).

    Google Scholar 

  107. In addition, Article 111 provides that any order affecting personal liberties may be reviewed. The article excepts from its coverage judgments of military tribunals during wartime. Laws limiting the right to review that were enacted prior to the Constitution and not repealed are deemed no longer effective. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 292. The Corte di cassazione has given article 111 an expansive interpretation, holding not only that any judgment (sentenza), but also that ordinanze and decreti that have a decisive effect, may be reviewed. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario Al Codice Di Procedura Civile (part 2) 216–17 (Milano, Vallardi 1959–62); Cannelloni v. Fallimento Ruggieri, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 10, 1962, No. 2544, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 156 (1962); Martinelli v. Brollo, Corte di cassazione, May 14, 1962, No. 1003, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile, No. 157 (1962); I. M. I. v. Banca nazionale del lavoro, Corte di cassazione, April 4, 1962, No. 703, Repertorio Giustizia civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 158 (1962); Cosimi v. Proietti, Corte di cassazione, March 29, 1962, No. 652, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 159; Polimeni v. Amministrazione Ferrovie dello Stato, Corte di cassazione, May 9, 1962, No. 927, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 162 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  108. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 360, para. 1. For purposes of review, decisions rendered in the form of ordinanze and decreti that should have been in the form of sentenze are deemed sentenze. S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 375. Article 360 excludes non-appealable judgments of the conciliatori from review in the Corte di cassazione. However, this exclusion is deemed unconstitutional. Di Salvo v. Stimolo, Corte di cassazione, Feb. 9, 1962, No. 271, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 163 (1962). See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 439; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 374; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 35; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 292. Since judgments that validate foreign judgments are rendered by courts of appeal, and no appeal is permitted, they are reviewable in the Corte di cassazione without a prior appeal. Judgments rendered after proceedings for revocation of, and third party opposition against, appellate judgments are reviewable in the Corte di cassazione without further appeal. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 403; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 292.

    Google Scholar 

  109. According to article 360, paragraph 2 of the Codice Di Procedura Civile, stipulations of this kind are authorized only when review is sought on the ground of violation or misapplication of law, one of the five grounds for review. The Corte di cassazione has held that this limitation is unconstitutional. This holding seems erroneous. See V. Andrioli, op. cit. supra note 64, at 152–53.

    Google Scholar 

  110. 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 440; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part 2), op. cit. supra note 107, at 219; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 293.

    Google Scholar 

  111. Turin, Florence, Rome, Naples, and Palermo.

    Google Scholar 

  112. The law explicitly states that this is the function of the Court. Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 65.

    Google Scholar 

  113. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 374, 376. When the Court sits in united sections, fifteen rather than seven judges participate. Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 67.

    Google Scholar 

  114. On the authority of precedent, see P. Cai.Amandrei, op. cit. supra note 5; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 32–33; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 372; V. Colesanti, Giurisprudenza, Vii Novissimo Digesto Italiano 1101 (Torino, Utet 1961).

    Google Scholar 

  115. The manner in which decisions are published is another indication of the Italian lawyers’ approach. Law is often considered a sort of “pure form” to be applied mechanically by purely logical processes without references to the pecularities of the factual setting. In modern Italian doctrine there is a strong current of rebellion, led by such leading figures as Piero Calamandrei and Tullio Ascarelli, questioning this approach and the adequacy of traditional logic as the sole tool for interpreting law. See G. Calogero, op. cit. supra note 106, passim. Many modern legal scholars regard interpretation of law as a creative process that must consider the concrete factual circumstances before making a responsible choice from among conflicting interpretations. See M. Cappelletti, L’attività e i poteri del giudice costituzionale in rappporto con il loro fine generico, Iii Scritti Giuridici In Memoria Di P. Calamandrei 83, 128 et seq. (Padova, Cedam 1958).

    Google Scholar 

  116. On publications of decisions and headnotes, see 1.43 supra. On the office charged with the drafting of headnotes (ufficio del massimario), see Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 68.

    Google Scholar 

  117. See 4.13 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  118. See 3.01.e supra.

    Google Scholar 

  119. See, e.g., 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 290.

    Google Scholar 

  120. Constitution art. 111, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  121. Constitution art. 111, para. 3. See 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 293; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 223.

    Google Scholar 

  122. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 362, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  123. On the powers of, and access to, the Constitutional Court, see 4.34–4.35 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  124. On the supremacy of the Corte di cassazione in the Italian judicial system, see 2 P. Calamandrei, Istituzioni Di Diritto Processuale Civile 50–51 (Padova, Cedam 1943); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 289.

    Google Scholar 

  125. Exceptions are discussed at 4.33 at note 184, and 4.13 at note 117 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  126. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 363, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  127. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 446; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 373; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 164–65; E. T. Liebman Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 36; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 292.

    Google Scholar 

  128. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 70, para. 2. See 5.10 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  129. See 10.07.j infra.

    Google Scholar 

  130. See 10.06.d supra.

    Google Scholar 

  131. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 361.

    Google Scholar 

  132. A discussion of judgments of special courts is beyond the compass of this book. On the special courts, see 4.36–4.38 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  133. See generally P. Calamandrei, La teoria dell’ “error in iudicando” nel diritto italiano intermedio, I P. Calamandrei, Studi Sul Processo Civile 53 (Padova, Cedam 1930); id., Sulla distinzione tra error in iudicando ed error is procedendo, Ibid., at 213. When judgments are rendered pursuant to equità (see 9.05 supra), since the court is not required to apply the rules of substantive law, only procedural errors may be advanccd as grounds for review. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 218–19; 2 G. A. Micheli, op. cit. supra note 13, at 292.

    Google Scholar 

  134. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 444; Amministrazione Ferrovie dello Stato v. Santinello, Corte di cassazione, April 11, 1960, No. 826, X Giustizia Civile (part I) 878 (1960) (note M. Cappelletti).

    Google Scholar 

  135. For example, according to article 38, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defense of lack of subject matter competence because of the value of the case in controversy may be raised at any time during proceedings in the court of first instance. Failure to raise the defense in the appellate court precludes the parties from raising the defense in the Corte di cassazione. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 13, at 182; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 219.

    Google Scholar 

  136. An erroneous determination that giurisdizione existed occurs when: (1) the power to determine the issues of the case was vested in the executive or legislative branches of government; (2) that power was vested in a special court; or (3) no Italian organ had power to determine the issues. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 173–74. This ground for review is distinct from the proceeding known as regolamento di giurisdizione discussed at 4.13 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  137. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 42. See 10.05 supra; 4.33 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  138. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 43; art. 360(2).

    Google Scholar 

  139. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 360(4).

    Google Scholar 

  140. Constitution art. 111, para. 1; Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 132, para. 2(4). See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 175–76; 2 E. Redenti, op. cit, supra note 13, at 445.

    Google Scholar 

  141. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 112. See 9.06 supra; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, opp. cit. supra note 13, at 444; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 205–06; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 294.

    Google Scholar 

  142. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 442–43; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64. at 156; 2 G. A. Micheli. Corso op. cit. supra note 13 at 294.

    Google Scholar 

  143. If the decision did not rely on the improperly admitted evidence, an application for review based on the improper admission of the evidence would be denied. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 178.

    Google Scholar 

  144. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 164 (courts of first instance); art. 359 (appellate courts). See 7.15 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  145. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 159. See 7.14 supra, at notes 125–26.

    Google Scholar 

  146. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 178–79; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 202–03; V. Andrioli, Appunti, Op. cit. supra note 64, at 155; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 295–97.

    Google Scholar 

  147. On custom and usage as sources of law, see Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 8–9.

    Google Scholar 

  148. See 15.23 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  149. See 9.04 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  150. Article 360 (5), as originally enacted, permitted only omission of explanation as a ground for review. See V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 157–61; 2 S. Satta, CommentariO (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 207; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 298.

    Google Scholar 

  151. See 2 F. Carnelutti, op. cit. supra note 24, at 175–77; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 446; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 191, 207; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 298–99.

    Google Scholar 

  152. See 10.03.c supra. The application, like any impugnazione, is deemed made when served upon the adversary. 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 447.

    Google Scholar 

  153. See 10.03.e supra.

    Google Scholar 

  154. See 10.03.f supra. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 371 provides more detailed rules. A cross-application must be based on grounds upon which an application may be made. It is made in the same paper with a controricorso, discussion of which follows in the text. The rules of Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 364, 365, 366, and 369, which apply to applications, are also applicable to cross-attacks.

    Google Scholar 

  155. See Salerno v. Soc. S.E.T., Corte di cassazione, Dec. 21, 1962, No. 3405, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 8 (1962) (a controricorso is to be used to advance legal arguments countering those made in the application and may not be used to attack a judgment). An applicant on whom a cross-application has been served may file a controricorso to the cross-application. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 371, para. 4.

    Google Scholar 

  156. If the applicant fails to elect domicile at a Rome address, service is made by filing the controricorso with the office of the clerk of the Corte di cassazione. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 301.

    Google Scholar 

  157. See text at notes 174–175 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  158. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 370.

    Google Scholar 

  159. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 364, para. 1. Exception is made for special circumstances, such as legal aid, labor, and social security cases. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 364, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  160. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 381.

    Google Scholar 

  161. 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part 2), op. cit. supra note 107, at 228–29; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 300; Meli v. Angilieri, Corte di cassazione, July 25, 1962, No. 2099, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 37 (1962) (the deposit constitutes a penalty to inhibit baseless applications). An attack on the constitutionality of the requirement of a deposit has been held to be “manifestly unfounded.” Corte di Cassazione, Nov. 9, 1961, No. 2597, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 31 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  162. See note 170 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  163. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 369. In addition to the deposit, certain other trivial amounts must be paid to the clerk for expenses and taxed paper. Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 38, 135, 137.

    Google Scholar 

  164. See 2.03.b supra.

    Google Scholar 

  165. Codice Di Procedura Cilive arts. 365, 83.

    Google Scholar 

  166. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 366, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  167. If the names of the parties are not placed in the heading of the application but are found in the body, the application may not be dismissed. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 299; Fallimento Giovannelli v. Soc. Rapsider, Corte di Cassazione, Aug. 22, 1959, No. 2544, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 111 (1959).

    Google Scholar 

  168. The exact statutory provisions need not be cited as long as they can be deduced from the text of the application. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 186; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 300; Vallarino v. I.N.P.S., Corte di cassazione, Dec. 15, 1962, No. 3379, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 173 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  169. The power of attorney may, instead, be placed at the foot of the application, in which case it may be authenticated by the party’s procuratore. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 83, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  170. This requirement is in addition to the requirement that the receipt be attached. Considering the trivial amount of the required deposit the penalty of dismissal for failure to comply with this requirement seems excessive. From the large number of reported cases reaching this result, it would seem that many lawyers are unaware of the requirement. The court has interpreted this provision with a rigidity worthy of a better cause. See, e.g., Garoglio v. Marocco, Corte di cassazione, March 9, 1962, No. 463, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 184 (1962) (an allegation that the receipt for the deposit is attached is insufficient without further identification of the receipt; case dismissed) For criticism of the excessive formalism of the court on this point, see 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part 2), op. cit. supra note 107, at 229–30; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 162.

    Google Scholar 

  171. Domicile is usually elected at the attorney’s office. Attorneys who have no office in Rome frequently associate themselves with a Roman colleague for the prosecution of cases in the Corte di cassazione.

    Google Scholar 

  172. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 366, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  173. On the rules of service, see 10.03.d supra.

    Google Scholar 

  174. Instead, a decree admitting to the benefits of legal aid may be annexed.

    Google Scholar 

  175. Co Dice Di Procedura Civile art. 369. In addition, the applicant must take steps to have the official file of the court below (see 7.26 supra) transmitted to the Cortedicassazione. For details on this and related rules, see Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 369; Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 134–135, 137–142.

    Google Scholar 

  176. See 10.07.j infra.

    Google Scholar 

  177. See 9.11 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  178. CoDice Di Procedura Civile art. 373. The suspension is ordered in the form of an ordinanza, which serves as a provisional remedy in the sense that that term is used in 6.02 supra. Prior to the amendment of article 373 in 1950, the power to suspend execution was vested in the Corte di cassazione. To reduce the court’s workload, the power was transferred to the court below. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 306–07. The provision is criticised by 2 F. CaRnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 189–90.

    Google Scholar 

  179. However, exceptiones facti (see 8.04.e supra) which may be raised by a court on its own motion on any stage and level of the proceeding, such as lack of subject matter competence (see 4.32 supra) may be considered by the Corte di cassazione, whether or not the parties have raised them in the application or cross-application. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 182–83, 185; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 441, 449; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 302, 305.

    Google Scholar 

  180. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 453, 461; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 314. A party may, however, withdraw his application or crossapplication at any time before the commencement of oral argument. The withdrawal must be made in a writing subscribed by the party and his attorney, or by the attorney alone if he has been given specific written authority to withdraw. The withdrawal may be made unilaterally without the adversary’s consent. Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 390–391.

    Google Scholar 

  181. Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 66.

    Google Scholar 

  182. Instead of setting a date for public oral argument, the president may set a date for a meeting of the adjudicating panel in chambers. Without oral argument, the panel, in chambers, may: (1) dismiss the application on procedural grounds (inammissibilità or improcedibilità); (2) reject the application because it is not founded on one of the grounds upon which review is permitted; (3) order that necessary parties be joined; or (4) declare the case discontinued by the withdrawal of the applicant. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 375, para. 1. If a meeting in chambers is scheduled for this purpose, the pubblico ministero must serve his opinion (conclusioni) upon the attorneys at least twenty days before the meeting. The attorneys may file briefs within five days prior to the meeting. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 375, para. 2; Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 138. As in the case of appeals, if the application is dismissed as inammissibile or improcedibile, it may not be reinstituted even if the time for making an application has not expired. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 387.

    Google Scholar 

  183. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 377.

    Google Scholar 

  184. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 378; Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 140. The briefs may not assign new errors. 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 263; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 304; Boletti v. Tosi, Corte di cassazione, July 19, 1962, No. 1942, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 6 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  185. The voidness of a judgment may depend upon facts not in the record; for example, lack of legal capacity of a party. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 452.

    Google Scholar 

  186. The application or controricorso may be inammissibile on grounds appearing neither on the face of the document nor from the file of the case. For example, the applicant may, outside the proceeding, have waived his right to apply for review. 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 452. Conversely, a party may introduce documentary evidence to show that he is the successor in interest to a party in the proceeding and consequently entitled to seek review of the judgment below. Gagliardi v. I.N.A.I.L., Corte di cassazione, July 6, 1962, No. 1739, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Cassazione civile No. 27 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  187. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 372. For an expansive interpretation of this rule, see 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 183–84.

    Google Scholar 

  188. Evidence may, however, be taken of law that is not part of the common experience of judges, including foreign law, custom, and ancient law. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 304–05. See 15.23 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  189. The panel consists of seven judges. If the case is before united sections, the panel consists of fifteen judges.

    Google Scholar 

  190. See 9.02 supra; 10.07.h at note 158 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  191. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 379.

    Google Scholar 

  192. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 380; Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, art. 76.

    Google Scholar 

  193. Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 141. Since the drafter (estensore) of the opinion is identified in the published decision, his vote is not secret.

    Google Scholar 

  194. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 324; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 32, 39; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 310.

    Google Scholar 

  195. On the distinction between dispositivo and motivazione, see 9.04 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  196. If the judgment has been attacked only in part, it is reversed only in part. However, “a partial reversal is effective even as to parts of the judgment that are dependent on the part reversed.” Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 336, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  197. Appellate judgments or non-appealable judgments are enforceable. See 9.11 supra. If there is a remand, the request for restitution or other remedial action must be addressed to the court to which the case is remanded. If there is no remand, the request is made to the court that rendered the reversed judgment. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 389. The request is made by serving a citation on the adverse party. Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 144.

    Google Scholar 

  198. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 382, para. 3.

    Google Scholar 

  199. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 382, paras. 1, 2.

    Google Scholar 

  200. One author has raised the question of the constitutionality of this provision in the light of article 25, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, which provides that “no one may be deprived of his natural judge as previously designated by law.” A. Pizzorusso, La competenza del giudice come materia coperta da riserva di legge, Cxv Giurisprudenza Italiana (part I, sec. I) col. 1313, 1321. However, the purposes for which this provision was placed in the Constitution are far removed from the rules regarding remand. Difficulties ensue under the 1950 amendments to the Code which permit review of partial judgments. If a partial judgment is appealed, reviewed in the Corte di cassazione, and reversed and remanded to a different court of appeal, it is uncertain whether that court may hear a subsequent appeal from the later judgment of the court of first instance. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 468 (affirmative answer).

    Google Scholar 

  201. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 196; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 173; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 312.

    Google Scholar 

  202. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 383, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  203. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 383, para. 3. Since no discretion is involved, it is perhaps inappropriate to consider this a remand rather than a mere indication of the court in which proceedings may be resumed. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 465, 473; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 274.

    Google Scholar 

  204. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 360 (3).

    Google Scholar 

  205. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 384, para. 1; Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 143. See E. Redenti, Il giudicato sul punto di diritto, Ii Scritti Giuridici In Onore Di F. Carnelutti 691 (Padova, Cedam 1930); V. Andrioli, Ilprincipio di diritto enunciato dalla Corte di cassazione, Vii Rivista Di Diritto Processuale (part I) 279 (1952); G. A. Micheli, L’enunciazione del principio di diritto da parte della Corte di cassazione e il giudicato sul punto di diritto, X Rivista Di Diritto Processuale (part I) 26 (1955).

    Google Scholar 

  206. See, e.g., V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 175. However, it is still permissible to question the constitutionality of the law applied by the Corte di cassazione. See, e.g., 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 203. But see 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 317.

    Google Scholar 

  207. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 393. The decision is binding in no other case. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 467–68; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 276; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 42–43; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 321.

    Google Scholar 

  208. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 450.

    Google Scholar 

  209. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 385. Costs are assessed in accordance with the rules given at 9.10 supra. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 197. But see 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 464.

    Google Scholar 

  210. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 315; Parascandalo v. Di Lella, Corte di cassazione, May 9, 1960, No. 1058, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Giudizio di rinvio in mat. civ. No. 4 (1960). There exist two monographs on proceedings on remand which were written before the present code was enacted. G. Pavanini, Contributo Allo Studio Del Giudizio Civile Di Rinvio (Padova, Cedam 1937); R. Provinciali, Il Giudizio Di Rinvio (Padova, Cedam 1936).

    Google Scholar 

  211. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 392, para. 1. On filing of judgments, see 9.08 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  212. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 392, para. 2. Personal service, as that term is used in article 392, embraces all manner of service, including substituted service, but excludes service on the party’s attorney pursuant to article 330.

    Google Scholar 

  213. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 393. On grounds for discontinuance generally, see 11.20–11.26 infra. Under the prior Code it was a debatable question whether, upon discontinuance of proceedings on remand, the judgment that was reversed was restored to effectiveness. Article 393 makes clear that there is no such restoration. See, e.g., 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 203–04; S. Satta, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 47, at 376; id., 2 Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 301–02; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 320.

    Google Scholar 

  214. See 10.07.n supra.

    Google Scholar 

  215. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 394, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  216. Since only part of the judgment may have been reversed, the “renewal” may be only partial.

    Google Scholar 

  217. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 315; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 42.

    Google Scholar 

  218. See 10.06.f. supra.

    Google Scholar 

  219. For example, in a suit by P against D, the defense of the statute of limitations is raised and upheld through the appellate level, but disallowed by the Corte di cassazione. Upon remand, evidence on other issues of the case may be taken if in the prior proceedings the evidence offered was not accepted because of the court’s reliance on D’s defense of the statute of limitations. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 42; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 318–19.

    Google Scholar 

  220. Consequently, the parties are barred from modifying their claims or defenses and from introducing new claims and defenses. They are also barred from adducing evidence not previously profferred, with the exception (Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 394, para. 3) that a decisory oath may be requested. See 2 E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 41. But see 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 318–19 (evidence that the court may order on its own motion is not barred); 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 201–02 (any new evidence may be profferred). Exceptiones facti that may be considered by a court on its own motion (8.04.e supra) are not barred, even if not previously raised. Consequently, it has been argued that evidence may be introduced to establish such a defense. M. Cappelletti, Nuovi fatti giuridici ed eccezioni nuove nel giudizio di rinvio, Xiii Rivista Trimestrale Di Diritto E Procedura Civile 1610 (1959); 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 319.

    Google Scholar 

  221. On revocation, see generally A. Attardi, La Revocazione (Padova, Cedam 1959); G. De Stepano, La Revocazione (Milano, Giuffrè 1957); G. Zani, La revocazione e l’opposizione di terzo nel nuovo codice di procedura civile, Xix Rivista Di Diritto Processuale Civile (part I) 265 (1942).

    Google Scholar 

  222. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 496.

    Google Scholar 

  223. On the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary forms of impugnazione, see 10.02 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  224. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395, para. 1. Judgments of the Corte di cassazione are not subject to revocation. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 210.

    Google Scholar 

  225. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 396, para. 1. If the facts upon which extraordinary revocation may be based are discovered during the period of time in which an appeal may be taken, appeal is the exclusive remedy, but the time within which an appeal may be commenced is extended. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 396, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  226. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 319; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 323. See also 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 495. On partial judgments, see 9.09 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  227. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398, para. 1. This rule distinguishes revocation and third party opposition from other forms of attack.

    Google Scholar 

  228. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 402.

    Google Scholar 

  229. See 10.03.c supra.

    Google Scholar 

  230. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (4).

    Google Scholar 

  231. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 491; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 44. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 205–06, points out that the distinction between this ground of revocation and the grounds for the correction of errors on the face of the judgment (errori materiali) sometimes cannot be drawn. Grounds for correction of errors involve mistakes of the court in manifesting its intent, while this ground for revocation involves a mistake that is not merely of manifestation of intent. The distinction is drawn in Chimenti v. Soc. Zurigo, Corte di cassazione, May 11, 1962, No. 1029, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 19 (1962); Marinelli v. Monte Paschi Siena, Corte di cassazione, July 4, 1962, No. 1688, id. No. 17; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 331.

    Google Scholar 

  232. Bossi v. Baldracchi, Corte di cassazione, Aug. 2, 1961, No. 1855, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 31 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  233. In the event the location of Blackacre in relation to Whiteacre was a point in controversy, an erroneous determination is not a ground for revocation. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 324.

    Google Scholar 

  234. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (5).

    Google Scholar 

  235. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 491–92; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 44; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 332; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 186; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 295–96; 324–25. If the aggrieved party fails to attack the judgment, it will become res judicata and take precedence over the prior inconsistent judgment. See 9.13.f suPra; 2 S. Satta. supra. at 331.

    Google Scholar 

  236. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (1). See generally C. Marchetti, Dolo revocatorio e falsa allegazione, Xv Rivista Di Diritto Processuale 418–45 (1960).

    Google Scholar 

  237. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 207; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 325.

    Google Scholar 

  238. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326.

    Google Scholar 

  239. See Bevilacqua v. Bevilacqua, Corte di cassazione, June 9, 1962, No. 1442, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 13 (1962) (failure to inform the court of the existence of a document that would be favorable to the adversary party is not a ground for revocation).

    Google Scholar 

  240. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 322 and cases cited. This follows from the prevailing view that parties are under no duty to tell the truth. See 7.09 supra. In addition, article 395 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally given a restrictive interpretation.

    Google Scholar 

  241. See E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 45; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 188; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 325. See 7.09 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  242. If, for example, as a result of promises or threats by a party, a witness did not testify. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 206–07.

    Google Scholar 

  243. The exception is based on the rule that party oaths are inadmissible when the subject matter of the oath involves illegality (fatto illecito). See 8.22 supra, at note 215; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326.

    Google Scholar 

  244. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (2).

    Google Scholar 

  245. Brigidi v. Società Pacilli, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 17, 1962, No. 3385, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 33 (1962); Mitidieri v. Fall. Petrocelli, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 24, 1962, No. 122, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 34 (1962); 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 324; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 188. Contra, 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326 (it is sufficient if the recognition is made by the person responsible for the evidence; e.g., the witness who testified falsely). For still another interpretation of the provision, see 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 209–10.

    Google Scholar 

  246. See, e.g., 8.10.a supra.

    Google Scholar 

  247. E.g., a judgment convicting a witness of perjury. Codice Penale art. 372.

    Google Scholar 

  248. The time within which the application for revocation may be made commences to run from the time the judgment that declares the evidence to be false becomes res judicata. Brigidi v. Società Pacilli, supra note 245.

    Google Scholar 

  249. Codice Civile art. 2738, para. 1. See also 8.22.f supra. The exclusion has been criticized. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 207, 209; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 46.

    Google Scholar 

  250. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (3). The term within which the application must be made commences from the date on which the applicant obtained possession of the document (2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 327) or obtained sufficient information about the document (8.49.e supra) to obtain an order for its production.De Gori v. De Gori, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 12, 1962, No. 2943, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 9 (1962); 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 333–34. Documentary evidence includes tangible evidence other than documents. See 8.07 supra. Although the law speaks of “decisive” documentary evidence, it has been held that the evidence need not be conclusive, but that it is sufficient that it might have materially affected the outcome if introduced during the proceeding. Mainini v. Rivolta, Corte di cassazione, Nov. 7, 1961, No. 2579, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 9 (1961).

    Google Scholar 

  251. E.g., lack of knowledge that a decedent has left a will.

    Google Scholar 

  252. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326.

    Google Scholar 

  253. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 326–27. However, this view has not found wide acceptance.

    Google Scholar 

  254. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 395 (6). On judicial civil liability for fraud, see 3.08 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  255. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 206; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 495; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 327. Although the court that rendered judgment is also competent in revocation proceedings, naturally the application must be considered by a judge or judges who were not parties to the fraud. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 213. Judicial fraud was not a ground for revocation under the previous (1865) code, but was ground for an action for damages against the judge. 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 206. Instances of judicial fraud have been extremely rare. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 495; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 46.

    Google Scholar 

  256. See text at note 243 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  257. He is a necessary party to certain cases involving the public interest and over which the parties lack full powers of disposition. See 5.10 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  258. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 397 (1). See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 337–38; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 190.

    Google Scholar 

  259. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 397 (2). See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 496; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 211; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 327–28.

    Google Scholar 

  260. If revocation is sought on the first ground, the time within which the pubblico ministero may bring a proceeding for revocation commences from the time he receives notice of the judgment; if on the second ground, from the time he discovers the collusion. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 339; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 190.

    Google Scholar 

  261. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 72. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 328.

    Google Scholar 

  262. See 5.10 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  263. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  264. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  265. See 7.08 supra. Similarly, the general rules governing the manner in which defective citations may be cured are applicable. See 7.15 supra; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 191; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 328.

    Google Scholar 

  266. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398, para. 3. See 10.07.h supra.

    Google Scholar 

  267. See 7.10–7.13 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  268. The case is dismissed (becomes improcedibile) if he fails to file.

    Google Scholar 

  269. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 399, paras. 1, 2. For special rules before the conciliatore and pretore, see art. 399, para. 3; art. 314. Although the law is silent on the point, it seems that the answer may contain a crossdemand for revocation. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 330.

    Google Scholar 

  270. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 329.

    Google Scholar 

  271. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 171, paras. 2, 3 (by implication). On contumacia, see 11.01–11.08 infra.

    Google Scholar 

  272. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 396. See 10.09.a supra.

    Google Scholar 

  273. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 398, para. 4. On the clerk’s notice of filing of the judgment (comunicazione della sentenza), see 9.08 supra. When a suspension terminates, time limitations do not commence to run de novo, but recommence from the point at which they were suspended. Mele v. Sepe, Corte di cassazione, Dec. 29, 1962, No. 3446, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di) No. 40 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  274. It is argued that the request may be made subsequent to the citation. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 330.

    Google Scholar 

  275. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 401. The court order serves as a provisional remedy. See 6.02 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  276. A similar rule applies when an application is pending for review in the Corte di cassazione. See 10.07.i supra.

    Google Scholar 

  277. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 331.

    Google Scholar 

  278. See 10.06.j supra. Since there is no statutory bar, a proceeding dismissed on procedural grounds may be recommenced if the time within which the proceeding must be brought has not expired. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 329. Contra, V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 193. Cf. also Codice Di Procedura Civile arts. 358, 387, barring the reinstitution of appeals and applications for review in the Corte di cassazione.

    Google Scholar 

  279. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 402, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  280. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 402, para. 2. If property is transferred pursuant to a judgment and subsequently transferred to bona fide purchasers, specific restitution may not be available. See Codice Civile arts. 1153, 1445 (rights of bona fide purchasers); arts. 2652 (9), 2690 (6) (filing of lis pendens notice of demand for revocation). See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 331. Damages may be granted in lieu of restitution.

    Google Scholar 

  281. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 402, para. 3. If the proceeding is discontinued (see 1 1.21–1 1.27 infra) at this stage, the vacated judgment is not reinstated. All proceedings taken are ineffective. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 332.

    Google Scholar 

  282. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 330; Pasini v. Brunetti, Corte di cassazione, Jan. 29, 1953, No. 234, Repertorio Giurisprudenza Italiana, heading: Revocazione (giudizio di)No. 54 (1953).

    Google Scholar 

  283. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 330.

    Google Scholar 

  284. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 331. But see 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 344.

    Google Scholar 

  285. See 9.10 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  286. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 403, para. 1, so states. However, if new grounds for revocation supervene or are subsequently discovered, a new demand for revocation will be entertained. 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 499; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 320.

    Google Scholar 

  287. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 403, para. 2. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 499–500.

    Google Scholar 

  288. In addition to treatment in works on civil procedure in general and on impugnazioni in particular, see on third party opposition generally G. Zani, op. cit. supra note 221; G. Benettin, Appunti in tema di opposizione di terzo, Iv Rivista Trimestrale Di Diritto E Procedura Civile 402 (1950). See also E. T. Liebman, Efficacia Ed Autorità Della Sentenza (Milano, Giuffrè 2d ed. 1962); E. Allorio, La Cosa Giudicata Rispetto Ai Terzi 307–24 (Milano, Giuffrè 1935); F. G. Lipari, Caratteri e presupposti dell’opposizione di terzo, Iii Rivista Di Diritto Processuale Civile (part I) 21 (1926).

    Google Scholar 

  289. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 324.

    Google Scholar 

  290. See 10.02 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  291. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 405, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  292. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, Op. cit. supra note 24, at 216; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 508, 509; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 340. But see 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op cit. supra note 107, at 369–71.

    Google Scholar 

  293. Even partial judgments may be attacked by third party opposition. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 508.

    Google Scholar 

  294. See 9.13.b supra.

    Google Scholar 

  295. See 5.08 supra. Persons who would be entitled to bring third party opposition are permitted to intervene on appeal. See 10.06.g supra. A person who intervenes either in the court of first instance or in the appellate court is barred from initiating third party opposition. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 338.

    Google Scholar 

  296. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 216, 218; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 50; V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 201; Giuliano v. Salvatore, Corte di cassazione, June 14, 1962, No. 1485, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Opposizione di terzo No. 1 (1962).

    Google Scholar 

  297. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 216; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 336–37.

    Google Scholar 

  298. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 404, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  299. Judgments are often enforceable before they become res judicata, either by force of a clause permitting provisional enforcement (see 9.11 supra), or by force of the rule that makes judgments enforceable when rendered on appeal or when no appeal is available (see 12.02 infra). If a judgment contains a clause permitting provisional enforcement which is subsequently deleted (see 9.11 supra, at note 74), an attack by third party opposition must be rejected since an essential precondition is lacking. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Is Tituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 216–17; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 339. However, the opponent may reinitiate the attack when the judgment again becomes enforceable. Since third party opposition is permitted against judgments that are appealable, it is possible that an appeal by a party and opposition by a stranger are pending simultaneously. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 216; V. Andrioli, op. cit. supra note 64, at 195; Andronaco v. Andronaco, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 28, 1960, No. 2927, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Opposizione di terzo No. 1 (1961). The law fails to regulate expressly the procedure to be followed in this instance. It also is silent on the subject of the simultaneous pendency of third party opposition and an application for review in the Corte di cassazione. It seems, however, that, pursuant to article 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one of the forms of attack must be suspended. See 11.10 infra. Contra, 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 362–63. See also V. Andrioli, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 64, at 195–96.

    Google Scholar 

  300. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 404, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  301. Demanio v. Jurca, Corte di cassazione, Oct. 28, 1959, No. 3163, Repertorio Giustizia Civile, heading: Opposizione di terzo No. 4 (1961).

    Google Scholar 

  302. See 10.10.a supra; 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 218; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 337.

    Google Scholar 

  303. 1 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 16, at 201; 2 ibid., op. cit. supra note 13, at 337.

    Google Scholar 

  304. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 505–06; 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 356; E. T. Liebman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13, at 50–51; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 337. Creditors, however, have other remedies, especially the azione revocatoria (Codice Civile arts. 2901–2903) to set aside certain transfers of property and the azione surrogatoria (see 5.06 supra).

    Google Scholar 

  305. It would seem that creditors may oppose the judgment even if their claims are conditional or not yet matured. COdice Civile art. 2901 (by implication). See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 364.

    Google Scholar 

  306. See 2 F. CArnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 206–08. See also 2S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 366.

    Google Scholar 

  307. See 2 F. Carnelutti, Istituzioni, op. cit. supra note 24, at 206–08; 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 505.

    Google Scholar 

  308. See 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 505.

    Google Scholar 

  309. However, if the statute of limitations has run, third party opposition is barred. 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 506–07.

    Google Scholar 

  310. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 325. Judgments of the Corte di cassazione are not subject to third party opposition.

    Google Scholar 

  311. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 326, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  312. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 405, para. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  313. See 7.08 supra.

    Google Scholar 

  314. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 405, para. 2.

    Google Scholar 

  315. See 2 S. Satta, Commentario (part Ii), op. cit. supra note 107, at 367; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 339.

    Google Scholar 

  316. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 406. Consequently, the rules described in chapters 7, 8, and 9 are applicable to third party opposition to judgments of courts of first instance and the rules described in 10.06 supra are applicable to opposition to appellate judgments. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 340. The general rules of evidence also apply. 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 339.

    Google Scholar 

  317. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 407.

    Google Scholar 

  318. The fine varies from 400 to 2,400 lire, depending on the level of the court. Codice Di Procedura Civile art. 408; Disposizioni Di Attuazione Del Codice Civile art. 127. The decision is rendered in the form of a sentenza. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 341.

    Google Scholar 

  319. For more detailed discussion, see 2 E. Redenti, Diritto, op. cit. supra note 13, at 504–05, 507; 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 341–42; E. T. Liesman, Appunti, op. cit. supra note 13 at 52.

    Google Scholar 

  320. See 2 G. A. Micheli, Corso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 342.

    Google Scholar 

  321. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors
  1. Mauro Cappelletti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Joseph M. Perillo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1965 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Cappelletti, M., Perillo, J.M. (1965). Attacks on Judgments: Impugnazioni . In: Civil Procedure in Italy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6273-1_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6273-1_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-017-5825-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-6273-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation