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Toward a Theory of the Dynamics of Conflict

  • Roger L. Sisson
  • Russell L. Ackoff
Part of the World Academy of Art and Science book series (WAAS)

Abstract

The purpose of the research1 reported herein is to develop quantitative theories of escalation and de-escalation of conflict. This research, although emphasizing theory, is grounded in the basic needs of practicing foreign-policy makers. The potential value of an adequate theory to a practitioner is that it predicts the consequences of a contemplated policy. A more powerful theory tells him more precisely when and what actions to take in order to affect its outcome in a desired direction. For example, modern economic theory permits the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board to predict the effect of various monetary and tax policies and to determine when to take fiscal and monetary action, so as to at least partially control economic conditions. The ultimate goal of this research is to develop a theory which will provide similar guidance to statesmen who can affect international conflict situations by diplomatic, trade and military action.

Keywords

Experimental Situation Social Conflict Simple Game Conflict Situation Prediction Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Ackoff, Russell L. Conflict, Cooperation, Competition and Cupid, in: Essays on Econometrics and Planning, Pergamon Press, India, 1964.Google Scholar
  2. Bloomfield, Lincoln P. The Political-Military Exercise; A Progress Report. ORBIS, VIII, 4, 854–870. 1965.Google Scholar
  3. Emshoff, James R. An Analytic Model of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Master’s Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1965.Google Scholar
  4. Fishburn, Peter C. Decision and Value Theory. Wiley, New York, 1964.Google Scholar
  5. Guetzkow, Harold, et al. Simulation in Inter-Nation Relations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963.Google Scholar
  6. Kahn, Herman. On Escalation. Praeger, 1965.Google Scholar
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  9. Richardson, Lewis F. Arms And Insecurity. Boxwood, Pittsburgh, 1960.Google Scholar
  10. Richardson, Lewis F. Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. Quadrangle, Chicago, 1960.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1966

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger L. Sisson
    • 1
  • Russell L. Ackoff
    • 1
  1. 1.University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA

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