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Abstract

I want to suggest, at the outset, that we must approach all claims of universality with caution and trepidation. There can be little doubt that visions of universality and predestination have been intertwined throughout modern history, and have been deployed as the linchpin for advancing narrow, sectarian, and exclusionary ideas and practices. At the purely theoretical level, therefore, we are chastised to look not once, but twice, and again, at universalizing creeds, messages, ideas, and phenomena. This is not to suggest that universality is always wrong-headed, or devious, but it is rather to assume that universality is not a natural phenomenon. In other words, universality is always constructed by an interest for a specific purpose, with a definite intent.

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References

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András Sajó

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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Mutua, M. (2004). The Complexity of Universalism in Human Rights. In: Sajó, A. (eds) Human Rights with Modesty: The Problem of Universalism. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6172-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6172-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-04-13823-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-6172-7

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