Abstract
Soviet legal writers approach the public policy problem as they approach any topic of private international law, in a distinctly dualistic manner. While Western public policy is the object of constant criticism, the public policy manifested in Soviet legislation is either overlooked or promptly justified by pointing to some important social functions it is intended to fulfil.
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References
See infra : English and American systems.
See e.g. Levitin, p. 212.
Even in the most recent studies relating to ordre public this approach is followed. Lunts and Levitin, e.g., accept the German solution that, when a foreign law is rejected as contrary to the public policy of the forum, the lex fori should not necessarily be applicable. While Lunts gives no further explanation of the background to his attitude, Levitin follows a quite different approach. First he explains in general terms that according to the capitalist legal systems the rejected foreign law (for reasons of public policy) is replaced by lex fori. Declaring that such an attitude is unacceptable for the Soviet legal system, he proposes a solution identical with the German one and concludes laconically: “Sometimes the judges of the capita list countries also adhere to such a practice”. As an example Levitin gives here the classic German decision relating to Swiss prescription. See Lunts, I (1959), pp. 236–237; Levitin, pp. 227–228. See more particularities infra: Soviet legal writers on their own system.
In the initial years of the Soviet State there were some indications that the communist government was willing to recognize, though indirectly, a legal community with the other civilized countries, invoking in some official documents “the general principles of international law”. The legal significance of this expression was refuted by the Soviet lawyers at an early stage, however, and since then no opportunity has been missed to emphasize the fundamental difference between the two legal systems — the communist and the capitalist. (On the initial period see: Pereterskii, 1924, pp. 7, 17, 26 et seq; Goikhbarg, p. 9. For the negative attitude of Soviet lawyers with regard to Western legal systems see Feldbrugge, pp. 38–39; Verdam, pp. 229–244.
See Levitin, p. 208.
Pereterskii, Krylov, 1940, pp. 48–49; idem 1959, pp. 57–58; Koretskii. p. 103; Tumanov, pp. 234–235; otherwise Goikhbarg, pp. 44–45.
Koretskii, 1948, p. 102; Lunts 1949, p. 116; Tumanov, p. 231; Levitin goes still further in his criticism, maintaining that even in the earlier periods of development public policy has not always played a progressive role in the West. (levitin, pp. 223–224).
Koretskii, p. 102.
Levitin, p. 210. See also Tumanov, pp. 233–234. For this author the meaning of such concepts are clear enough, but inconsistent with the interests of the Soviet State. With great reluctance and indignation he talks about e.g. Niederer, who declares as contrary to natural justice the laws which encroach upon private property and especially the communist nationalization decrees.
Lunts, 1949, p. 109; Lunts, I (1959), pp. 232–233; Koretskii, pp. 22–103.
Lunts, 1949, p. 108; Lunts, I (1959), pp. 219–220.
Niboyet, III (1944), pp. 488 et seq.
“Pactes sur successions futures” as admitted in Switzerland, but considered contrary to French public policy; the French provision according to which children adopted outside France cannot claim succession rights in France against children born in marriage, etc. See: Niboyet, III (1944), pp. 511, 512.
Niboyet, III (1944), p. 497.
Lunts, I (1959), p. 221; Levitin, p. 213.
Lunts, 1949, p. 109. Otherwise Krylov. He points out that “many theorists correctly mention the changeability of the public policy notion”. See Krylov, 1930, p. 57.
A quite different opinion has been expressed in this connection by some Western legal writers. Neumayer, e.g., says that “cette distinction rend de grands services au développement du conflict des lois”. (Neumayer, p. 54).
Levitin, p. 213; a different attitude was taken by Krylov, who in 1930 declared that the distinction made by Brocher was “absolutely correct” (Krylov, 1930, p. 56).
Pereterskii, Krylov, 1940, pp. 49–50; idem 1959, pp. 58–59; Lunts, 1949, p. 109; idem, 1959. p. 220
See infra: Soviet legal writers on their own system.
Nussbaum, 1939, p. 489.
Lunts, 1949, p. 111; Lunts I (1959), p. 223.
See the introduction.
See infra.
Koretskii, pp. 29 et seq.
“The continental conception of ordre public” says Wolff, “as excluding the application of foreign law reappears in England under the name of public policy”. Or again: “Where there are both English and French authentic teats of a State Treaty the ‘ordre public’ and ‘public policy’ are used as equivalents” (Wolff, p. 176).
Lunts, 1949, p. 112; Lunts I (1959), p. 224. Cf. however Graveson, p. 572.
Koretskii, p. 30.
The principal points of the case of Luther v. Sagor were the following: The Soviet Commissariat of foreign affairs had sold to the British firm Sagor & Co. a quantity of veneer which formerly belonged to the nationaUzed company A.M. Luther. The veneer was stored on Soviet territory when the nationalization took place. The former owner brought an action for recovery of the goods when they arrived in Great Britain, supporting his claim with the argument that the communist nationalization decrees being of a confiscatory character were contrary to British principles of justice and morality. The English Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the ground that the decree involved, being an act of recognized governement, must be respected. In connection with this case a central place in Soviet literature is accorded to the following, not very sound, argument of Scrutton: “It appears a serious breach of international comity if a State is recognized as a sovereign independent State, to postulate that its legislation is contrary to essential principles of justice and morality; such an allegation might well with a susceptible foreign government become a casus belli and should in my view, be the action of the Sovereign through his ministers, and not of the judge”. For the complete text of the decision see: Luther, A.M. v. Sagor & Co., 1921, 3 K.B., 532.
On English practice relating to public policy see: Koretskii, p. 59–62; Lunts, 1949, pp. 112–114; Lunts I (1959), pp. 224–225; Levitin, p. 219.
USA V. Pink, Superintendant of Insurance, Febr., 2, 1942; Am. Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, p. 3Û9 et seq. See also Editorial Comments of “Am. J. of Int. Law”, vol. 36, 1946, p. 275; pp. 277–278.
See the motives of the U.S. Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. Am. Journal of Internat. Law, LVIII (1964), p. 796.
Koretskii, p. 38.
Lunts 1949, p. 115; Lunts I (1959), p. 226; Levitin pp. 223–224.
Koretskii, pp. 56–57.
That is admitted also in the communist literature. See e.g. Lunts, 1949, p. 120; Szászy, Budapest, 1964, p. 168. Reczei, p. 112.
“Ordre public national” according to Pereterskii is incorporated e.g. in circular letter no. 42 of the RSFSR. People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of 12th April, 1922. This instrument provides that: “Legal relations pertaining to property which is located outside of the territory of the RSFSR and connected with it, cannot be judged outside of the confines of the RSFSR under the Russian laws, and they are subject to the effect of the local legislation, regardless of the nationality of the persons involved in such legal relations, even if they are Russian citizens.... However, the limits within which the protection of such rights may be extended shall also be determined by general bases of the concept of law of the Soviet law. No protection may be extended, therefore to claims and acts which though legitimate under the law of the country of a person’s residence, are contrary to the opinions established in the RSFSR as to the limits of what is permissible. This is subject to appraisal in each individual case. (See: Pereterskii, 1924, pp. 28–29. 34–36 et seq. Russian text of the latter citation see idem p. 128. Transi, in English see: Gsovski, I (1948), pp. 300–301. Conf, also Krylov, 1930, p. 56, note 1.
Krylov, 1930, p. 56.
Goikhbarg, p. 20–21.
Pereterskii 1924, p. 30; see also Krylov, 1930, p. 57.
In connection with these general remarks it is of interest to mentibn two East-European attempts at a comparison between Communist and “bourgeois” public policy systems. The first and rather original thesis originates from the Bulgarian scholar Ivan Altanov. Considering the prohibitive and permissive function of public policy, Altanov observes that bourgeois systems use public policy predominantly in its prohibitive function and only very seldom in its permissive function. In the Soviet system on the other hand, it is the permissive function which plays a more important role. (Altanov, p. 23–24). Szászy made a broader comparison, but limited himself to summarizing the opinions of the communist writers, instead of giving his personal views. a. The first difference according to Szászy concerns the definition of the concept of public policy. The majority of authors in the People’s Democracies “see, as do the Germans, the essence of the principle of public policy.....in the reservation clause, in the dismissal of foreign law propter normam externam. ... The concept of public policy is of a purely defensive character and its purpose is to protect from the aspect of general interests the domestic order and political programme of the State. Protection in this sense does not mean the defence of the individual interests and subjective rights but that of the State as a political unit”. b. “The opinions adopted in people’s democratic countries... stress in a much more energetic manner the exceptional character of the use of public policy than is the case in Western literature. ..”. c. “The third principal disagreement between people’s democratic and Western opinions on public policy consists in the fact that the first sees the positive effect of the principle of public policy exclusively and always in the application of the rule of the lex fori and never considers the foreign public policy, whereas in Western countries an increasing number of authors support the view that, if foreign law is precluded, the rules of the foreign State or of a third State should be applied and that in certain cases, foreign public policy should also be considered....” (Szászy, Budapest, 1964, pp. 175–177). Cf. also Szászy, the Hague, 1964, p. 245. As will be seen below, the last conclusion of Szászy does not cover the prevailing opinions of Soviet legal writers.
For the characteristic features of this theory see infra.
Pereterskii, 1924, pp. 27–28; Goikhbarg, p. 44; Krylov, 1930, p. 55 et seq.; Koretskii, p. 23; Lunts 1949, p. 106; Lunts, I (1959), p. 217; Recently Lunts expressed a quite different opinion in his lectures at the Summer Session of the Hague Academy of International Law, (1965); about this new attitude see below.
Pereterskii, 1924, p. 29.
Levitin, pp. 209–210.
Lunts I (1959), pp. 235–236.
Lunts I (1959), p. 238; Levitin, p. 229; Averin, p. 146. This opinion is shared by the lawyers of other communist countries. See e.g. Ionasco, Nestor, pp. 199–200; Jezdic, pp. 189–201. From the Western lawyers see: Hazard, 1963, pp. 133 et seq.; Verdam, pp. 229, 243.
Pereterskii, 1924, pp. 27–28. Similar interpretation has been given by Réczei. He maintains that: “a) der sowjetische Standpunkt bei der Anwendung der Vorbehaltklausel den Inhalt des ausländischen Gesetzes berücksichtigt, b) das ausländische Gesetz nicht nur in dem Falle ausser acht gelassen wird, wenn es einem sowjetischen Gesetz widerspricht, sondern auch dann, wenn es gegen eine, im Gesetz zwar nicht ausgedrückte, doch als eine Grundlage dienende politische Zielsetzung oder gegen die Grundlagen des Sowjetischen Systems verstösst”. (Réczei, p. 113).
Krylov, 1930, p. 59.
Lunts, I (1959). pp. 235–236; Lunts, 1964, pp. 633–634.
Pereterskii, Krylov, 1959, p. 56; see also: Tumanov, pp. 230=231; Levitin, pp. 209–210; Averin, p. 136.
Pereterskii, 1924, p. 29; see also Krylov, 1930. pp. 57–58.
Lunts, I (1959), p. 235; Levitin, p. 227.
See e.g. Pereterskii, 1924, p. 29; Krylov 1930. p. 57; Lunts I (1959), p. 235.
Pereterskii, 1924, p. 31.
Krylov. 1930, pp. 56–57.
Lunts. 1949. p. 124.
Lunts. 1959, p. 236–237.
Levitin, p. 227–228.
(6) Lunts I (1959). pp. 236–237.
(7) Levitin. pp. 228–229.
Pereterskii, 1924, p. 30; of the same opinion: Krylov, 1930, p. 57; Goikhbarg, pp. 45–46.
Lunts, 1949, p. 109; see also this paper, supra: Soviet criticism on Western systems.
Szászy, Budapest, 1964, p. 176.
Pereterskii, Krylov, 1940, p. 47; Lunts I (1959), pp. 55–56; Levitin, pp. 224–226.
Levitin 1960. p. 224. The Soviet assertion regarding the precision and the legislative concretisation of public policy is deemed to have an equal validity for all East-European communist legal systems. See e.g. Ionasco. Nestor, pp. 198–200; Szászy, 1964, p. 176.
See p. 46, note 2.
Von Savigny, 1849. I 349; Engl, transi: Von Savigny, 1869, I 349. The general principle of private international law together with its exceptions are most characteristically presented in the following brief statement of Von Savigny: “Unsere Untersuchung hat bisher dahin geführt, dass auch bei der Entscheidung über solche Rechtsverhältnisse, welche mit verschiedenen unabhängigen Staaten in Berührung kommen, der Richter dasjenige örtliche Recht anzuwenden hat, dem das streitige Rechtsverhältnis angehört ohne Unterschied ob dieses örtliche Recht das einheimische Recht dieses Richters, oder das Recht eines fremden Staates sein mag. Dieser Grundsatz aber musz nunmehr beschränkt werden mit Rücksicht auf manche Arten von Gesetzen, deren besondere Natur einer so freien Behandlung der Rechtsgemeinschaft unter verschiedenen Staaten widerstrebt. Bei solchen Gesetzen wird der Richter das einheimische Recht ausschliessender anzuwenden haben, als es jener Grundsatz gestattet, das fremde Recht dagegen unangewendet lassen müssen, auch wo jener Grundsatz die Anwendung rechtfertigen würde”.
Von Bar, pp. 128–129.
Niboyet, III (1944), p. 490.
Reese, p, 395. See also: De Winter, 1964, p. 332.
(a) Mancini, 1874, pp. 296 et seq.
Brocher, pp. 106 et seq.; Weiss, pp. 392 et seq. For more details see below.
Pillet. 1923, p. 110; See also Pillet, 1929, pp. 407–515.
Dispagnet, p. 13.
Kosters, Dubbink, p. 339.
Raape, p. 93.
Wolff, 1954, pp. 62 et seq.
Dölle, pp. 403, 406–407.
Maury, 1952, pp. 72, 73. Even Battiffol recognizes that under some conditions a conflict rule can be of a public policy nature. Characteristic in this respect is his following remark: “Les regies de conflict de lois sont ainsi certainement d’ordre public en tant qu’elles donnent compétence a la loi francaise au moins en matfere imperative” (Battiffol, 1967, p. 400).
Kahn-Freund, pp. 45–48. A similar attitude has also been taken by Nussbaum. According to this author, the question is of “some independent rules which in reality are outgrowth of the public policy concept, such as the rules on the non-actionability of certain groups of foreign rights” (Nussbaum. 1943, p. 113).
From the long list of lawyers admitting the public policy character of some substantive legal provisions see e.g. the following: Lerebours-Pigeonniere, pp. 255–270; Paulsen, Sovern, p. 1008; Lagarde, pp. 93–94; 129–130; 144, 236–237. From Netherlands literature the following might be mentioned: Hijmans, pp. 209–237; Van Brake, pp. 86–87 et seq.; Deelen, pp. 172–173.
Neumayer, p. 77; De Winter, 1940, pp. 260–261; Idem. 1947, pp. 149–165; Idem, 1964, pp. 354–356.
Nussbaum, 1943, pp. 71–73.
Francescakis, 1958, pp. 13–15; 35; see also Francescakis, 1966, pp. 1–18. Francescakis proceeds from the premise that in each legal system there are two kinds of imperative rules: rules of a public policy character and others, which, although not classed under this category are of such great importance that their non-observance would be detrimental to the very organization of the forum State. The author proposes that the term “lois d’application immediate” be used to indicate both kinds of imperative rules because of their essentially common features: they constitute a reflection of the organization of the State and, as such, they claim an absolute and immediate application (excluding the intervention of any conflict rule). Illustrating his opinion with French law, Francescakis writes: “Il y a donc quelque chose de foncierement commun dans la solution, écrite, de l’article 3, alinéa 1erdu Code Civil, et la solution jurisprudencielle, qui s’appuye sur la notion de lois d’ordre public. D’ou l’idée de réunir ces deux solutions sous l’étiquette commune de ‘lois d’application immédiate’, l’adjective ‘ immédiate’ étant chargé de suggérer que le raisonnement ne passa pas par l’intermédiaire du procédé du conflit de lois tel que la doctrine contemporaine l’envisage” (Francescakis, 1966, p. 4). It must be observed further, that the puristic adherents to the school of Von Savigny have already considered the notion “lois d’application immédiate” in quite a different light. In their opinion the imperative laws brought under this category are divorced altogether from the concept of public policy. Thus for instance Graulich writes: “Puisque la regie d’application immédiate soumet le rapport au droit du for en l’assimilant a un rapport interne, il ne peut évidemment être question de renvoi ni d’ordre public; il en est toutefois de même chaque fois que la régie de conflit aboutit a dégager la compéunce de la loi du for” (Graulich, p. 635).
Lunts, 1964, p. 638.
Frankenstein, 1930, pp. 321 et seq. The basic idea of this thesis can be found, according to Frankenstein, in the distinction made by Von Savigny between cases where forum laws claim an absolute application and those where foreign legal institutions are considered inacceptable (Frankenstein, 1926, p. 193). Similar interpretation of Von Savigny’s teaching is made by Niemeyer: p. 64. The Dutch scholar Kollewijn, however, maintains that it is the Roman school of thought in which this idea, or as the writer calls it this “pearl of great value” originates. (Kollewijn, p. 45, note 1. For more details on this subject see ibid. pp. 29–32; 53–54; 59–60; 81; 132–133).
Louis-Lucas, pp. 393–442. Goldschmidt, pp. 223–244. With regard to the terminology, it is quite interesting to observe that Louis-Lucas introduced the terms “La regle d’ ordre public” as opposed to l’exception d’ordre public”, while Goldschmidt distinguishes between “La clause de réserve”, “les règles directes rigides” and “les règles d’exportation” relating to the latter.
Szászy, The Hague, 1964, pp. 238–239.
Lunts, 1965, pp. 15–16.
Here we are concerned with only one aspect of the scope of public policy. It relates to the categories of persons with respect to which public policy purports to operate. The scope so understood is of great importance for the so-called “positive function” of public policy. It must be distinguished from the scope of the public policy clause as determined by external conditions. To it belongs e.g. the German theory of “Inlandsbeziehung” or “Binnenbeziehung”, according to which the operation of public policy persupposes the existence of a point of contact in the case at issue with the forum territory, so that public policy may not be invoked whenever such a point of contact does not exist. The doctrine admits, however, that there are some exceptions to this principle. See: Kahn, pp. 180–190. Raape, p. 93, especial’)’ note 92a; Lagarde, pp. 55 et seq.). Another current theory is that of the so-called “effet atténué de l’ordre public”, a term which points to its French origin. According to some scholars, a distinction must be made between the acquisition of rights in the forum country and the effect of the rights acquired abroad. Public policy has its full scope of operation only with regard to the former, while with regard to the latter its manifestation is limited only to gravely prejudicial cases; in other words with regard to rights acquired abroad public policy has an ‘effet atténué”. (See: Battiffol, 1967, pp. 415–416; Lagarde, pp. 13–55; For a comparative study on German and French theories see Maury, 1954, pp. 16–23.
Louis-Lucas, pp. 414 et seq. In this connection cf. also Valery, pp. 197 et seq.
Pillet, 1929, pp. 449 et seq.
See e.g. Niboyet, 1928, p. 548.
For more details about the existing doctrines see the comparative study on public policy by Knapp; see also Louis-Lucas, pp. 406 et seq.
Weiss, p. 394.
Codice civile, art. 149: “Il matrimonio non si scioglie che con la morte di uno de coniugi...”.
Vitta, p. 277.
For a brief commentrary on this article see: De Winter, 1952, no. 4238–4239.
Despagnet, pp. 217 et seq.
Frankenstein, 1930, pp. 322 et seq.
See Nussbaum. 1940, pp. 1027–1028; Idem 1943, p. 111.
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Garnefsky, A. (1970). General Part. In: Public Policy in Soviet Private International Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5068-4_2
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