Abstract
In this chapter I propose to consider two important theories — the Kantian and the Thomist natural law theory — according to which a number of principles of absolute obligation may be set out. I shall argue concerning each that the conclusions which are drawn do not follow from the premisses from which they are derived, and that even if they did, they would not be tenable.
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References
Although Kant’s clearest statement of this view is to be found in The Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Benevolent Motives, there can be no doubt that this is also the view of the Groundwork and of the Critique of Practical Reason.
The translations and numbering are those of H. J. Paton in The Categorical Imperative: London, Hutchinson, 1947: pp. 129–130.
See also The Metaphysical Principle of Virtue, 1st Part, Section 16.
H. J. Paton’s translation, The Moral Law, London, Hutchinson, 1948, p. 88.
The Moral Law, p. 89.
The Moral Law, p. 90.
See The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics in The Metaphysic of Ethics, translated by J. W. Semple: Edinburgh, Thomas Clarke, 1836: pp. 35–6.
I am here, for convenience, accepting Ross’s interpretation of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, but this is not essential to my general point, that Kant cannot establish the existence of duties which admit of no exceptions.
The Moral Law: p. 96.
Kant offers an argument which implies that all sexual behaviour, e.g. pre-marital kissing and other morally innocent conduct, is gravely wrong, as treating people as means and not as ends. His explanation as to why intercourse within marriage is not wrong is an ignoratio elenchi, being that in marriage each spouse gives him/herself wholly to the other and receives him/herself wholly back from the other in this reciprocal give and take. This has nothing whatsoever to do with the question. If it did, it would involve admitting, what Kant clearly wished to deny, namely, that permanent homosexual ‘marriages’ are morally permissible. Had Kant considered morally innocent marriages entered into by consenting adults without mutual affection, and purely for the purpose of using the other to reproduce, i.e. using the other simply as a means and not as a rational being, he would have seen that his theory leads to even more paradoxical conclusions. Clearly such conduct is not immoral, even though it may not be admirable.
Foundations of Ethics, Oxford, Clarendon, 1939, p. 173.
There is a suggestion of this view in G. E. M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Philosophy, XXXIII, 1958, pp. 1–19. Many of the objections to be urged against the Thomist theory apply equally to Anscombe’s implied account.
D. G. Ritchie: Natural Rights, London, Allen & Unwin, 1894, pp. 38–41.
See Summa Theologiae, I, II, 94, esp. arts. 4, 5, 6.
J. Maritain: Man and The State: London, Hollis & Carter, (1st edition), 1954: p. 84.
Compare, for instance, his comments in reply to objections in Summa Theologiae, I, II, 94, 5 and I, II, 100, 1.
Compare K. Hörmann: An Introduction to Moral Theology: London, Burns Oates, 1961, with J. A. Ryan and F. J. Boland: Catholic Principles of Politics, New York, Macmillan, 1940: pp. 4–5.
Aquinas seems embarrassed by this apparent implication, namely, that only those who choose celibacy for spiritual reasons are morally justified. See Summa Theologiae, II, II, esp. art. 2.
Summa Theologiae, I, II, 94, 5, ad. 3.
Maritain seems to suggest this of world-wide institutions such as private property, but there seems no reason why his argument might not successfully be modified so as to apply to communities with different institutions. If he had looked more closely at the nature of the institutions of property, (and the different concepts of private property), Maritain may even have been led to the conclusion that each society develops those institutions, including marriage and family institutions, best suited for its members. Conservatives have often so argued in respect of property institutions. See Man and the State, p. 83 (1st Edition).
See Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, II, II, 64, 7; also P. J. Glenn: Ethics: St. Louis, Herder & Co., 1945: pp. 22–3.
Summa Theologiae, III, Suppl. 64.
For a thoughtful, sensitive, sympathetic approach to the morality of homosexuality which contrasts sharply with that of the natural law, resting as the former does on an examination of the facts and a concern for persons, see Iris Murdoch’s “The Moral Decision About Homosexuality”, Humanist, March, 1965, pp. 70–73.
See D. G. Ritchie: Natural Rights, London, Allen and Unwin, 1894, ch. 5.
See for example G. A. Kelly Birth Control and Catholics: London, Robert Hale, 1964: ch. 4.
The object of chewing gum is to have the pleasure of chewing whilst frustrating its purpose. With smoking, breathing is used to achieve the pleasure of smoking in such a way as partially to frustrate its natural end, that of bringing oxygen into the blood stream. By breathing in smoke instead of clean air the natural function of breathing is further interfered with by virtue of the damage done to the lungs. If this arbitrariness is eliminated, smoking, chewing gum, and the like must be condemned as being immoral, as immoral as using artificial methods of birth control. So, too, slimming biscuits must come under grave moral suspicion. This is plainly absurd.
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McCloskey, H.J. (1969). Pluralistic Theories of Absolute Obligation: Kant and Natural Law. In: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5065-3_8
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