Abstract
In the first part of our investigation we explicated the sense predelineated for traditional formal logic by the Aristotelian analytics. Formal logic presented itself as a completely separate science. We brought to light the sharp essential delimitation of its province and likewise the strata-disciplines combined a priori within it by founding We also learned to understand its perfectly correlated and therefore equivalent themes (as formal apophantics and as formal ontology), which allow us to speak of one logic treated in two attitudes.
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References
Author’s note: In any case, this is a fundamental concept of the analytic, the one delimited in the “III. Untersuchung” (Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II). [See particularly §§ 11f. Cf. Farber, op. cit., pp. 283–313, particularly pp. 293–295.]
Author’s note: See § 8, [pp. 33–36,] supra.
Author’s note: See Chapter 6, particularly § 99, [pp. 250 ff., infra]. The reader is also referred in advance to more detailed expositions in publications that are to follow shortly. [Cf. Edmund Husserl, “Phänomenologie and Anthropologie,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. II, No. 1 (September, 1941), pp. 1–14.]
Author’s note: See § 10, [pp. 38 f.,] supra.
Translator’s note: An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, Chap. XX.
Author’s note: The exposition substantiating this distinction, not yet made in the “Prolegomena”, will be offered in my Logische Studien [Logical Studies], which will soon appear. [See Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik (Experience and Judgment: Investigations pertaining to the Genealogy of Logic) ausgearbeitet und herausgegeben von Ludwig Landgrebe, Prag, 1939, and Hamburg, 1948 and 1954, § 64, c), pp. 314–317.]
Author’s note: Irreal objectivities can very well assume an extra-essential relatedness to time, likewise an extra-essential relatedness to space and an extraessential reification.
Author’s note: See § 107, [pp. 283–290,] infra.
Author’s note: As I was misled at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.
Author’s note: See § 44, b, p, [pp. 122–124,] supra.2 Author’s note: See § 45, [p. 126,] supra.
Translator’s note: Reading vorweisenden instead of vorweisende.
Author’s note: Regarding analysis of the constitution of temporal Data, see my Vorlesungen zur Pheinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins [Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time], edited by Martin Heidegger, this Jahrbuch, Bd. IX [(1928; also reprinted separately, Halle, 1928]. [Cf. Farber, op. cit., pp. 512–519.]
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Husserl, E. (1969). Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic. In: Formal and Transcendental Logic. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4900-8_8
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