Abstract
When historians of the future seek to find the authors whose works best express the spirit of new movements in their time, they are bound to note that, to the thinkers of several generations in America, John Dewey was the spokesman for science. While others in the humanities decried the expansion of the sciences, or simply ignored them, Dewey became their friendliest and most ardent advocate. Just as Francis Bacon perceived and urged the importance of developments in the physical sciences during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, so Dewey spoke for the rising biological, psychological, and social sciences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As he did so, the themes of his philosophy became important expressions of a new faith and outlook widely shared both by those who were active in scientific investigations and by those who were sympathetic observers of the scientific scene.
Dewey is not an idealist, he is what an idealist becomes when he incorporates the results of modern biology, psychology, and social science.1
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Literature
Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism (Columbia Studies in Philosophy, No. 4; New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), pp. 18–19.
“From Absolutism to Experimentalism,” p. 19. For an excellent and detailed study, noting the elements in Hegelianism which are retained, modified, and rejected in Dewey’s later philosophy, see Morton G. White’s The Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism. In addition to White’s book, useful information on Dewey’s move from Hegel is provided in the following works: Melvin C. Baker, Foundations of John Dewey’s Educational Theory, “Biography of John Dewey,“ ed. Jane M. Dewey in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, pp. 3-45, esp. pp. 17-18; James Collins, “The Genesis of Dewey’s Naturalism,” in John Dewey: His Thought and Influence, ed. John Blewett (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), pp. 1–32
Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), Ch. 2
Lewis E. Hahn, “Dewey’s Philosophy and Philosophic Method,” in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. JoAnn Boydston (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), Ch. 2; George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, Chs. 3-6
Neil Coughlan, Young John Dewey: An Essay in American Intellectual History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
To my knowledge, no one has traced in detail the development of Dewey’s psychological views. There is much useful information about the changes in his psychological thinking, however, in the studies mentioned in footnote 2. Of these, White’s Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism and Dykhuizen’s The Life and Mind of John Dewey are the most comprehensive. In addition, other valuable sources are: Gordon W. Allport, “Dewey’s Individual and Social Psychology,” in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, pp. 265-290, taken with Dewey’s reply in the same volume, pp. 554-556; Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), Ch. III; Herbert W. Schneider, “Dewey’s Psychology,” in Guide to the Works of John Dewey, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, Ch. 1.
Morton G. White, Origin of Dewey’s Instrumentalism, p. 40. While White carefully documents his assertions, later researches have brought forth evidence that two of his conclusions about influences upon the early Dewey must now be revised.
First, on pages 9-11, White uses R.M. Wenley’s The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris (New York, Macmillan, 1917) to portray Morris as hostile to the new experimental psychology. If this were true, Dewey’s concern with the subject would suggest a sharp divergence from his teacher at an early date—a divergence difficult to reconcile with the ensuing years of personal and intellectual compatibility between the two men at Michigan. Since the publication of White’s book, Marc Edmund Jones has reexamined Morris’ writings, marshaling textual evidence to show Morris as being much more receptive to the sciences than Wenley supposed. (George Sylvester Morris: His Philosophical Career and Theistic Idealism, Philadelphia, David McKay Co., 1948, pp. 161-181.) While Morris may have thought that much of the new psychological research was superficial (Jones, p. 185, suggests that this was true), he would have had no objection to someone pursuing the subject so long as the pursuit ended with the subject safely tamed in idealist harness—the kind of harness which Dewey sought to supply in his early articles and the Psychology.
The second of White’s conclusions which requires revision is his assertion (pp. 7-8, 11) that Peirce exerted no influence whatsoever on Dewey in the early years of Dewey’s development. Here, White has understandably relied upon some of Dewey’s own statements about not being affected by Peirce while at Johns Hopkins. On this point, however, Sidney Ratner cites strong evidence to support the contention that, even though Peirce may not have influenced Dewey at Johns Hopkins, his ideas did work strongly upon him at an earlier time than White supposes. (See “The Evolutionary Naturalism of John Dewey,” p. 443, fn. 14.)
A. A. Roback, History of American Psychology (New York: Library Publishers, 1952). p. 100.
G. Stanley Hall, review of Dewey’s Psychology in The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. I, No. 1 (November, 1887), p. 156.
Letter to William James, dated May 10, 1891, in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1935), Vol. II, p. 517.
Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York: The Century Co., 1933), pp. 201–233; Roback, History of American Psychology, pp. 211-224.
Morton White, Social Thought in America (enl. ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 53.
See Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), An Introduction to the History of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). These themes recur again and again as one reads about the thought of the leading sociologists of this period. As Barnes notes on p. ix, however, there was disagreement among the original leaders about the possibilities of sociology being used for social planning. Comte, Morgan, and Ward stood on the side of the planners; Spencer, Sumner and Gumplowicz were opposed; their followers tended to divide similarly.
Edward Cary Hayes, “Masters of Social Science: Albion Woodbury Small,” Social Forces, Vol. IV, No. 4 (June, 1926), pp. 670–671.
Albion W. Small and George E. Vincent, An Introduction to the Study of Society (New York: American Book Company, 1894). For the stress on the evolution of social institutions, see Book II; for the use of the organic analogy, see Book I, Ch. V, and Books III and IV, passim.
Albion W. Small, “The Significance of Sociology for Ethics,” in The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, First Series, Vol. IV (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903), p. 128.
W.I. Thomas, “The Province of Social Psychology,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. X, No. 4 (January, 1905), p. 446.
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Dewey, R.E. (1977). Scientific Foundations of the Instrumentalist View of Man. In: The Philosophy of John Dewey. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4740-0_3
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