Abstract
Paul Tillich was born in Brandeburg in 1886 and was educated in the German universities. His early academic career was set against the German scene; but since 1933 he has been in America at the Union Theological Seminary of New York. Since September 1955 his work continues at the Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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References
“This man (Tillich) is most significant for theology in the contemporary West. It can be maintained without rashness that he is the most impressive figure in today’s Protestant theology, which is distinguished by many great names both in Europe and America” (G. Weigel, “The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,” in Cross Currents 1956, p. 141)
“Through his lectures and writings Tillich undoubtedly exerts a seminal influence on American Protestantism. His fame is at a peak. Even in the most unexpected quarters the urge to speak a Tillichian language is strong.” (G. H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message; New York: Scribners, 1962, p. 164).
Chicago, University Press, 1951 and 1957. The third volume has not yet appeared. The other basic works for the understanding of Tillich’s theology are as follows: The Protestant Era, Chicago: University Press, 1948; The Courage to Be, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1952; The Shaking of the Foundations, New York: Scribners, 1953; The New Being, New York, Scribners, 1955; The Dynamics of Faith, New York: Harper, 1956.
P. Tillich, “Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,” in Theology of P. Tillich, ed. G. W. Kegley (Macmillan, 1952), p. 333.
P. Tillich, “Theology and symbolism” in Religious Symbolism, ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107–108.
The article first appeared in 1928 in Blätter für Deutsche Philosophie B. I, H. 4. It first appeared in English in 1940 with the title The Religious Symbol in The Journal of Liberal Religion Vol. II (1940), pp. 13–33. It has been recently reedited in Daedalus 1958 (Summer), pp. 3–21.
See especially “Theology and Symbolism” in Religious Symbolism, ed. F. E. Johnson (Harper, 1955), pp. 107–116; “Religious and our Knowledge of God,” The Christian Scholar, XXXVIII (1955), pp. 189–197; “Existential Analysis and Religious Symbol” in Contemporary Problems in Theology, ed. H. A. Basilius (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1956), pp. 35–55. In these essays Tillich treats of the religious symbols in general. In our opinion the best exposition of the doctrine of religious symbolism and its application to the fundamental theological problems is contained in Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper, 1957).
Cf. Liddle-Scott, Greek-English Lexikon “sµßολον”.
Cf. De Interpretationen I, 16a, 4 ff. According to Aristotle the relation between words and concepts is conventional: “We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention. No sound is by nature a noun: it becomes one becoming a symbol. Inarticulate noises mean something — for instance those made by brute beatss. But no noises of that kind are nouns” (De Interpretatione II, 16a, 27 ff.).
Cf. De Sophisticis Elenchis I, 1, 165a, 6–7.
Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philo, I, pp. 115–138.
Cf. Enceclopedia Cattolica, “Simbolo e Simbolismo.”
For Maimonides see The Guide for the Perplexed, especially Part I; for Bonaventura see Gilson, La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventura, especially ch. vii, “L’Analogie Universelle.”
E. Cassirer, Die Begriffsform im Mythischen Denken (Berlin, 1922); Language and Myth (New York, 1946)
W. M. Urban, Language and Reality, (New York, 1939)
R. Niebuhr, “The Truth in Myths” in Mature of Religious Experience, Essays in honor of D. G. Mackintosh, pp. 117–136; C. Morris, Signs, Language and Behaviour (New York, 1946)
A. N. Whitehead, Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect (New York, 1927).
“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 189; see also “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 108; Dynamics of Faith, p. 41.
“Religious Symbol,” Daedalus (Summer, 1958), p. 3.
In the past the distinction between sign and symbol has always been vague. The terms “sign” and “symbol” have frequently been used interchangeably. Symbol has been used for things pointing beyond themselves without participating in the thing signified (cf. Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a). Sign has been used for things pointing to something wherein they participate (cf. Aquinas, S. Theol. III, 60, 2 & 4). In modern thought symbol is more frequenly used for things which participate in the object to which they opint; sign is generally used for things which point beyond themselves by convention. For an excellent Neo-Thomistic discussion of the concepts of sign and symbol see J. Maritain’s “Signe et Symbole” in Quatre Essais sur l’Esprit, pp. 59–124.
Cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 189–190; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109; Systematic Theology, I, p. 177; II, p. 9; Dynamics of Faith, p. 42, etc.
This should not mislead the reader into thinking that Tillich conceives the relation between language and reality to be conventional, for this is not the case. With slight change through the years Tillich has always maintained that words are symbols rather than signs. See, for example, S. Theol. II, p. 19, “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Protestant Era, p. 61; “Religious Symbols and the Knowledge of God,” p. 190, etc.
“The Religious Symbol,” pp. 3–4.
Ibid.; cf. Dynamics p. 42; Protestant Era, p. 69.
“The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Dynamics, pp. 42–43; “Religious Symbol and Our Knowledge of God,” p. 192, etc.
“The Religious Symbol,” p. 17.
Systematic Theology, II, p. 9.
Systematic Theology II, p. 9. It is important to notice that these are two aspects of the same reality. It is the same reality considered either in its literal or in its symbolic meaning. In its literal meaning it signifies itself; in its symbolic meaning it points to something else.
See, for example, Interpretation of History, p. 225, where the profane and the holy are conceived as two “attitudes” of man towards the same reality. Also the relation between philosophy and theology is conceived in this way. See Systematic Theology I, pp. 22 ff.
See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 108 ff. In his recent writings, especially Systematic Theology II, where Tillich openly discloses his Platonic heritage (pp. 21 ff.), he tends to abandon the first view of the relation between transcendent and empirical aspect. He proclaims with decision the transcendent reality of the object symbolized. This view is the view of classical theology, of which Bonaventura in this respect is probably the best representative.
“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 190–191. Of course these two functions are not exclusive to symbolic knowledge. Existential analysis has recently shown that most of our sensory and intellectual knowledge is two-sided; it reveals both subject and object in the same act.
The terms “subjective” and “objective” are not foreign to Tillich’s terminology. In Dynamics of Faith p. 96 he distinguishes between two sides of faith “a subjective and an objective side.” In Systematic Theology I, pp. 75 ff. he distinguishes between subjective and objective function of reason.
Ibid, and also Dynamics p. 42; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109.
“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191; see also Dynamics, pp. 42–43: “A great play gives us not only a new vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our being. Thus we are able to receive what the play reveals to us in reality. There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through symbols, as melodies and rhythms in music.”
“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191.
Cf. “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 191; Dynamics, pp. 42–43; “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 117 ff. For the same division here Tillich uses also the terminology: intuitive and active, or mythical and ritual.
“Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.
“The Religious Symbol,” pp. 4–5.
I believe that the source of Tillich’s error is a failure to make a distinction between the different levels of reality to which symbols may point. Symbols may point to something which is only mentally real, or to something physically real, or to something spiritually real.
“The Religious Symbol,” p. 5.
Op. cit., p. 8.
Op. cit., p. 5.
Ibid.
Op. cit., p. 6. Since Tillich seems to have no aversion for the terminology “objective” and “subjective”, I would suggest to call the negative theories subjective and the positive theories objective. Cf. Tillich “Mythus und Mythologie,” Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen. 1930), p. 364, where Tillich describes his theory of myth as symbolical-realist.
Cf. “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 42–43; “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 192. where we read: “Symbols are born out of the womb which is usually called today the ‘group unconscious’ or ‘collective unconscious’... It is not invented intentionally; and even if somebody would try to invent a symbol, as sometimes happens, then it becomes a symbol only if the unconscious of a group says “yes” to it.”
C. Dynamics, p. 43 and 58.
See, for example, “Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 190–191; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 42–43; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 109; “The Religious Symbol,” pp. 5 ff.
“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193.
“The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.
The identification of the user of the symbol with the creator of the symbol, and, therefore, the identification of the user of the symbol with the “object” symbolized, is a characteristic of subjective theories of symbol. Such are the theories professed by many sociologists of primitive communities, who study the religious symbols of a community in order to have a better understanding of the community, and not in order to have a better knowledge of God. In dealing with “historical” symbols Tillich sometimes seems to maintain a subjective theory of symbol. He accepts or rejects “historical” symbols as religious symbols only on the ground that they have been accepted or rejected by the collective unconscious, independently as to whether any historical event did actually happen, i.e., independently as to whether the “historical” symbols were produced by the “object” to which they point or not. For example, the symbol of the “Virgin Birth” was for many centuries a good religious symbol although based on “a most obviously legendary story,” (“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196). So too polytheistic gods were good religious symbols for polytheistic communities although based on legendary ground (ibid. 192). See also Dynamics, p. 45–46. In re-editing the essay “The Religious Symbol” in Daedalus (Summer, 1958) Tillich has largely checked the subjective bent of his theory of symbol. Passages like “religious symbols have no basis either in the empirical order or in the cultural order of meaning. Strictly speaking they have no basis at all. In the language of religion, they are objects of faith” have been eliminated. For a similar criticism of the subjectivistic bent of Tillich’s doctrine of symbols see G. H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and The Christian Message, pg. 57–58.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 96–97 together with 42–43; cf. “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196; “Existential Analysis and Religious Symbols,” p. 55.
Sometimes Tillich calls the sides “functions,” cf. p. 123.
Cf. Dynamics of Faith, pp. 96–97; “The Religious Symbol,” p. 4.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 96–97.
The rejection of the reduction of adequacy to acceptance will not compel Tillich to adopt a criterion of truth of empirical verification. His recognition of different dimensions of objective reality enables him to protect the religious dimension from empirical criticism. What matters in Tillich’s case is to give priority to the objective side of the symbol. Only a recognition of the priority of the objective side will save his theory of symbolism from subjectivism and idealism. In a private conversation Tillich has told me that now he no longer uses the criterion of acceptance as a criterion of truth for symbols. Yet in his recent edition of “The Religious Symbol” (Daedalus, Summer 1958 cf. p. 4) he still preserves it.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 9–10; pp. 20–25; II, pp. 30–31; The Protestant Era, pp. 84–89
Protestant Era, pp. 85–87, Dynamics of Faith, pp. 90 ff.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 22–23; Dynamics of Faith, 90 ff.
Another frequent misinterpretation of Tillich’s principle of correlation is to confuse correlation with polarity. But polarity is not a relation of interdependence, but a relation of tension. “Tension refers to the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite directions” (Systematic Theology I, p. 198). Elements in correlation, on the contrary, tend to move in the same direction. Moreover, polarities are not in a relation of correlation because polarities can disintegrate “through the breaking of the ontological tensions and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure.” Op. cit., p. 199. For example, finite individualization “produces a dynamic tension with finite participation; the break of their unity is a possibility” (Ibid.). But the break is impossible between elements that are in a relation of correlation: the separation can never be complete.
Cf. Protestant Era, pp. 83 ff.; Systematic Theology I, pp. 64, 67–68, etc., and especially Dynamics of Faith, pp. 74–94.
Systematic Theology, I, p. 60.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 62–64.
Systematic Theology I, p. 64.
Systematic Theology I, p. 65; cf. II, 13: “In this method, question and answer are independent of each other since it is impossible to derive the answer from the question or the question from the answer.”
Systematic Theology I, p. 25; cf. Protestant Era, pp. 88–89.
Systematic Theology I, p. 25.
Systematic Theology I, p. 21; cf. Protestant Era, pp. 88–89.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 90–91; cf. also Protestant Era, pp. 85–88.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 64–66; II, pp. 6–8.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 85–89.
This is explicitly stated of the correlation between philosophy and theology, which we have seen to consist in a relation of question and answer. Tillich explicitly says that “man is the question” (Systematic Theology I, p. 62) and that “God is the answer” (p. 64).
Although the last two chapters of Dynamics of Faith where the various manifestations of the divine human correlation are examined may be condisered as a systematic analysis of the same.
“Man is the question” (Systematic Theology I, p. 62); “God is the answer” (p. 64); cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 13.
Here are a few passages in which the divine human relation is expressed in terms of finite and infinite: “man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated and for which he is longing. Man is totally concerned, about the totality which is his true being and which is disrupted in time and place” (S. Theol. I, p. 14); “although man is actually separated from the infinite, he could not be aware of it if he did not participate in it potentially” (S. Theol. II, p. 9); “man is finite, excluded from the infinity to which he belongs” (Ibid. p. 31); “in the complete reunion with the divine ground of being... the finite is taken into the infinite” (Dynamics of Faith, p. 103).
See especially pp. 21–44; cf. also Systematic Theology I, pp. 252 ff.
This is true also of all the other correlations.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 251 ff.; Dynamics of Faith, p. 103.
9 See Systematic Theology II, pp. 39–47.
0 Systematic Theology II, pp. 14, 33, 45 etc.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 78–79.
Cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 16. There is, however, a major drawback that Tillich is not willing to admit, i.e., the ontological use of the principle of correlation for the relation of God and man, as we have suggested above. He maintains (in a letter that he kindly wrote to us) that “correlation is a method of approach not an ontological concept.” We do not doubt that such is his intention; but what he says, especially in Systematic II, does not convey this message.
From the point of view of content (not of method) God’s transcendence is one of the central doctrines, if not the central doctrine of Tillich’s theology. God is frequently said to be beyond the elements of the correlations: “God is beyond finitude and infinity” (Systematic Theology I, p. 144); “God is beyond freedom and destiny” (Ibid., p. 185); “God transcends essence and existence” (Systematic Theology II, p. 34); cf. also Systematic Theology I, p. 61; 271; II, p. 7, 13, 22 etc.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 256; II, pp. 43–44.
In Tillich’s interpretation of the doctrines of Creation and Fall there is much evidence that a method of correlation cannot make a real distinction between Creation and Fall. See Systematic Theology II, p. 44.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 60.
Tillich himself usually gives this justification for the principle of symbolism. See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; Dynamics of Faith, p. 58; Interpretation of History, pp. 98, 106–107; 222. Frequently Tillich gives other justifications, that in my opinion are only secondary and, sometimes, rather ad hominem, as for example, when he says that “man’s ultimate concern must be expressed symbolically, because symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate” (Dynamics of Faith, p. 41); or when he says that omnipotence, omnipresence, providence, etc., “become absurdities and contradictions when taken literally.” “Existential analysis of the religious symbol”, p. 49; see also “Religious symbol and our knowledge of God,” p. 194.
Also the principle offcorrelation, on which the principle of symbolism rests, “is a theological assertion” (Systematic Theology I, p. 8). In Dynamics of Faith (p. 99) Tillich declares that all what is said there about faith end religious symbols “is derived from the expericene of actual faith”; see also pp. 58–59.
Cochrane, who classifies Systematic Theology as a systematic philosophy, as “a book which is not a witness to Christ but to ‘being itself,” disregards Tillich’s intention entirely. See Cochrane, Existentialists and God, p. 91 and ff.
Cf. Systematic Theologyl,pp. 110, 112, 116–117, 140, 147, 155–158, etc. Also this statement is theological. Sometimes Tillich seems to give philosophical arguments for it. See, for example, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; Interpretation of History, pp. 222 ff.; Dynamics of Faith, p. 58. Actually they are not arguments but assertions about God, the ground of being, that can be made only after God has revealed Himself. The most reason can do is to experience its finitude and the shock of nonbeing, which is a condition to the experience of the ground of being. Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 110 ff.; Dynamics, pp. 99–100 & 10–11.
Cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 192–193, Systematic Theology I, p. 118; II, p. 9; Dynamics of Faith, p. 58.
Dynamics of Faith, pp. 44–45; Systematic Theology I, pp. 118 ff.
Systematic Theology II, p. 16. A similar formulation is found also in Dynamics of Faith, where it is said that “in relation to the ultimate we are always receiving and never giving. We are never able to bridge the infinite distance between the infinite and the finite from the side of the finite” (p. 105). See also Systematic Theology I, p. 64; “Die Idee der Offenbarung,” Zeitschriftfür Theologie und Kirche (1927), p. 406. The fifth proposition, then, states that nothing becomes an actual symbol without God’s action: it is not the task of man to turn finite reality into actual symbols “for God is manifest only through God.” This proposition, together with Tillich’s objective theory of symbolism require that symbols have both a subjective and an objective side, and exclude the view that symbols are man’s creations. But, as already pointed out in the section on symbolism in general, Tillich occasionally teaches that man himself is the creator of religious symbols, and frequently seems to disregard the factual aspect, especially in historical events. This tendency to subjectivism is constantly present also in his theory of the religious symbol in general, and in his teaching of Jesus as the Christ in particular. See infra, p. 137–8.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff; II, 88 ff, etc.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 137, where Tillich says that “the event which is called ‘final revelation’ was not an isolated event. It presupposed a revelatory history which was a preparation for it and in which it was received. It could not have occurred without having been expected, and it could not have been expected if it had not been preceded by other revelations which had become distorted. It would not have been the final revelation if it had not been received as such, and it would lose its character as final revelation if it were not able to make itself available to every group in every place.” According to Tillich “the center of history divides the whole process into preparatory and receiving revelation” (Op. cit., p. 133). The bearer of the receiving revelation is the Christian Church. The bearer of preparatory revelation is not only the Jewish people of the Old Testament but “all the religious cultures (still) outside the Church” (p. 144). Cf. Protestant Era pp. XIX, 46–47; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 48, 58, 70, etc.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ft
Systematic Theology I, p. 136.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, 135 ft; II, pp. 158 ft; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 104, 125.
Systematic Theology II, p. 93
Ibid, and 112.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff.; II, p. 93.
Systematic Theology I, pp. 133 ff.
See Systematic Theology I, p. 255: “Before creation man is hidden in the divine ground of being.” Cf. Dynamics of Faith p. 126; “Die Idee der Offenbarung”, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (1927), p. 146.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, 130; I, pp. 101 ff.; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 86–88, etc.
Systematic Theology II, p. 108; Dynamics of Faith, p. 87.
The Interpretation of History, p. 265; cf. Systematic Theology II, pp. 101 ff.
Systematic Theology I, p. 130; c. “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.
Cf. Systematic Theology II, pp. 104 and 114.
Systematic Theology I, p. 130; II, p. 108; Dynamics of Faith, p. 87; “The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.
Systematic Theology II, p. 107.
Systematic Theology II, p. 98.
The Interpretation of History, p. 242; see also pp. 243 ff. and “A reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation” Church Quarterly Review vol. 147 (Jan.-March 1949).
The elimination of the historical element in Jesus would be particularly dangerous in Tillich’s system. Because according to the principles of correlation and symbolism it is through the historical Jesus that the New Being becomes manifest. Therefore, if the historical reality of the symbol becomes questionable, then the manifestation of the object symbolized becomes doubtful. (Cf. Systematic Theology II, p. 115). Nobody will accept as a symbol what is recognized to be mere fiction, even if it is the creation of an unconscious community. It is therefore necessary to maintain that historical truth has at least a negative relation to faith, namely it makes impossible to be ultimately concerned with what is known to be mere fiction. Hence between faith and history there cannot be complete indifference and separation. It is because they are not separated but interpenetrated that we must witness to a constant struggle between faith and reason with regard to historical events: reason condemning statements of faith that seem to conflict with its evidence; faith repudiating views of reason in conflict with its doctrine. Cf. D. Emmet “Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation,” in Theology of P. Tillich, pp. 212–213.
Supra, p. 123.
Systematic Theology I, p. III, cf. p. 117: “revelation is the manifestation of the depth of reason and of the ground of being.”
This is well said both in the first and second volumes of Systematic Theology. In the first volume it is said that “the final revelation, like every revelation, occurs in a correlation of ecstasy and miracle. The revelatory event is Jesus as the Christ. He is the miracle of the final revelation, and his reception is the ecstasy of the final revelation.” (p. 136) In the second volume Tillich insists that “Jesus as the Christ is both a historical fact and a subject of believing reception. One cannot speak the truth about the event on which Christianity is based without asserting both sides... Only their unity creates the event upon which Christianity is based. According to later symbolism, the Christ is the head of the Church, which is his body. As such, they are necessarily interdependent” (pp. 98–99).
“Theology and Symbolism,” pp. 114–115. Also in Dynamics of Faith Tillich distinguishes three levels of religious symbols: (1) God, (2) divine attributes and (3) manifestations of the divine in things and events, in persons and communities, in words and documents (see Dynamics of Faith, pp. 45–48). This threefold classification departs from that of “Theology and Symbolism” inasmuch as here no distinction is made between the liturgical and the sacramentel level.
“The Religious Symbol and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 114–115. In “The Religious Symbol” (pp. 14 ff.) Tillich distinguishes two main levels of religious symbols, which he calls the level of the objective religious symbol and the level of the transcending religious symbol.
This view that theological language is always symbolic leads Tillich to a radical de-mythologization of many traditional concepts, as it has been rightly pointed out by G. Tavard. “Tillich’s attitude to dogmas, like his approach to the Bible, is one of demythologization. The Councils, and whatever other ecclesiastical authorities formulated the traditional dogmas, did but discover, in their apperception of the revelatory events of the Christ, symbols, or sets of symbols, pointing to the Christian message. This they formulated in propositions and rational statements. Combining these symbols, they constructed Christian myths. Thus the Creeds, with their picture of a divine being descending in the flesh and ascending to heaven again after passing through, and triumphing over, death, are mythological epics. Their truth does not lie in the historical exactness of every detail of the picture, but in the ability of those symbols to express the Unconditional appearing under the conditions of existence. Their value to the Church lasts as long as, and no longer than, their symbolic meaning is perceived. Dogmatic myths must be ‘broken’, that is, understood symbolically. If we take them literally, we undermine their religious dimension. Creeds and dogmas then become intellectual taboos that must be defended without regard to scientific honesty.” (Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, p. 116). For Tavard’s critique of Tillich’s demythologization of Christian dogmas see o.c. p. 117 and ff.
Cf. Dynamics of Faith, pp. 51–42; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.
Cf. Dynamics of Faith, pp. 52–54; Protestant Era, pp. 62–65 & 119; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193.
Systematic Theology I, p. 140; cf. “Mythus und Mythologie,” p. 364; Interpretation of History, pp. 102 ff.; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 60–62.
But it seems to us that Tillich’s criticism of this danger is badly stated if not completely irrelevant. For, the danger of symbolism does not consist, as Tillich seems to believe, in an identification of the symbolic material with the symbolic meaning, or of the symbolic sense with the literal meaning (cf. “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 193; Protestant Era, p. 119; Dynamics of Faith, pp. 51 ff.). For instance, assuming that the symbolic sense of a flag is a nation and that its symbolic material is a piece of cloth, who would confuse the symbolic sense of the flag with its symbolic material? The danger of symbols does not come from their literal aspect but from their symbolic sense. Since the literal aspect is open to inspection, no mistake is possible about it. The symbolic sense, on the contrary, is hidden and because it is hidden one can be mistaken about it. Therefore the danger of symbolism is not an identification of the symbolic meaning with the symbolic material, but a misplacement of the symbolic meaning either by putting a symbolic meaning where there is none or by attributing to an object a symbolic meaning different from the one it has. An example of the first misplacement would be the cult of the stones of Mount Washington; an example of the second misplacement would be the adoration of Moses or Elias.
See Dynamics of Faith, pp. 51–52; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” p. 196.
Sometimes Tillich defines theology as the study of religious symbols (cf. for instance “Relations of Metaphysics to Theology” in Review of Metaphysics (1956), p. 59; “Theology and Symbolism,” p. 108); other times he defines theology as the study of divine revelation (for instance in Systematic Theology I, pp. 3, 6, 8, etc.) I think that the second definition should be considered as complementary of the first, since revelation is a function of religious symbols. It is not the task of theology to create religious symbols. “Theology as such has neither the duty nor the power to confirm or to negate religious symbols. Its task is to interpret them according to theological principles and methods” (Systematic Theology I, p. 240). The theologian cannot discard traditional Christian symbols; that they are symbols and, as such, endowed with divine power, is enough for him. This cuts the ground from under much of liberal Protestantism and its rejection of Catholic symbols. Yet the theologian should critisize symbols: he “may discover contradictions between symbols.” (ibid.) He may also by his prophetic insight contribute to the surge of a new revelatory situation out of which new symbols will grow. This, for Tillich, condemns the “static character which he attributes to Catholic sacramentalism and Catholic theology.”
“Theology and symbolism,” pp. 111–113.
In Theological Studies (1950), p. 201; cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p. 131.
Cf. Systematic Theology I, pp. 79, 131; II, p. 34; Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 339.
It is by means of a distinction within analogous names between the mode of signification and the thing signified (modus significandi and res significata) that analogy is able to preserve an element of literalness even in the names of God. The names of God are predicated literally with regard to the thing signified. Tillich is not entirely unaware of the distinction between mode of signification and perfection signified. With regard to “personality,” for example, he says that it is predicated of God only symbolically because the perfection of personality is identified with its realization in man (Protestant Era, pp. 62 ff.). Another time he says that “in the notion of God we must distinguish two elements: the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God” (Dynamics of Faith, p. 46). See also Theology of P. Tillich, p. 334, where Tillich speaks of a via negationis and a via symbolica. Cf. G. Weigel, “Myth, Symbol and Analogy” in Religion and Culture, ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), p. 127.
Tillich allows only one exception to this universal symbolism. There is a statement about God that must be understood literally. This statement is that God is “being-itself” (cf. Systematic Theology I, p. 146; “Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,” pp. 193–194). In Systematic Theology II Tillich seems to abandon this view and to maintain that the only non-symbolic statement about God is the statement that “everything we say about God is symbolic” (p. 9). In my opinion neither proposition is a correct statement of Tillich’s view on non-symbolic predication. For he insistently argues, for instance, that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically (cf. Systematic Theology I, 110 & 140 ff.; II, 20 etc.). Therefore also the statement that existence cannot be predicated of God even symbolically must be included among the nonsymbolic statements. And in general, symbolists have always maintained that alle negative predication is to be understood literally. This is, for instance, Maimonides’ view. Tillich has not offered an adequate treatment of the difference between negative and affirmative predicates.
On this point see G. Weigel, “The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich,” Cross Currents (1956), pp. 141–155; “Myth, Symbol and Analogy” in Religion and Culture, ed. W. Leibrecht (New York, 1959), pp. 120–130; G. Rhein, Paul Tillich (Stuttgart, 1957) pp. 173 ff.
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Mondin, B. (1963). Tillich’s Doctrine of Religious Symbolism. In: The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-4734-9_6
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