Abstract
Let me first confess a certain uncertainty about the title of my paper: it is a simple question, and a simple question may be bewitching, in that one might seek an answer as simple as the question appears to be. So it is necessary first to get clear about the question — and then to try and find an answer, which I hope will also help us to understand the position of Wittgenstein better.
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Notes
R. Rorty, ‘Pragmatism, Relativism and Irrationalism’, in Proceedings and Addresses of theAmerican Philosophical Association, 53, 1980, p. 727.
See W. V. O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University Press, New York 1969, 19712; N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1958; T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1962; S. Toulmin, Human Understanding, I: The Evolution of Collective Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1971; R. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, New Left Books, London 1975; N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett Publ. Co., Indianapolis-Cambridge 1978; H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981; M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1982; J. Meiland and M. Krausz (eds.), Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 1982; P. K. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason, Verso, London 1987; R. Egidi (ed.), La svolta relativistica nell’epistemologia contemporanea (with bibliography), F. Angeli, Milano 1988; W. Sauer, Aspekte und Probleme des Begriffsrahmen-Relativismus, Habilschrift, Graz (unpublished) 1989.
See Farewell to Reason, cit.
Wittgenstein’s Lectures. Cambridge. Macdonald, ed. by A. Ambrose, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1979, p. 224.
Ibid., p. 65
C. Wright, Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, Duckworth, London 1980, p. 365.
L. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Farben. Remarks on Colour, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe. Trans by L. L. McAlister and M. Schättle, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1977, III, § 317, p. 59. (I diverge from the English translation, which translates the singular “Die Praxis gibt den Worten ihren Sinn” with “Practices give words their meaning”)
Philosophische Untersuchungen. Philosophical Investigations (PI), ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1953, I, § 42.
C. McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1984, p. 55.
M. B. Hintikka and J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1986, p. 218.
L. Wittgenstein, MS 165, p. 97f, cit. by S. St. Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1987, p. 291f.
PI, II, xi, p. 223.
Ibid.
Über Gewißheit. On Certainty, ed. by G.E. M.Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. Trans. by D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, B. Blackwell, Oxford 1969, § 94.
Wittgenstein ‘s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. by C. Diamond, Harvester Press, Hassocks-Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1976, VI, § 17, p. 321.
Op. cit.
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Haller, R. (1995). Was Wittgenstein a Relativist?. In: Egidi, R. (eds) Wittgenstein: Mind and Language. Synthese Library, vol 245. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3691-6_17
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