Abstract
Having explained the nature of the mind and shown that it thinks all the time and is immortal; and having also explained the essence of the two principal faculties which constitute its nature and are inseparable from it, an orderly exposition requires that I come next to the explanation of all the lower powers which depend on these two principal faculties. But since most of them occur in the mind only when it is united with the body or, at least, it is not easy to know them without knowing what this union is (for otherwise, how could one explain sensation, imagination, corporeal memory, the power of moving, of speaking and, finally, the passions of the soul), and since even those which are most independent of the body are known better by comparing them with others less independent, it seems to me that, before coming to a more detailed statement of the way in which the mind exercises all its functions, I must explain the way in which these two substances can be united. And since being in the same place at the same time is a type of union it seems that, before speaking more explicitly about this union, I should consider how duration and place can be attributed to the mind.
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References
La Forge gives a rather loose translation of the following text by Simplicius, from Simplicii Commentarius in Enchiridion Epicteti (Lyon: J. Maire, 1640), pp. 7–8: `Voluntas enim extrinsecus moved non potest. Quamvis enim id quod expetitur, extrinsecus sit: ipse tarnen motus ad illud, intrinsecus est: veluti, hoc illove modo, sentire de rebus, ut, divitias, aut mortem, aut aliud generis, vel bonum, vel malum, vel neutrum esse. Cum igitur sic aut aliter quapiam de re sentimus, sive nostra sponte, sive edocti ab aliis: non picas and psittacas imitabimur, qui id quod docentur garriunt, nec intelligunt quod dicant. Neque enim ut psittacus dicit, se conditum bibitunim:’
La Forge quotes the Latin text (’intenninabilis vitae tots simul and perfecta possessio’) and provides a French translation. To avoid duplication, I have included only an English translation of the French in the body of the text above. The Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. V, Pros. 6 (PL 63, 858 ).
Cf. Principles,Part II, art 10: AT IX-2, 68, CSM I, 227. On the distinction of interior and exterior place, see Suarez, De Angelis,Bk. IV, chs. 2–3 (Paris: Vivès, 1856), II, 427–37, and Q. LXXV, art, 1, disputatio xlvii, section ii, §§ 8–9 (Vivès ed, 1861), XXI, 48–49.
Cf. Suarez, Opera (Vivès, 1861), vol. XXI, 86–88, Quaest. LXXV, Art. 1, Disp. xlviii, sect. 3, § 6, where he discusses these types of presence to clarify the sense in which Christ is present in the Eucharist.
Aristotle, Physics Bk. iv, ch. 1, 208’30: `All suppose that things which exist are somewhere (the non-existent is nowhere....).’
Cf. Amauld and Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking,ed. and trans. J. V. Buroker (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), p. 94: `we imagine that the soul must take up some space just as a body does, and that it could not exist if it were not somewhere, which are things that apply only to bodies.’ This text also refers to St. Augustine, De Trinitate,Bk. x, ch. 10.
Johannis Claubergii, De Cognitione Dei et Nostri,Exercitatio LXVI, §3; Opera,p. 704.
Porphry, Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures, Section I, §1: `Every body is in a place; but nothing essentially incorporeal, or any thing of this kind, has any locality.’ Select Works of Porphry, trans. T. Taylor ( London: Rodd, 1823 ), p. 201.
Letters,Epis. CLXXXVII, ch. vi, § 18 (PL 33, 838): `Nam spatia locorum tolle corporibus, nusquam erunt, et quia nusquam erunt, nec erunt.’
Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exotericarum Exercitationum liber quintus decimus, de subtilitate, ad Hieronymum Cardanum (Paris, M. Vascosani, 1557), 359, § 3. La Forge seems to quote from Heereboord’s citation in Meletemata Philosophica: Disputationes ex Philosophia Selectae,Disp. XII, De Angelis,Thesis VII, p. 47a: `Contra hic disputat Scaliger, Exerc. 359, Sect. 3: Quantae, inquit, sunt intelligentiae, baud quantitate praedicamenti, sed quantitate intelligibili, ut intellectus intelligat in eis unam partem, quae non sit alia.’
Heereboord, ibid,quoting Sect. 4 of Scaliger’s text.
Heereboord, Meletemata philosophica,p. 47 a-b.
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De La Forge, L. (1997). The Mind Considered with respect to Duration and Place. In: Treatise on the Human Mind (1664). International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 153. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3590-2_12
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