Abstract
The standard resolution of the semantical paradoxes arising from self-referential statements is to dismiss these statements en bloc as meaningless. In a recent article, A.N. Prior has deplored this wholesale solution as too drastic, and urges a more selective procedure.1
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References
‘On a Family of Paradoxes’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2 (1961) 16–32.
An interesting if not strictly relevant case arises if D says that at least three truths are spoken. For this statement — which could feasibly be classed as false — is self- validating: if taken as true it is true.
This chapter is an expanded version of A Note on Self-Referential Statements’ published in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 5 (1964) 218–220. For a different approach to the elimination of the paradoxes of self-reference see pp. 277–280 below.
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© 1968 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Rescher, N. (1968). Self-Referential Statements. In: Topics in Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3546-9_2
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