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Sufficient Reason and Human Freedom in the Confessio Philosophi

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The Young Leibniz and his Philosophy (1646–76)

Abstract

This paper is concerned with certain features of what is perhaps one of the most important and interesting works of the young Leibniz. The work in question is a dialogue which he wrote during the early months of his stay in Paris — probably between Autumn 1672 and the early months of 1673 — and which he entitled Confessio Philosophi. Its theme1 is the justice of God, a topic which remained an abiding concern, culminating in the Theodicy of 1710. Here I shall be concerned with only a part of the dialogue, the part that concerns the question whether human beings can be called free.

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References

  1. References, by page and line, are to the text of the Confessio Philosophi contained in A VI iii. Translations are my own.

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  2. For Leibniz’s approach to these problems, see G. H. R. Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970), pp. 5–17.

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  3. Two common formulations of this principle are that there must be a sufficient reason for everything that exists and happens (e.g. to Clarke, 5.125, G VII 419; cf. Principles of Nature and of Grace, section 7, G VI 602; Monadology, section 32, G VI 612) and that there is no true proposition whose reason could not be seen by anyone who had all the knowledge necessary to understand it properly (Remarques sur le livre de l’origine du mal, section 14, G VI 413; cf. to Clarke, 5.125; Monadology, section 32, G VI 612).

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  4. Confessio philosophi 118, 2.

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  5. Confessio philosophi 118, 3–5.

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  6. Compare, for example, the remark that physics requires “the principle of the need for giving a reason” (Specimen Inventorum,G VII 309) with the assertion that it requires the “principle of the need for a sufficient reason” (to Clarke, 2.1, G VII 355).

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  7. Confessio philosophi 118, 9–10.

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  8. In Leibniz’s works, the principle of sufficient reason also takes the form of the assertion that there is nothing without a cause. It does not appear in this guise in the Confessio Philosophi; but see Catena Mirabilium Demonstrationum,12 Dec. 1676, A VI iii 584, and a paper on existence, Dec.? 1676, A VI iii 587: PDSR 113.

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  9. See also De Conatu et Motu, Sensu et Cogitatione (1671), A VI ü 283: “A requisite is that which, if it is not thought, something cannot be thought”.

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  10. Confessio philosophi 118, 9ff.

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  11. Confessio philosophi 118, 14.

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  12. Confessio philosophi 118, 15.

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  13. See also Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum, A VI ii 480: “I, as far as I know, was the first to demonstrate that the proposition that there is nothing without a reason is the foundation of the sciences of mind and motion”.

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  14. Confessio philosophi 118, 16–20.

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  15. Confessio philosophi 118, 20–22.

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  16. Elsewhere he argues for the principle of contradiction along similar lines. See PDSR xv-xvi, 48, 56; also to Foucher (1686), G I 382.

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  17. Compare Theodicy, section 44, G VI 127 and Remarques sur le livre de l’origine du mal, section 14, G VI 413.

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  18. Catena Mirabilium Demonstrationum, 12 Dec. 1676, A VI iii 584, PDSR 107; a paper on existence, Dec.? 1676, A VI iii 587, PDSR 111–3.

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  19. Remarques sur le livre de l’origine du mal, section 14, G VI 414.

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  20. Discourse on Metaphysics, section 13; to Arnauld, 14 July 1686, G II 56; De Verum a Falso Dignoscendi Criteriis (1685–7) G VII 301, VE 1174.

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  21. Confessio philosophi 118, 24ff.

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  22. Confessio philosophi 120, 16–9.

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  23. The Theologian says (120, 16), “You yourself have said”. This seems to be a reference to a remark made earlier by the Philosopher (118, 15), in which he concedes that philosophers seek a series of reasons until they reach a being which is necessary, i.e. is its own reason.

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  24. Confessio philosophi 120, 17.

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  25. Confessio philosophi 121, 4.

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  26. Confessio philosophi 129, 10.

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  27. See the definition of “author”, Confessio philosophi 127, 10.

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  28. Confessio philosophi 130, 9ff.

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  29. Confessio philosophi 131, 1; 131, 28–9. Confessio philosophi 132, 4.

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  30. Confessio philosophi 120, 3ff. Confessio philosophi 131, 17ff. Confessio philosophi 120, 4: cf. 131, 18.

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  31. Confessio philosophi 120, 4. Confessio philosophi 131, 19–20. Confessio philosophi 120, 5. Confessio philosophi 120, 7–9. Confessio philosophi 120, 10. Confessio philosophi 120, 11.

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  32. Confessio philosophi 131, 20–22.

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  33. Leibniz then elaborates on this, saying that the power and the will to sin come from the present state of things, and that in turn from the universal harmony and the immutable ideas contained in the divine intellect (131, 23–5). The point of this is to lead up to the assertion (131, 25) that there is no intervention of the divine will; God does not will sin, he only permits it.

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  34. Confessio philosophi 132, 4 ff.

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  35. Confessio philosophi 132, 8–9.

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  36. Confessio philosophi 133, 4 ff.

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  37. Confessio philosophi 132, 12.

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  38. Confessio philosophi 132, 12.

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  39. Confessio philosophi 120, 4.

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  40. As Leibniz notes (132, 13), this is a (slightly abridged) version of a definition given earlier in the dialogue (127, 8).

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  41. Confessio philosophi 132, 14.

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  42. Confessio philosophi 127, n.14.

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  43. Cf. Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, p. 18. For a fuller account of Leibniz’s concept of the will, see ibid, pp. 18–23.

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  44. Confessio philosophi 133, 13–4; cf. the beginning of Section VI below.

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  45. A VI iii 600, 6.

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  46. See Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 60. Kenny cites Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, Qu. 80, Art. 2.

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  47. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), p. 62.

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  48. One could say, indeed, that the Philosopher’s discussion of the will only emphasises the difficulties that lie in the way of free will. He argues (132, 14) that pleasure is a sensation of harmony, and that what is harmonious depends on the state of the percipient, of the object and of the medium. His conclusion (132, 21–2) is that we do not will to will — i.e. our acts of will are not in our power.

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  49. Confessio philosophi 132, 24–6.

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  50. Cf. Francesco Piro (ed.), G. W. Leibniz: Confessio Philosophi e altri scritti (Naples: Cronopio, 1992), p. 114, n. 24. Leibniz says only that the definition was stated by the “later Scholastics”. (Conversation with Stensen, 7 Dec. 1677, VE 302: C 25)

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  51. Confessio philosophi 132, 27–133, 4.

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  52. Confessio philosophi 133, 4–6. Cf. Leibniz’s conversation with Stensen, ibid

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  53. Confessio philosophi 133, 6–7.

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  54. Confessio philosophi 133, 8.

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  55. See Otto Saame (ed.), G. W. Leibniz: Confessio Philosophi (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), pp. 173–4, notes 128–9.

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  56. E.g. Theodicy, section 34, G VI 122; section 301–2, G VI 296. On `spontaneity’ and `spontaneity with choice’, see also Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, pp. 57–8.

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  57. E.g. Theodicy, section 302, G VI 296; a paper on freedom (undated, but after 1676) G VII 108–9.

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  58. Theodicy, section 302; Causa Dei, section 20, G VI 441; Nouveaux Essais 2.21.9.

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  59. Theodicy, section 302; paper on freedom, G VII 108, 109; `Remarks on Descartes’ Principles’, G IV 362.

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  60. Confessio philosophi 120, 4–12.

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  61. Confessio philosophi 133, 9–12.

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  62. Cf. 135, 5: “The true root of freedom is the use of reason”.

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  63. Confessio philosophi 135, 14–6.

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  64. Confessio philosophi 135, 7.

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  65. Confessio philosophi 135, 14.

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  66. See especially a paper on freedom, G VII 109–10: “The more we act from the passions, the more we are slaves to the power of external things”. For other references, see Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, p. 63.

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  67. Affectus, 135, 10.

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  68. Much later, in the Nouveaux Essais (2.21.8), Leibniz was to recognise this as a kind of freedom, the `freedom to do’.

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  69. Confessio philosophi 133, 12.

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  70. Confessio philosophi 133, 13–4.

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  71. Confessio philosophi 133, 14–7.

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  72. Confessio philosophi 133, 17–9.

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  73. Confessio philosophi 133, 20–1.

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  74. Confessio philosophi 134, 1.

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  75. Confessio philosophi 134, 3–4. In connection with what Leibniz has said earlier, about willing as a kind of pleasure (cf. Section IV above), one may note that in the present passage pleasure is treated as a motive for an act of will, not as will itself.

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  76. Subtilis: 134, 7.

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  77. Nouveaux Essais, 2.1.15; Theodicy, section 305, G VI 297.

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  78. Confessio philosophi 134, 10.

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  79. Confessio philosophi 134, 10–11.

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  80. As has been said before, 134, 3–4.

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  81. Confessio philosophi 134, 12–13.

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  82. Confessio philosophi 134, 14–5.

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  83. Confessio philosophi 134, 15–6: quivisquod scit dicere potest, audiente quovis

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  84. Confessio philosophi 134, 19–22.

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  85. The existence of such a being has in fact been conceded at the beginning of the dialogue (116, 2, 10–11).

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  86. Metamorphoses, 7, 20–1, discussed in Confessio philosophi 134, 23. Cf. Theodicy, section 154, G VI 201 and section 297, G VI 292; also Nouveaux Essais 2.21.35.

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  87. Confessio philosopha 135, 1–2.

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  88. Confessio philosophi 133, 9–12; cf. Section V above.

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  89. Confessio philosophi 135, 5, 14–6.

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  90. Confessio philosophi 135, 16.

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  91. Confessio philosophi 135, 16–7.

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  92. Confessio philosophi 135, 17–8.

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  93. Confessio philosophi 135, 19–21.

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  94. Confessio philosophi 135, 23–4.

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  95. “Dic cur hic”, “Respice finem” and “Vide quid agas”. Such expressions are cited in works which are roughly contemporary with the Confessio: see Demonstratio Propositionum Primarum (1671–2), VI ii 482; Wilhelmus Pacidius (1671–2) A VI ii 511, G VII 362. Leibniz continued to cite them, e.g. `Remarks on Descartes’ Principles’ (1692), G IV 362; Nouveaux Essais, 2.21.47.

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  96. Confessio philosophi 136, 5.

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  97. Confessio philosophi 136, 5–7.

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  98. Confessiophilosophi 136, 10–12.

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  99. Confessio philosophi 135, 7, 14: cf. Section V.

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  100. Principles of Philosophy I 71–2 (The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, I 218–9); Replies to Sixth Objections, ibid. II 296–300. Leibniz could have added that, besides the circumstances of our temperament and upbringing, a cause of our use of principles which are not universal lies in the passions. These, it may be recalled, have previously been said (cf. Section V) to explain our failure to follow reason, and so be free. Leibniz could argue that the passions, which make us look to our own narrow interests, lead us to follow a perverted kind of reason.

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  101. Confessio philosophi 136, 12.

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  102. Confessio philosophi 136, 13–6.

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  103. Confessio philosophi 136, 16–7. In his notes on his conversation with Stensen of 7 Dec. 1677, Leibniz quotes this nearly verbatim: Gr 272, VE 301.

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  104. Compare the remark “The contrary implies a contradiction” (137, 26) which is made about the same thesis.

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  105. Confessio philosophi 136, 18.

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  106. Confessio philosophi 136, 21–9; 137, 1–8.

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  107. Confessio philosophi 136, 21–22.

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  108. Confessio philosophi 136, 26–7.

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  109. Confessio philosophi 136, 28.

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  110. Thomas Nagel, `Moral Luck’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24–38, and Bernard Williams, `Moral Luck’ in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 20–39.

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  111. Nagel, op. cit, pp. 28, 32–3, 35. The other two sorts of moral luck recognised by Nagel are (a) luck in one’s circumstances, i.e. the kinds of problems and situations one faces (26, 33–4) and (b) luck in the way one’s actions turn out (pp. 2832). (E.g. a motorist might pass a red light, but by good luck there is no one on the crossing).

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  112. Confessio philosophi 137, 11–23.

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  113. Confessio philosophi 137, 23.

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  114. Confessio philosophi 137, 25–6.

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  115. Confessio philosophi 137, 26–138, 3.

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  116. The reference is to Confessio philosophi 136, 16–7.

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  117. Confessio philosophi 138, 1–3.

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  118. Confessio philosophi 138, 3–5.

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  119. Confessio philosophi 138, 5–6.

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  120. About 1670–71 (section 13: A VI i 542).

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  121. See also notes on three letters on Spinoza (October 1676?), A VI iii 368 n.16; conversation with Stensen, Gr 272, VE 301; Discourse on Metaphysics, section 30; Theodicy, section 264, G VI 274.

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  122. Confessio philosophi 133, 4–6: Section V.

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  123. Confessio philosophi 133, 13–4; Section VI.

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  124. Cf. Parkinson, Leibniz on Human Freedom, pp. 50–53. When Leibniz says that motives incline without necessitating, he is thinking of the strongest among two or more motives. The connection with hypothetical necessity is this: Whenever I make a choice, I follow the strongest motive. If, in the present situation, X is my strongest motive, then I follow X. The conclusion is necessary, but only hypothetically necessary, for it remains logically possible that I should have chosen something else. Had there been no such logical possibility, the conclusion would have been what Leibniz calls “absolutely necessary”.

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  125. Von der Allmacht and Allwissenheit Gottes, section 11.

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  126. There is a passing reference in 129, 24 and in a deleted passage, 127, note to 1. 16. Cf. 128, 8–9 and 129, 10 (per accidens necessarium).

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  127. Consider an example given by Stuart Hampshire, The Age of Reason (New York: Mentor, 1956), p. 167. Suppose that a householder, Jones, has been bound and gagged by a robber. As such, Jones cannot prevent the robbery of his house, i.e. it is necessary that he does not prevent it. This proposition is hypothetically necessary, i.e. it is necessary given that Jones is bound and gagged. Hampshire points out that it makes sense to suppose that the man could have prevented the robbery (in Leibniz’s terms, the proposition that he fails to do so is not absolutely necessary). But no one, says Hampshire, would suppose that such a man was free to prevent the robbery.

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  1. G. H. R. Parkinson
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  1. The Open University, UK

    Stuart Brown

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Parkinson, G.H.R. (1999). Sufficient Reason and Human Freedom in the Confessio Philosophi . In: Brown, S. (eds) The Young Leibniz and his Philosophy (1646–76). International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 166. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3507-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3507-0_10

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