Abstract
German philosophers may have to answer for much. However, one thing for which they are clearly not responsible is the endorsement of rampant philosophical skepticism. There is no strong skeptical tradition in Germany, and there is no German skeptic that would rival Pierre Bayle and David Hume in importance. Instead of skeptics of this caliber, Germany may boast of such names as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Immanuel Kant. And these thinkers are known for many doctrines, but not for skeptical reserve. Indeed, Leibniz was not overly interested in skepticism either as a philosophical approach or as a philosophical problem; and Kant, it is usually claimed, was essentially an anti-skeptical philosopher. As Ralph Walker puts it:
Any list of the great philosophers has to include Kant. His influence on philosophical thinking ... has been immense, and his work remains of the most immediate contemporary relevance. For he faces up to the most fundamental problem that confronts philosophers, and tackles it in a more illuminating way than anyone has done before or after. This is the problem which skepticism raises.
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References
Ralph C. S. Walker, Kant: The Arguments of the Philosophers (London, 1978), vii.
Myles F. Burnyeat, “Introduction,” The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Burnyeat (Berkeley, 1983 ), 3.
Carl Leonhard Reinhold, The Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge (1791), available in Reinhold, Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens; Über die Möglichkeit der Philosophy als strenge Wissenschaft (Hamburg, 1978). I am quite in accord with George di Giovanni and Henry S. Harris, Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism (Albany, NY, 1985), 56, 59. Fundament,45; 48.
Reinhold tried to supply the true foundation of Kant’s system in what he called the “fact of consciousness.” Formulated as a principle, this fact amounts to the claim that “the representation is differentiated by the subject in consciousness from the object and the subject and referred to both.” Reinhold, Fundament,78.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York, 1965), A856/B884.
This appears to be the reason why Kant entitles section 5 of the Antinomy of Pure Reason “Sceptical Representation of the Cosmological Questions in the Four Transcendental Ideas.”
See also A769/B797: “The skeptic is thus the taskmaster who constrains the dogmatic reasoner to develop a sound critique of the understanding and reason.”
Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl, Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung: Umrisse einer Rezeptionsgeschichte (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1987), 7.
I am not prepared to argue that here, however.
Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Hume,6, 7.
The full title reads actually Socratic Memorabilia, compiled for the Boredom of the Public by a lover of Boredom. With a Double Dedication to Nobody and to Two (Amsterdam, 1759). There is an English translation of this work by James O. Flaherty (Baltimore, 1967). I shall quote in accordance with this edition.
Hamann, Socratic Memorabilia,ed. Flaherty, 167.
Hamann argued this in a letter to Kant in 1759. See Immanuel Kant, Philosophical Correspondence, 1759–1799, ed. and intr. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago, 1967), 41f. I have substituted “belief” for “faith.”
The concluding paragraph of Section X of Hume’s first Enquiry might indeed suggest such a reading.
David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, The Philosophical Works,ed. Thomas H. Green and Thomas H. Grose, 4 vols. (Edinburgh, 1874–75), 4:108. There is a historical case to be made that Hume actually had a great influence on this Kierkegaardian conception, at least indirectly. For it can be shown that his discussions of belief in the Treatise and the Enquiry influenced Hamann and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi in their conception of faith. Especially Jacobi liked to talk of a “salto mortale” into faith. Kierkegaard knew both Hamann and Jacobi. For more on Hume and Hamann, see Philip Merlan, “From Hume to Hamann,” The Personalist,32 (1951), 11–18; “Hamann et les Dialogues de Hume,” Revue de Métaphysique,59 (1954), 285–89; “Kant, Hamann-Jacobi and Schelling on Hume,” Rivista critica di storia filosofia,22 (1967), 343–51.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,ed. Green and Grose, 4:107.
For an exploration of these issues see especially the works of Richard Popkin and Terence Penelhum.
For discussions of this dispute, see Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors ( Cambridge, Mass., 1969 ).
For Mendelssohn’ s biography see especially AlexanderAltmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (Tuscaloosa, Ala, 1973). See also his Moses Mendelssohn, Frühschriften zur Metaphysik (Tübingen, 1969). Mendelssohn lived from 1729 to 1786.
Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Hume,84.
The “Thoughts on Probability” were first published anonymously in Vermischte Abhandlungen und Urtheile über das Neueste der Gelehrsamkeit,3 (1756), 3–26, rpt. as “On Probability” in Mendelssohn’s Philosophische Schriften,vol. 2 (Berlin, 1761, 1771, 1777), now in Moses Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften. Jubiläumsausgabe,vol. 1 (Berlin, 1929) 147–64; 495–515. I shall quote in accordance with this last edition. The essay actually consists of three parts. In the first and introductory part, Mendelssohn summarizes briefly some of the general principles of probability as he sees them, in the second part he discusses Hume’s objections to the principle of analogy, and in the third he addresses the Leibnizian problem of freedom and determinism.
Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 1:230f. from the Preface of the Philosophische Schriften (1771).
Ibid., 1:157.
we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect, that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all hands, that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist“ (Hume, Enquiry,29–30). ”From causes, which appear similar, we expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems evident, that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of experience.… Now where is that process of reasoning, which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances, that are nowise different from that single one?“ Ibid., 32.
Mendelssohn thinks that “the probability that the temporal proximity of A and B is merely accidental is equivalent to the relation of 1 to the number of observed cases + 1,” i.e., in the first observation the probability was 1/2, in the second 1/3, in the third 1/4, and in the nth case, it is 1/n+ 1. Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 1:158. In fact, he thinks that “the more often we make this experience, the closer to certainty our expectation becomes, and if n were infinite, we would be entirely certain.” Ibid., 1:160.
This is not meant to constitute a complete discussion of this problem. Much more needs to be said. However, I hope that it roughly indicates how Mendelssohn’s answer proceeds.
These seem to be the only relevant theories Mendelssohn recognizes. See Ibid., 1:160: “For this reason we can never determine by experience which of the three systems that explain the effect one substance has on another is true; namely whether (1) the change in substance B is sufficiently and immediately founded in another substance A, which is maintained by the universal influxionists (systema influxis phisici) (2) the change in substance B and the change in substance A are both immediately subordinated to the highest being? This is assumed by the Cartesians and the universal occasionalists (systema causorum occasionalium universalium) (3) or finally whether they are mediately subordinated to the highest being by two harmonic series of changes, which Baumgarten calls the system of the universal harmonists (systema harmoniae praestablitae universalis).”
Mendelssohn to Lessing, 19 November 1755; Ibid., 11: 21.
More recently, Hidé Ishiguro has argued for a similar view. See Hidé Ishiguro “Preestablished Harmony versus Constant Conjunction: A Reconsideration of the Distinction Between Rationalism and Empiricism,” Rationalism, Empiricism, and Idealism: British Academy Lectures on the History of Philosophy,ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, 1986), 61–85, here 62. The same view was also held by Cassirer already. Mendelssohn’s dismissal of Hume must be seen within the context of the Berlin intellectual milieu. He told both the anti-Wolffians and the Wolffians to disregard Hume because his metaphysical theory bypassed all important questions. For a more detailed discussion of the entire issue, see Manfred Kuehn, “David Hume and Moses Mendelssohn,” Hume Studies,21 (1995), 197–220.
Johann Heinrich Lambert also failed to see anything important in Hume, rejecting him out of hand. See Gawlick and Kreimendahl, Hume, 50f. And Eberhard called Hume “the most shallow head.” See Philosophisches Magazin, 1 (1789), 249.
Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, J. G.H. Feder’s Leben, Natur and Grundsätze: Zur Belehrung and Ermunterung seiner lieben Nachkommen (Leipzig, 1825), 60. See also Ernst Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen,2 vols. (Leipzig 1793–1800), 1:iv/v, and Christoph Meiners Revision der Philosophie (Göttingen and Gotha, 1772), 61, 64, 75. Meiners sees a close connection between skepticism and eclecticism.
Meiners, Revision,161, 202; see also 153f.
Feder, Leben,249; Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen,1:v/vi: “Experience, common sense and morality—these are the best things in all the wisdom of this world.” Christian Garve, Eigene Betrachtungen über die allgemeinsten Grundsätze der Sittenlehre (Breslau, 1798), 2–3; idem, “Von der Popularität” Popularphilosophische Schriften über literarische, ästhetische und gesellschaftliche Gegenstände,2 vols., ed. Kurt Wölfel (Stuttgart, 1974), 2:1064–66. For the entire problem see especially Wölfel’s Nachwort to this edition (2:1–76).
Feder, Logik und Metaphysik,2nd ed. (Göttingen, 1770), 57f. See also Meiners, Revision,87ff. This may be said to have been the task of all the philosophers of that period. See, for instance, Johann Nikolaus Tetens, Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (1775),11–13.
Feder, Logik und Metaphysik,231f
Platner, Philosophische Aphorismen,250f., 256f.
There are more than 35 explicit reference to Hume in Tetens’ two main works, many of which are designed to defend him against the criticisms of his Scottish enemies Reid, Oswald and Beattie. Furthermore, these reference show that Tetens had more than a cursory knowledge of Hume’s texts, but is intimately acquainted with its particulars. He knew not only the first Enquiry,but also the Treatise. At the very least, he mentioned both.
Johann Nikolaus Tetens, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur and ihre Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1777), 392f.
Ibid. 394.
Tetens, Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie,85–86.
Beck, Early German Philosophy,425.
Tetens, Philosophische Versuche,313. He thinks that “this was also the most important reason for his committing the same mistake with regard to the entire extent of human knowledge. Because he did not recognize its true inner strength, he believed that he could shake it by means of his skeptical cavils (Vernunfteleyen).” Ibid., 312f.
Ibid., 316.
Ibid., 320.
Ibid., 323.
Ibid., 327.
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, The Philosophical Works,ed. Green and Grose, 1:511.
Tetens, Philosophische Versuche,520.
Ibid., 531.
Ibid., 532.
Ibid., 546.
Tetens makes this quite explicit, saying: “If we replace the words objective and subjective with the words unchanging subjective and changing subjective, then we do not have to take into account the faculties of thought of other beings, of which we have no concepts… For this is the same as when we ask what depends upon the special organization of our organs or our constitution and what is necessarily and always so, and remains so as long as our self remains a thinking being, even if the bodily organs of thought are changed.”
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Kuehn, M. (1998). Skepticism: Philosophical Disease or Cure?. In: van der Zande, J., Popkin, R.H. (eds) The Skeptical Tradition Around 1800. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées, vol 155. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3465-3_7
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