Abstract
Carefully regarded, the last chapter presented two theories of the ideal vis-à-vis its role in the intentional relationship. The first has its basis in the Fregean distinction between concept and object. The properties of objects are not the properties of the species which define what properties objects must have in order to be subsumed under them. Thus, the concept square is not a square concept. The distinction in predication that is implied in this is taken by Husserl to apply generally to the whole ontological realm of the ideal. It is thus taken to apply to the perceptually embodied sense which, as ideal, cannot be considered as having the same predicates as our real conscious processes. We, thus, have the doctrine that “there dwells an ideal intentional content next to an inherent, actual content” of our psychological processes. The fact that the predicates of the one are not those of the other establishes what we called the “ontological transcendence” that specifically defines the intentional relationship. This is the transcendence of the ideal with regard to the real. It is a transcendence designed to avoid the psychological relativism that attempts to reduce the perceptual sense of the object to the psychological process involved in its apprehension.
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Notes
This position is repeated a number of times. See, e.g., LU, Tüb. ed., I, 171–2; F., pp. 180–81; Ibid., II/1, 210; F., p. 141; LU, Halle ed., II, 144–45.
Husserl makes reference to his debt to James in LU,Tüb. ed., II/1, 208, fn. 1; F., p. 420.
It may be noted that these forms are sufficient to express formal implication. Thus, p implies q is truth functionally equivalent to the denial, not both p and not q. See Willard Quine, Elementary Logic (New York, 1965 ), p. 25.
That this, indeed, is the sense of the priority of epistemology (and of phenomenology, conceived of as a “method” of epistemological reflection) can be seen by comparing a number of Husserl’s statements. See, e.g., LU,Tüb. ed., I, 160–61; F., p.. 172; Die Idee der Phänomenologie; Biemel ed., pp. 22–23, 32; “Nachwort,” Ideen III; Biemel ed., pp. 147–48.
Husserl follows this with the comment, “But enough of such arguments which are only different ways of expressing one and the same state of affairs (Sachlage),one which already guided us in the Prolegomena” (LU, Tüb. ed., I1/2, 201;F., pp. 831–32). The Sachlage,we are maintaining, is that of the priority of the epistemological standpoint. It is a priority which, for Husserl, is established through the Prolegomena’s refutation of scepticism and relativism.
As should be apparent, the sense is that of an object. See pp. 61–62, 69–70.
See also LU,Tüb. ed., II/1, 166; F., p. 386; Ibid.,II/1, 170–71; F., p. 390;Ibid.,II/1, 183; F., p. 400;Ibid.,I1/2, 386; F., p. 568.
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Mensch, J.R. (1981). The Subject-Object Correlation. In: The Question of Being in Husserl’s Logical Investigations . Phaenomenologica, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3446-2_7
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