Abstract
This study proposes a double thesis. The first concerns the Logische Untersuchungen itself. We will attempt to show that its statements about the nature of being are inconsistent and that this inconsistency is responsible for the failure of this work. The second concerns the Logische Untersuchungen’s relation to the Ideen. The latter, we propose, is a response to the failure of the Logische Untersuchungen’s ontology. It can thus be understood in terms of a shift in the ontology of the Logische Untersuchungen, a shift motivated by the attempt to overcome the contradictory assertions of the Logische Untersuchungen. In this sense our thesis is that, in the technical meaning that Husserl gives the term, the Logische Untersuchungen and the Ideen can be linked via a “motivated path.”
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Notes
Logische Untersuchungen, 5th ed., 3 vols. (Tübingen, 1968). The 5th edition is an unchanged version of the 2nd edition, the first two volumes of which appeared in 1913, the third appearing in 1921. Where there are substantial textual differences between this and the 1st edition, 2 vols. (Halle a. S., 1900–1901), we shall quote from the latter. Our translations from Husserl will in all cases be our own. The letter “F” refers to the pagination in the English translation, Logical Investigations, trans. J. Findlay (New York, 1970 ).
See LU, Tüb. ed., I, 224; F., p. 221;Ibid., II/1, 21; F., p. 265. The asser¬tions are repeated in Die Idee der Phänomenologie, ed. W. Biemel, 2nd edition, Husserliana II (The Hague, 1958), pp. 22–23, 32.
For a representative sampling, see H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2nd edition, Phaenomenologica, No. 5, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1971 ), I, 73; M. Farber, The Foundations of Phenomenology, 3rd edition (Albany, 1964), pp. 543–49; also Farber’s The Aims of Phenomenology (New York, 1966), pp. 76–78; Theodor Celms, Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls (Riga, 1928), pp. 251–52;A. Osborn,Edmund Husserl and his Logical Investigations, 2nd edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), p. 109; P. Ricoeur, “Introduction du Traducteur,” Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie (Paris, 1950), p. xxxi. The last two authors do not see any real opposition between the two works, while the rest stress, in varying degrees, their fundamental incompatibility. As will become evident, our own position is very closely allied to Theodor De Boer’s “genetic method” for interpreting Husserl. According to De Boer, “This method makes it possible to understand the earlier work as an initial stage of the latter and the latter as an answer to the problematic of the earlier” (“Zusammenfassung,” De Ontwikkelingsgang in het Denken van Husserl, Assen, 1966, p. 576). Unlike De Boer, our primary focus will be on the problematic of Husserl’s ontology.
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Mensch, J.R. (1981). Introduction. In: The Question of Being in Husserl’s Logical Investigations . Phaenomenologica, vol 81. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3446-2_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3446-2_1
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