State and standards

  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Günter Knieps

Abstract

Interaction among individuals is facilitated when it is standardized. Two individuals using the same standards of interaction will communicate or exchange more efficiently than if they apply exclusively their own rules.1 Often such standards are related to technology. They are combinations of hard- and software. One therefore can also say: The two individuals interact on the same type of technology.

Keywords

Market Power Seventeenth Century Network Externality International Standard Organization Voice Communication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles B. Blankart
    • 1
  • Günter Knieps
    • 2
  1. 1.Fakultät für WirtschaftswissenschaftHumboldt Universität zu BerlinBerlinSwitzerland
  2. 2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätAlbert-Ludwigs-Universität FreiburgFreiburg i. Br.Germany

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