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Public choice theory: Some items for a research agenda

  • Peter Bernholz

Abstract

To write about the expected development of Public Choice during the next twenty years is, of course, impossible. For, in order to predict the development of the field, it would be necessary to know already today the results of future research, but then the latter would be unnecessary. Thus I shall turn to a more modest and rather subjective endeavor, namely, to sketch some items which might prove fruitful for future research by filling gaps, by integrating already existing insights and by extending the domain of Public Choice. I will especially take up in the next section the relationship of Public Choice Theory with “Constitutional Economics”, “Law and Economics”, “Institutional Economics”, and “Social Choice Theory”. Following this, the relationship of Public Choice with the analysis of the International System will be discussed (Section 3). Section 4 will take up Public Choice, Ideology and Information and nondemocratic regimes. Finally, Section 5 offers some remarks on the evolution, transformation and reform of political-economic regimes.

Keywords

Legal System Public Choice Institutional Economic Social Choice Theory Public Choice Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Bernholz
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für VolkswirtschaftUniversität BaselBaselSwitzerland

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