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The shape of public choice to come: Some predictions and advice

  • William C. Mitchell

Abstract

In the normal course of events, elders are sometimes called upon to reflect on the past while the more youthful set about deciding the future. For the most part, I shall honor the dictum but offer some unsolicited advice on what needs to be done and be so bold as to predict these suggestions will be acted upon — a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course, the advice may be rejected or ignored. What, then?

Keywords

Public Choice Group Solidarity Rent Extraction Military Unit Group Loyalty 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • William C. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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