Art and the Reenchantment of Sensuous Human Activity

Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 65)


Contemporary aestheticians face a question that has troubled writers since the Enlightenment: What is the role of the arts, when scientific rationalism and empirical understanding undermine our belief in the autonomy of each person? One reply consists of two familiar moves: the reiteration of dangerous effects caused by the hegemony of empirical thinking, and the affirmation that artworks serve as instruments for an emancipatory contact with some pre-objective domain. It is our challenging task to find an interpretation that upholds both of these moves, without linking aesthetic practices to the outmoded notion of a human subjectivity that is wholly disembodied, abstract and detached from actual life.


Actual Life Human Individual Natural Content Aesthetic Dimension Natural Life 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New HavenUSA

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