Abstract
Improving enforcement of environmental regulations would improve environmental conditions both by increasing compliance to existing regulations and by allowing regulatory agencies to broaden their scopes within existing budgets. Although considerable effort has been devoted to assessing incentive schemes to induce compliance, such as tax and subsidy systems and marketable permits, direct enforcement of environmental regulations has received little attention. This study describes the enforcement dilemma resulting from confrontation between a regulatory agency and a regulated firm. It proposes an effective long-term policy to encourage the firm and the agency to cooperate with each other, thereby overcoming the dilemma.
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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Fukuyama, K., Kilgour, D.M., Hipel, K.W. (1994). A Policy for Inducing Compliance to Environmental Regulations. In: Hipel, K.W., Fang, L. (eds) Stochastic and Statistical Methods in Hydrology and Environmental Engineering. Water Science and Technology Library, vol 10/2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3081-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3081-5_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4380-1
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