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How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law

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Part of the book series: Sociology of the Sciences ((SOSC,volume 14))

Abstract

European and American scholars of law and society apparently have problems in communicating with each other. To invoke Lewis Carroll’s authority on a piece of legal theory indicates how serious the problems are. After all, traced to its true origins, “Jabberwocky”, the famous “Stanza of Anglo-Saxon Poetry”1 means “weeks of woe” in its original German version.2 And inextricably involved in the interpretation of the poetry is a certain Hermann von Schwindel...

»Twas bryllig, and the slythy toves did gyre and gymble in the wabe: all mimsy were the borogoves; and the morne raths outgrabe.«

American law professor commenting on Niklas Luhmann, »The Unity of the Legal System«.

This is a revised version of an article which appeared in Law and Society Review 1989. For helpful criticism I would like to thank Michael Donnelly, Reiner Grundmann, Christian Joerges, Wolfgang Krohn, Giandomenico Majone, David Nelken, Helga Nowotny, Alessandro Pizzorno, Joyce Reese, Sean Smith.

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Notes and References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Bremen, Germany

    Gunther Teubner

  2. European University Institute, Firenze, Italy

    Gunther Teubner

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  1. Gunther Teubner
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  1. University of Bielefeld, Germany

    Wolfgang Krohn  & Günter Küppers  & 

  2. University of Vienna, Austria

    Helga Nowotny

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Teubner, G. (1990). How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law. In: Krohn, W., Küppers, G., Nowotny, H. (eds) Selforganization. Sociology of the Sciences, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2975-8_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2975-8_6

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