Abstract
In the previous chapter I described in some detail how reference is fixed. There are simple sentences associated with each word which are responsible for its reference. Once we know the truth conditions of these sentences, the reference of a word is given by disquotational schemas. The truth conditions of these sentences are identical with their justification conditions. In the final analysis, reference is fixed by justification conditions. However, some justification conditions are inadequate, they are not conducive to truth; in other words, they fail as truth conditions. What these inadequate justification conditions determine is relative reference; the sort of reference we attribute to users of inadequate conceptual schemes when we give rationalizing explanation of their behavior. As to adequate justification conditions, we cannot do better than to identify them with our current justification conditions. Our current justification conditions may turn out to be inadequate. But we must take what we have.
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Notes
Of course, it is a rather complicated question what A and B look like. One reason for the simplification is that A and B may not be fully verbalizable: we can tell if they are satisfied, but we cannot make them fully explicit.
In defending his constructive empiricism against the ‘no miracle’ argument for scientific realism, van Fraassen replies in a similar way (The Scientific Image, 39-40, esp. footnote 34).
I am afraid, this section will be somewhat sketchy and unsophisticated. This is my fault, but I have an excuse. The issue addressed here has rarely been addressed in the way I intend to, so I cannot rely on technical resources of the sort which are usually developed during prolonged philosophical discussion. This is also the reason why I frequently mention questions which were raised and discussed within the philosophy of science. It is in that field that questions closely related to the ones I discuss emerged.
There is one important provision. Each basic color has a prototypical version, the ‘focal’ color, the availability of which is practically unaffected by of words and verbal concepts. In fact, it was the Dani who provided a very strong argument for the existence of focal colors. Given their weak performance in memory tests, it was surprising that each color has a variety with which they are as successful as us.
This is the same sort of double vagueness which is also present in the notion of a conceptual scheme. In fact, it is the vagueness of practices which accounts for part of the vagueness of conceptual schemes. Conceptual scheme were defined as sets of closely related concepts, which serve similar purposes, occur in the similar contexts, and fit one another. This definition makes clear that conceptual schemes are often tied to particular practices. In so far as practices are vague, so are conceptual schemes.
If one wants to use ‘conceptual scheme’ in the broader sense of involving non-verbal representations as well (as it was briefly indicated in 3.1.), the restriction to theoretical knowledge should be lifted. Concepts would then be devices for coding practical knowledge, i. e. kno -how. The male stickleback has the practical knowledge of chasing off rivals in the mating period. This practical knowledge presupposes the ability to pick out rival males.
For example, in the sixties some physicists had this attitude to Geoffrey Chew’s theory of nuclear democracy. By that time a vast number of elementary particles have been discovered and new ones were being discovered practically every other day. Most particle physicists were trying to explain the properties of these particles in terms of even more fundamental particles. Given the rate of the discovery of the particles it was not obvious that this task could be accomplished. Chew’s view was that we should stop looking for even more fundamental particles and just take it for granted that there are a vast number of elementary particles. Most physicists, however, remained in the mainstream. Yet, some believed that Chew’s ideas are worth exploring by someone, even if they were not willing to undertake this themselves. Thus they regarded nuclear democracy as choiceworthy. Alas, nuclear democracy never became successful.
Therefore, it would be nice to refute that premise. Unfortunately, I have no general argument to show this. The standard move against relativism is to say that it is self-refuting, because if it is true, it undermines its own validity. Since it denies universal validity, it cannot be universally valid itself. This move cannot be employed here, since the premise about disjunct cultures in itself is not a fully-fledged relativistic claim. I think the only way to deal with it is to take particular cases and to show that even quite distant cultures have much in common. This would be a useful exercise also because it would also help to sharpen our understanding of practices. However, I cannot undertake that task now.
Of course, the very fact that Putnam makes use of this assumption makes his argument vulnerable against the skeptic. The skeptic may reject this assumption and thereby ward off Putnam’s conclusion even if the rest of the argument is impeccable. This, however, does not make the argument worthless, if we understand it in the context of the metaphysical realism - internal realism debate: it can do some damage to metaphysical realism.
This is a simplified version of Anthony Brueckner’s (“Putnam’s Model-Theoretic”) reconstruction of the argument. Most otller reconstructions consider only one horn of the dilemma, the first disjunct of (PI), (P3) and (C). The various reconstructions in the literature differ only in small details which are not relevant from the present point of view. I could have used almost anyone of them to make my point, but Brueckner’s reconstruction makes this especially easy. For further details see Harrison (“Putnam on Brains”), Casati and Dokic (“Brains in a Vat”), David (“Neither Mentioning”), Tymoczko(“ln Defense”, “Brains Don’t Lie”), Tichy (“Putnam on Brains”), Farrell (“Putnam on the Vat-People”), Kinghon (“External World”), Van Kirk (“Kant’s Reply”), Heil (“Epistemic Route”), Sacks (The World, 56-76)), Nagel (The View From Nowhere, 71-4), Dell ’Utri (“The Case of the Brains”), Collier (“Could I Conceive”), Iseminger (“Putnam’s Miraculous”), Stephens and Restow (“Brains in Vats”), van Inwagen (“On Always”).
The objection I am going to discuss takes different forms depending on the reconstruction. Sometimes the argument is claimed to have a missing premise, or one premise is claimed to be false, or it is said to assume that we know one of the premises which the skeptic may challenge. This is not the only line of criticism, but it is the only one which I think is successful. The argument has few defenders. Farrell (“Putnam on the Vat-People”) believes that it can be vindicated if it is supplemented with a Wittgensteinian account of rule following. I do not think this is right. Tymoczko (“In Defense”, “Brains Don’t Lie”) defends the argument in the same way as I am going to, but he does not recognize that this line of defense presupposes a good deal of internal realism. Dell ’Utri (“The Case of the Brains”) holds that from the internal realist position the argument is valid, but his reasons are different from mine.
Well, there are two small gaps, which were already mentioned: the justification procedure may be badly executed, or the conceptual scheme may be inadequate. But these gaps are not large enough for global skepticism. They only allow fallibilism.
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Forrai, G. (2001). Truth. In: Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes. Synthese Library, vol 296. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2868-3_4
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