Abstract
We all know lots of people; we also all know lots of persons. Normally we use the term “person” as a synonym for “human beings,” people like us. However we are also familiar with the idea that there are nonhuman persons, and humans who are not, or may not be persons or full persons. Nonhuman persons may include gods, demigods, ghosts, extraterrestrials, angels, and devils. They may also include animals, fictional and real, with special properties or characteristics. These will include Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, Winnie the Pooh, Tarka the Otter, Willy the whale, and, perhaps, educated nonfictional primates, like Washoe and Sarah (Allen and Gardner 1969; Linden 1975). Human nonpersons or humans who are not fully fledged persons may include zygotes and embryos, or individuals who are “brain-dead,” anencephalic infants, or individuals in persistent vegetative state. I shall explore these categories of persons and possible persons more fully below. For the moment it is enough to remember our relative familiarity with the idea of nonhuman persons and human nonpersons, whatever we feel about the existence of such individuals or the respectability of the terminology.
Reprinted with permission: 1999 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4): 293-308.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Adams, D. (1972) The Hitch-Hikers Guide to the Galaxy, Pan Books, London.
Allen, R., and Gardner, B. (1969) Teaching Sign Language to Chimpanzees, Science 165, 664–72.
Finnis, J. (1995) The Fragile Case for Euthanasia: A Reply to John Harris, in J. Keown, ed., Euthanasia Examined, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 46–55.
Harris, J. (1980) Violence & Responsibility, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Harris, J. (1985) The Value of Life, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Harris, J. (1992) Wonderwoman and Superman, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Harris, J. (1998) Clones, Genes and Immortality, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Linden, E. (1975) Apes, Men and Language, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Locke, J. (1964) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, E.S. Pringle-Patterson, ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Lockwood, M. (1988) Warnock Versus Powell (and Harradine); When does Potentiality Count?, Bioethics 2, 187213.
Savulescu, J. (1999) Should We Clone Human Beings? Journal of Medical Ethics 25, 90–91.
Tooley, M. (1998) Personhood, in H. Kuhse and P. Singer, ed., A Companion to Bioethics, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 117–27.
Wamock, M. (1983) In Vitro Fertilization: The Ethical Issues, Philosophical Quarterly 33, 241. Warren, M.A. (1997) Moral Status,Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harris, J. (1999). The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life. In: Personhood and Health Care. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2572-9_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2572-9_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5858-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2572-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive