Abstract
I am perfectly aware that I am taking up an ancient theme that has been the subject of much discussion and intense research, especially recently in the United States, but I do so because among the many discordant voices I would like that of a “classical” philosopher to be heard. In fact, I see that much of the discussion is argued on the basis of analytic philosophy and thus of linguistic analysis, or on the basis of more or less psychological phenomenology. If one wants to look back in time one can draw on those as distant as Descartes, but then one must rely fundamentally on Lamettrie, even though, from the opposite side, Platonic ontology is called upon as well.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
For a more detailed historical-theoretical exposition, cf. M. Casula, “Ein berühmtes Beispiel künstlicher Intelligenz in der Natur: der Zellenbau der Honigbienen”, Filosofia Oggi 14: 60 (1992), pp. 465–492.
For the history of discussions on the possibility of thinking matter, cf. M. Casula, “Die historische Entwicklung der Frage: ob die Materie denken kann? von F. Suarez, bis P. J. G. Cabanis, Filosofia Oggi 12:3–4 (1989), pp. 407–462.
For Leibniz’ “Gedankenexperiment”, cf. Monadologie, § 17. Continuing with Leibniz’ line of thinking, we could add that the only observable activity inside a computer is that of an electric current that passes and does not pass, and the consequent states of on and off that follow each other at enormous velocities. But we are the ones who interpret these states as numbers in binary code (1, 0) and manipulate them in languages and programs to make letters, symbols, texts, coordinates and graphics — information, in a broad sense. The only intelligent thing about a computer is its software, and just as animals are stupid beyond their instincts, so computers are stupid beyond their programs.
Et feignant, qu’il y ait une Machine, dont la structure fasse penser, sentir, avoir perception, on pourra la concevoir aggrandie en conservant le mêmes proportions, en sorte qu’on y puisse entrer comme dans un moulin. Et cela posé, on ne trouvera en la visitant au dedans que des pieces qui poussent les unes les autres, et jamais de quoy expliquer une perception.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Casula, M. (2000). The Limits of Artificial Life. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Paideia. Analecta Husserliana, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2525-5_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2525-5_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5462-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2525-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive