Abstract
“Having a moral right” in private and public debates probably is one of the most important arguments to bring some foundation to one’s claims. Within international law and politics, for example, one easily falls back on universal “human rights”, especially if neither a more subtle moral argument nor prudential reasons find a hold. But in some contrast to this agreement on the strong practical relevance of rights, both the conceptual analysis and normative justification of rights are rather controversial in moral philosophy. There is, perhaps, a consensus on a constructivist understanding of rights, that is that rights have to be constructed from a basis of more “elementary parts” of morality. There is no agreement, however, on the exact character of these parts and their normative import within an overall construction of rights. It seems to be clear somehow that rights have to secure and promote interests — of a human and animal kind. Not so clear is the kind of foundation rights can be given within the sphere of interests, especially if this is understood in a reductive sense. Nevertheless, because the function of rights is to secure interests, the construction of rights from an understanding of interests seems to suggest itself. It is in the interest of all beings to have their interests secured and furthered by rights. Therefore, an “interest theory of rights” provides itself as a primary option — meaning thereby the (non-trivial) justificatory, and not the (trivial) directive side of rights.
There is more to morality than value; there are also claims.
(Judith J. Thomson)
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Notes
1. See, for example, Judith J. Thomson: The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University Press 1990, ch. 1-2, for discussion.
2. John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1971, p.27.
3. Cf. Richard Hare: Essays on Political Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989, p.79.
Ibid.
5. For supplementary interpretation of Rawls’ critique, see Herbert L. Hart: “Between Utility and Rights”, in: Alan Ryan (ed.): The Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979, pp.78-80. Critical on Hart is Leslie Mulholland: “Rights, Persons and Distinctness”, in: Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986, pp.323-340.
6. John Rawls: A Theory of Justice,op.cit., pp.26f.
7. See Robert Nozick: Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1974, pp.28-42, and Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth 1977, pp.90-94, 364-368. In one phrasing: “Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them.” (Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit., p.xi.) Pettit argues for the equivalence of the constraint-and the trump-terminology. (Cf. Philip Pettit: “Rights, Constraints, and Trumps”, in: Analysis 46, 1987, pp.8-14.)
For contributions to this discussion see John Harris: “The Survival Lottery”, in: Philosophy 50, 1975, pp.81-87; Peter Singer: “Utility and the Survival Lottery”, in: Philosophy 52, 1977, pp.218-222; Thomas Nagel: The View from Nowhere, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986, pp.180-185; Judith J. Thomson: The Realm of Rights, op.cit.
John Harris: “The Survival Lottery”, op.cit.
Something Peter Singer suggested in “Utility and the Survival Lottery”, op.cit.
Judith J. Thomson: The Realm of Rights, op.cit., pp.135-202.
In an early discussion of Harris’ article, Singer suggested that the survival lottery would not work because of an increasing exploitation of those living healthy life-styles by the ones living an unhealthy life. (Cf. Peter Singer: “Utility and the Survival Lottery”, op.cit., p.221.) The same point is again mentioned by Judith J. Thomson: The Realm of Rights, op.cit.,p.183. This certainly may be a very good reason to oppose such a “morally hazardous” kind of health system, but hardly one a utilitarian can easily make use of (something Singer suggests). Injustice is one thing, utility-optimization another.
Cf. Brian Barry: Theory of Justice, Vol. 1, New York: Wheatsheet 1989.
Cf. John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, op.cit., § 22.
. Ibid., p.190.
“[...] the love of several persons is thrown into confusion once the claims of these persons conflict. […] Benevolence is at sea as long as its many loves are in opposition in the persons of its many objects.” (Ibid.)
In the following I leave Rawls’ focus on rights because it is not fine-grained enough to give an answer to the problem at hand. Rawls probably would refer to “widespread intuitions”, a move not satisfying if you are on the look-out for justification. Intuitions can only be part of the story.
Take also the invocation of Kant’s formula of using someone merely as an end, and not “as an end-in-itself’ (Cf. Francis M. Kamm: “Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-inItself, and the Significance of Status”, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 21, 1992, pp.354-389.) Surely the one used to help some others is not being taken as an end-in-itself, rather as a means for other ends. But why should we take the Kantian formula as given?
Kamm is not successful in my mind.
Cf. Thomas Nagel: The View from Nowhere, op.cit., p.184.
Francis M. Kamm: “Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status”, op.cit.,p.381.
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Leist, A. (1994). Some Problems in the Justification of Moral Rights. In: Pauer-Studer, H. (eds) Norms, Values, and Society. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2454-8_5
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