Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and fmally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. “Military” refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. “Excess” refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium.1
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Reference
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Sutcliffe, W.G. (1995). A Perspective on Safeguarding and Monitoring Excess Military Plutonium. In: Merz, E.R., Walter, C.E., Pshakin, G.M. (eds) Mixed Oxide Fuel (Mox) Exploitation and Destruction in Power Reactors. NATO ASI Series, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2288-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2288-9_7
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