Abstract
Cognitive science, a mixture of psychology, computer science, neurophysiology, linguistics and philosophy has been hailed by many as the first genuine science of cognitive phenomena. Its composition signals that the discipline employs methodologies of the ‘two cultures,’ of the natural sciences represented most clearly by neurophysiology and of the humanities represented by philosophy. Cognitive science, thus, becomes an interesting new area for the Erklären- Verstehen controversy. There are voices which, citing this methodological eclecticism, deny cognitive science the status of a separate discipline. Others disagree arguing that a ‘naturalized’ philosophy is not much different from psychology or even neuroscience. Many researchers believe that there is a central idea that unifies all the different approaches belonging to cognitive science. It is the idea represented by the model of algorithmic processing of information with all its related concepts and techniques. Thus the main goal of cognitive science in this view is to understand and explain the nature of perception, memory, learning, linguistic abilities, etc. by representing them in terms of their underlying computational processes.
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Bielecki, M.W. (1999). Cognitive Science: Two Cultures or One?. In: Cornelis, G.C., Smets, S., Van Bendegem, J.P. (eds) Metadebates on Science. EINSTEIN MEETS MAGRITTE: An Interdisciplinary Reflection on Science, Nature, Art, Human Action and Society, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2245-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2245-2_3
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