Abstract
It is well known that the Falāsifa (Aristotelian philosophers) and Maimonides in their wake had a low opinion of the Mutakallimūn, the practitioners of “dialectical (rational) theology.”1 But this does not mean that they spurned dialectic (jadal) per se. There is a world of difference between dialectic as practiced by the theologians and dialectic as employed by the philosophers. The philosophers claimed that the theologians were blind to the inferior cognitive status of dialectic and to the superiority of scientific discourse, and consequently abused dialectic. If so, the Mutakallimūn were neither philosophers nor even proper dialecticians. In the view of the philosophers, following Aristotle, dialectic has a useful, indeed vital, function when employed for the right purpose and directed to the appropriate audience.
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Notes
The first version of this paper was given at the Sixth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter in May, 1985 but not included in the volume that ensued, Maimonides and Philosophy, ed. S. Pines and Y. Yovel (Dordrecht, 1986 ). A revised version was subsequently given at the Wellcome Institute and thereafter as one of the Momigliano lectures at the Committee of Social Thought, The University of Chicago.
See Topica 100b21–23, 104a8–12, 165b3–4, 170a33, 40, b7–11, Analytica Priora 81b18–20; Metaphysica 995b23–4.;Terence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford, 1988), 37–38; and see the literature cited there on p. 494, n. 42.
J. Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration,” in Articles on Aristotle 1, Science (London, 1975), 65–87, at 65 (first published in 1969 ).
See E. Kapp, “Syllogistic,” in Articles on Aristotle,35–49, at 35 (first published in 1931). For eristic syllogisms, see Topica, I, 1,100b23, which foreshadows Sophistical Refutations,appended to the Topica; and for rhetorical syllogisms, see An. Pr. II,23, 68b11ff. and Rhetorica,passim.
See J.L. Kraemer, “Heresy versus the State in Medieval Islam,” in Studies in Judaica, Karaitica and Islamic (Ramat Gan, 1982), 167–80, were Huizinga’s Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston, 1955), 11–12, is cited.
See J.L. Kraemer, “The Jihad of the Falasifa, ” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 10 (1987), 288–324.
F.W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1981), cxiv, n. 1, from Alfarabi’s Book of Letters (Kitab al-Huruf),ed. M. Mandi, paras. 108–13, 129, 140–53. And see L.V. Berman, “Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi,” Israel Oriental Studies,4 (1974), 154–78, at p. 156.
See L. Strauss, Philosophy and Law: Essays toward the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors (Philadelphia, 1987), 40ff.
See ed. G.F. Hourani, Kitab Fasl al-Maqal (Leiden, 1959), 1–2; tr. Hourani, Averroes on the Harmony of Philosophy and Religion (London, 1961), 44–5 (with pagination of the text in the margin). Cf. also Maimonides, Guide, II, 39.
The full title is probably Kitab Fasl al-Maqal wa-tagrir ma bayn al-shari’a wal-hikma min alittisal. See Hourani’s edition, p. 7, 15–16. In two manuscripts of Ibn Abt Usaybi`a, `Uyan al-Anba’fi tabaqat al-atibba; ed. A. Müller (Konigsberg, 1884), II, 77, the word al-muwafaga is added, and Hourani compares this to Ibn Rushd’s use of this term and mutabaqa in Manahij al-Adilla.
Averroes quotes here a felicitously appropriate verse from the Koran: “Summon to the way of your Lord by wisdom and by good preaching, and debate with them in the most effective manner” (Koran 16:125). See Decisive Treatise, p. 6; p. 92, n. 56.
Decisive Treatise, 6 (text), 49 (trans.); and see Hourani’s note, p. 92, n. 56.
On philosophical style, see L. Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 1952); and also Berel Lang’s Philosophy and the Art of Writing: Studies in Philosophical and Literary Style (London, 1983); idem, The Anatomy of Philosophical Style (Oxford, 1990 ); idem (ed.), Philosophical Style: An Anthology about the Reading and Writing of Philosophy (Chicago, 1980 ).
See the excellent discussion of multilevel writing by Miriam Galston, in her Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Alfarabi (Princeton, 1990), passim (references in Index, 238).
See Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985), 28, 115ff
Y. Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics (Princeton, 1989), I, 29. On Spinoza’s use of dual language and equivocation, see pp. 28–30, 113–6, 128–152. Yovel consciously follows Leo Strauss in his understanding of Spinoza’s rhetorical technique; see Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, trans. E.M. Sinclair (New York, 1965 ). But whereas Strauss traced this back to Maimonides, Yovel (less convincingly in my opinion) evokes the more direct tradition of “Marrano culture and linguistic habits”(pp. 30, 150–2). To be sure, one does not exclude (but may even reinforce) the other if Yovel is right about Marrano influence.
See E. Efros, “Maimonides’ Arabic Treatise,” PAAJR 34 (1966), 21–24; and idem, Maimonides’ Treatise on the Art of Logic (New York, 1938 ), 47–49 (Eng. trans.). See also A. Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides,” Moses Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby (Washington, D.C., 1989 ), 35–51.
In Guide I, 2, Maimonides stresses that through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, whereas fine and bad belong to things generally accepted as known (=endoxa), not those cognized by intellect. Fine and bad (hasan, gabih) are equivalent to Greek kalon and aischron (morally fine or morally base) and are definitely not aesthetic categories.
See A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sind (Avicenne) (Paris, 1938), p. 235, no. 443, where ma’gülat ûla (prima intelligibilia), are identified with muqaddamat that are assented to, as “the whole is greater than the part.”
See D.M. Dunlop, ed. and trans., “Al-Farabi’s Introductory Sections in Logic,” Islamic Quarterly, 2 (1955), 275, n. 2 and 264; and Alfarabi’s Kitab al jadal, ed. R. al-Ajam, in al-Mantiq ‘inda al-Farabi, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1986), 19, for premises that are traditional, generally accepted, sensible and certain (magbûlat, mash/û1-ät, mahsûsat, yaginiyya).
The word is read tafddul in the edition of Efros. Efros prefers the variant tafdsul. Ibn Tibbon (Efros, 40) did not understand the text; Ahituv (Efros, 86) and Vivas (Efros, 113) apparently read tafädul. And see Efros, Introduction, 5. d.
Cf. Alfarabi, Kitab al-Jadal, 17, where he states that assent to dialectical propositions depends upon the consensus of people, their reliability as authorities and their number. It is greatest when all human beings assent. He also asserts (p. 19) that these propositions are accepted by different nations in different regions and having different characters and languages.
For qawm we may understand “religious communities” in accordance with Maimonides’ terms of reference.
See Letter of Astrology, gy, ed. A. Marx, HUCA 3 (1962), 350; trans. R. Lerner, Medieval Political Philosophy: a Sourcebook, ed. R. Lerner and M. Mandi, p. 228. And see the edition of Shailat, Letters, 474–90, at 479.
Kitab al-Amandt wal-J’tigaddt, ed. J. Kafih (Jerusalem, n. d), 14–15; The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. S. Rosenblatt (New Haven, 1948 ), 16–18
For rhetorical syllogisms, see Analytica Priora, II, 23, 68b11ff; and Rhetorica, passim. In Rhetorica, 1, 1, 1355a24–7, Aristotle says that the rhetorical argument is used for people who cannot be persuaded by reasoning in accordance with knowledge. As the purpose of a rhetorical syllogism is to persuade, it has no truth value. See also Alfarabi’s Kitdb al-Khatdba, ed. and trans. J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi (Beirut, 1971 ).
See R. Walzer, “Zur Traditiongeschichte der Aristotelischen Poetik,” in Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 129–36. The Alfarabian program, which Walzer claimed continued the Alexandrian syllabus toward the end of its development, divided types of argument or syllogisms into scientific, dialectic, refutation of sophisms, rhetorical persuasion and poetical evocation. And see Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary, xxii—xxiii; Deborah L. Black. Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden, 1990 ); and S. Kemal, The Poetics of Alfarabi and Avicenna (Leiden, 1991 ).
The account is given by ‘Abd al-Wâhid al-Marraküshi, Kitdb al-Mujib fi talkhis akhbar alMaghrib, ed. R. Dozy, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1881 ), 174–5. See the translation and discussion by Hourani, Averroes On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, 12–14. Al-Marrakûshi says he heard the report from a pupil of Ibn Rushd who had heard it from his teacher. It may nevertheless be anecdotal.
See the Introduction by S. Pines to his translation of The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago, 1963 ), cxxv—cxxxi; H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam ( Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1976 ), 4358.
See Pines, “Translator’s Introduction,” cxxvi. And see also pp. Ixxxiii—Ixxxv. And see S. Stroumsa, “Al-Farabi and Maimonides on the Christian Philosophical Tradition: a Re-evaluation,” Der Islam 68 (1991), 263–87.
Maimonides cites Themistius (Guide, I, 71; Pines, p. 179). Cf. Aristotle, Topica 173a29ff., 161 b33ff.; E. Weil, “The Place of Logic in Aristotle’s Thought,” in Articles on Aristotle, 88–112, at p. 103. Aristotle says: “Convention (nomos) is the opinion (doxa) of the majority; but wise men (sophoi) speak and argue (legousin) in accordance with nature and with the truth.” And see especially Metaphysica, IV, 6, 1011 a20ff. Moses of Narbonne expressed wonder in his comment on this passage that Maimonides cited Themistius and not the well-known passage from the Metaphysica. He suggests that in writing the Guide Maimonides followed “the moderns” (i.e., commentators such as Themistius) rather than Aristotle himself — an insight worth following up. See Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensis… zu dem Werke More Nebuchim des Maimonides, ed. J. Goldenthal (Vienna, 1852), 15b; and S. Munk, Le guide des égarés (Paris„ 1856–66), I, 345, n. 4.
R. Sorabji, Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (Ithaca, 1987 ), 1.
Traces of these tensions are found in Islamic sources; see J.L. Kraemer, “A Lost Passage from Philoponus’ Contra Aristotelem in Arabic Translation,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 85 (1965), 318–27.
P. Hoffmann, “Simplicius Polemics,” in Sorabji, Rejection, 64.
This, at least, is suggested by Michael Tardieu, “Säbiens Coraniques et ”Sabiens“ de Harran.” Journal Asiatique, 274 (1986), 1–44, at 22–23.
See Philoponus, Against Aristotle, on the Eternity of the World, trans. C. Wildberg (London, 1987 ).
See J. van Ess, “Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Théologie. Eine vorläufige Skizze,” Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 44 (1976), 23–60, at p. 23: “Theologie ist im Islam, mehr vielleicht als in anderen Religionen, eine streitbare Wissenschaft, dialektisch in der Argumentation und dialogisch im Stil.”
See J.L. Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1991), 126ff., 186ff; idem, Philosophy in the Renaissance of Islam (Leiden, 1986), 248ff.
See van Ess, “Disputationspraxis,” 26.
Kraemer, Humanism, 187.
Ibid., 36; and see the report of the Andalusian scholar Abo Abdallah al-Humaydi who relates that a certain theologian named Abo `Umar Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Sa`di visiting Baghdad toward the end of the tenth century found in sessions of Mutakallimon that there were present Muslims of all sects, and also infidels, Mazdaeans, materialists, atheists, Jews, and Christians, in short, infidels of every sort. See R. Dozy, Histoire des Musulmans d’Espagne, new edition, edited by E. Lévi-Provennal (Leiden, 1932), II, 126–7; Kraemer, Humanism, 59.
See Larry B. Miller’s Princeton, 1984 dissertation, Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth Centuries 42, The notion of koinai ennoiai is Stoic, as Miller states (note 90 ad loc.).
The text reads pros gymnasian. This is rendered in the translation of E.S. Forster, in the Loeb edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 277, as “mental training.”
The breakdown into 3a and 3b is my own.
The translation is from Terence Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 36–7. Irwin notes (p. 37) that these various purposes are related, and that the third function of dialectic rests on the first two. Alexander, in his commentary on the Topica, p. 29. 18–30.12; cited by Irwin, 494, n. 35, considers whether the last function should be subdivided. On the constructive use of dialectic, Irwin cites copious secondary literature, p. 493, n. 40.
The word jadal is Koranic (18:554), and in Arabic translations of Aristotle, it renders the term dialektiké (e.g. Metaph. 987b23).
The Topica was translated by Athanasius of Balad (d. 696) and by Ishaq b. Hunayn (d. 910) into Syriac. In the tenth century it was translated into Arabic by Abil `Uthman al-Dimashgi and others. For details, see F.E. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968), 20–3. The translation of al-Dimashgi was published by `A Badawi from the famous Ms. Paris Bibliothèque Nationale 2346, in Mantiq Arista (Cairo, 1948–52), II, 469–672; III, 675–689. And the eighth book, translated by Ibrahim b. `Abadalläh al-Kätib (from the Syriac of Ishaq b. Hunayn), was published by Badawi in vol. III, 690733. In the West the Topica became known first through Boethius’De topicis differentiis and De divisione. It was rendered into Latin in the twelfth century by an anonymous translator.
Ed. ‘Ajam, 29–38.
See Zimmermann, Index, 286: ‘road, mu’dnada, ta’anud; lxxxiii, n. 3. And see text, 62.9, 21a38 (antikeintai), 22a11, 23b30, 211.22f f.
Cf. Alfarabi’s discussion of human progress in Kitdh al-Huraf cited above.
That is, the raising of aporiai.
See Republic 536Dff, and cf. 539Dff.
This phrase was adopted by Maimonides in Guide, III, 28 for beliefs necessary for the sake of political welfare, as divine anger and retribution.
See also Ibn Sinâ, Kitdb al-Shijd; al-Mantiq, al-Jadal, ed. I. Madkour (Cairo, 1965 ), 11–14.
Ed. C.E. Butterworth and A.A. Haridi (Cairo, 1979 ), Part One, p. 31ff, par. 3–7.
See Butterworth, Introduction, pp. 44–45, and Commentary, Part 3, p. 199, no. 302. He refers (see p. 53, n. 41) to Topica 155b3–18.
Ed. and trans. C.E. Butterworth (Albany, 1977 ).
See Guide, II, Introduction; and 2 (pp. 253–4 ).
Maimonides goes on to say that Alfarabi had great contempt for Galen because he held that this was an obscure question which could not be demonstrated in one way or the other, whereas Abo Nasr held that the heavens are proven by demonstration to be eternal. The position of Galen is the one that Maimonides himself adopted.
See Georges Vajda, “A propos d’une citation non identifiée d’AI-Fârâbi dans le ”Guide des égarés,“ Journal Asiatique, 258 (1965), 43–50. Vajda cites Ms. Bratislava TE41, fols 232–33. See ed. ‘Ajami, 80–2. The Arabic version, from ed. ‘A. Badawi (Cairo, 1949), II, 485, reads idh hiya’azfma li-:anninâ, which closely followd the Greek at 104b15, whereas Alfarabi has aw hiva azima fi 7annind, and Maimonides’ text (ed. S. Munk and I. Joel [Jerusalem, 1929]), 203, 1. 15–204.2 reads: ow hiva ‘azfma ’indand, thus following the text of Alfarabi (aw for idh) and making a substitution of ’indand for li-(fi) zannind of the other texts.
See also Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical and Sophistic Arguments,” 48–9.
Hyman, 45–8.
Abd al-Latif al-Baghdâdi, as cited by Ibn Abi Usaybi’a, ‘Cyan al-anted’ fi tabagat al-atibbd; ed. N. Rida (Beirut, 1965), 697–9. See B. Lewis, “Jews and Judaism in Arabic Sources (Maimonides),” Metsudah, 3–4 (1945), 175–6. A version of the Guide in Arabic script apparently existed in Maimonides’ lifetime.
Ibn al-`Ibri,Ta’rikh mukhtasar al-duwal (Beirut, 1958), 239. See Lewis, 175.
Ibn Abi Usaybi`a, ’Cyan al-anted; 583. See Lewis, 177.
See J.L. Kraemer, “Maimonides on Aristotle and Scientific Method,” Moses Maimonides and his Time, ed. E.L. Ormsby ( Washington, D.C., 1989 ), 53–88.
C.H. Lohr, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann et al. (Cambridge, 1988), 91. Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration,” 82–3, breaks these characteristics down to Thera (’hunt’), Skepsis inquiry’), Heuresis (’finding’), Zetesis (`seeking’).
Lohr, 95–96.
Karl A. Popper, “What is Dialectic,” in Conjectures and Refùtations, 313, n. 4. This was a paper read first at a philosophy seminar at Canterbury University College, Christchurch, New Zealand, in 1937; first published in Mind, N.S. 49, 1940.
A definition of syllogism is given at the beginning of the Prior Analytics and Topics; and it is employed in the Sophisticatal Refutations and appears in the Rhetoric. In the Prior Analvtics (24b18–20) it is said: “A syllogism is a discourse (logos) in which, certain things being laid down (protaseis), something other than what is laid down follows by necessity on the basis of these things being so” See also Topica I00a26; Sophistica 165a2; Rhetorica 1356b16–17. And see E. Kapp, “Syllogistic,” in Articles on Aristotle I. Science, 35, 37, 38, 40. J. Lukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic, 1–12; Jonathan Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration,” in Articles on Aristotle, 65–66, 68 and n. 15 for references; E. Weil, “The Place of Logic in Aristotle’s Thought,” 110; Jonathan Lear, Aristotle and Logical Theory, 1–14.
That is, a demonstrative argument rests on principles that are true, necessary and universal, immediate; and they also explain the conclusion that must also be true, necessary and universal.
See Barnes, “Aristotle’s Theory,” 69ff., where Aristotle’s possible influence of Euclid is discussed; Heath, Euclid’s Elements, I, 117–24, and especially 120–121 on common opinions.
Barnes, p. 73.
Kapp, “Syllogistic,” 41–42; Barnes, 77, and n. 63, 79–80, 83; cf. Heath, Elements, I, 120–121. And see Weil, “The Place of Logic,” p. 98, 107 (4).
Nussbaum, “Saving Aristotle’s Appearances,” 252ff.
That is, of believing in the denial of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.
Nussbaum, 255.
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Kraemer, J.I. (2000). Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic. In: Cohen, R.S., Levine, H. (eds) Maimonides and the Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 211. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2128-8_7
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