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The Autocreation of a Manager in the Process of Transformational Leadership

  • Bronisław Bombała
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 76)

Abstract

In the field of management sciences the opinion that dynamic and effective leadership constitutes the primary attribute of good organizations is more and more often voiced. As soon as it turned out that managers play a significant and direct role in the shaping of the organization’s culture, interest in research on the personalities of great managers — organization leaders — has definitely been on the increase. This has been so because they are not only authors of the formal side of organization, but also creators of the cultural components of life within an organization. Problem solving and decision making takes place in the space of certain limitations resulting from the system of economic and financial aims, as well as from legislation and social norms. However, the strongest limitations are of psychological aspects and are connected with the system of views held by particular managers.

Keywords

Business Ethic Transformational Leadership Transactional Leadership Moral Competence Personal Subject 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Cf. E. Husserl, Méditations Cartésiennes, Introduction à la Phénoménologie ( Paris: Bibliothèque de la Société Française de Philosophie, 1931 ).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
  3. 3.
    An in-depth analysis of the personalistic organizational culture is to be found in the author’s doctoral dissertation entitled: The Personalistic Vision of Organizational Culture. Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Cf. C. S. Bartnik, Theology of Human Work ( in Polish), (Warsaw: IW PAX, 1977 ), p. 15.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    The essence of responsible action is brilliantly handled by R. Ingarden: “Responsible action is taken by its originator in a specific way. The originator undertakes it and performs it with a more or less complete aware understanding both of the situations resultant from his action, the situations being seen from the aspect of values (…), as well as of the value of the motives, which made him act. In all the phases of his action the originator realizes his own connection with the positive or the negative value of its outcome, and undertakes it, or continues it with a conscious acceptance of the outcome’s value, and, accordingly, of the legitimacy and appropriateness of his action.” (R. Ingarden, A Little Book About Man (Polish trans.), (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1987), p. 76.)Google Scholar
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    R. W. Griffin, Management ( Warsaw: PWN, 1998 ), p. 491.Google Scholar
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    Cf. K. M. Bartol, D. C. Martin, Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991 ), pp. 506–508.Google Scholar
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    K. Wojtyla, The Person and the Act ( in Polish), (Cracow: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1969 ), p. 16.Google Scholar
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    J. Tischner, The World of Human Hope ( in Polish), (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1975 ), p. 86.Google Scholar
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    J. Majka, The Ethics of the Economic Life ( in Polish), (Warsaw: ODiSS, 1985 ), p. 140.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 146.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 157.Google Scholar
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    T. Merton, No Man Is an Island ( Polish trans.), (Cracow: IW ZNAK, 1982 ), p. 155.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., p. 154.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., pp. 155–156.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    This issue is very important and is connected with our sense of purpose in life. In our culture this is connected with a definite picture of oneself and of one’s own actions. It entails the meeting of hopes and expectations in a way that would allow a man to consider his life satisfactory. These hopes and expectations can be included in the category of human needs. Because of their significance for contemporary man, they are called the primary values of life. They can be listed as follows: (a) the need to feel one’s subjectivity in social acts, i.e., the conviction that in his actions, man has a considerable range of freedom of choice, that he is not manipulated and that his role is not reduced to a puppet-like function; (b) the need to be convinced that experienced feelings — friendship, love, gratitude, readiness to help or to console — are “noble” and disinterested: that they have the weight of real altruism; that they are not attitudes perceived fundamentally as “cunning,” or calculated; (c) the feeling of a membership in a definite human community, be it an ethnic, professional, or political one, together with pride or satisfaction in that (it is important that this not be an awareness of belonging to a community in any way inferior to other communities, or a despised one — awareness of a pariah condition); (d) the need to nurture hope for immortality, and the belief that death does not establish a complete and irrevocable elimination — non omnis moriar — which releases the aspiration to bequeath something of durable value (pieces of art, science, or organization); (e) the need to have the sensation of an Important Mission that we must accomplish in our lives, i.e., setting an aim so important that it would be worth the effort to organize one’s own life as a strategy for achieving that aim (such a sensation may not only be shared by artists and leaders, but may also accompany the life of any “man in the street,” and relate to a belief in service to the Important Cause (lack of awareness of such an aim is defined as a sensation of emptiness in life). Unfortunately, many hypotheses and theories having their origins in the exact sciences (sociobiology, behaviorism) violate the primary values of human life. Cf. T. Bielicki, “The Scientific Outlook on Life and the Primary Values of Human Life: Harmony or Discordance?” in: Views on Man and Society in Scientific Theory and Research, a volume of studies in Polish edited by S. Nowak (Warsaw: PWN, 1984 ).Google Scholar
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    Cf. K. Sosenko, the Creation of Wealth in the Perspective of the Personal Subject’s Self-creation,(typescript), (in Polish).Google Scholar
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    R. Wisniewski, “Three Types of Ethical Theory vs. Business Ethics,” in Business Ethics (in Polish), ed. J. Dietl and W. Gasparski ( Warsaw: PWN 1997 ), p. 49.Google Scholar
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    Building the pattern on the basis of the ethical values necessitates the introduction of the personal subject category (the person), which will define the individual human existence as a concrete, subsistent and possible whole which is responsible for the enacting of values and, at the same time, is the medium for some of these values. There are, naturally, those philosophical orientations (positivism), and corresponding ideological tendencies (scientism), as well as cultural trends (technocracy) which will not agree with the introduction of the notion of the personal subject, treating it as a metaphysical construct.Google Scholar
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    A. Wçgrzecki, An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Subject ( in Polish), (Cracow: Ossolineum, 1996 ), p. 62.Google Scholar
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    This phenomenon has been aptly described by H. Marcuse. According to him, Western civilization’s dominant principle of productivity creates an artificial human nature supressing all that is not in accordance with the “technological mind.” The transcending dimension of the existence, so typical of human nature, which manifests itself in the cognitive-aesthetic attitude towards the world, undergoes repression. Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (in Polish trans].) (Warsaw: PWN. 1991 ).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bronisław Bombała
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Political and Sociophilosophical SciencesWarmia and Masuria University in OlsztynPoland

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