Abstract
In Plato’s Apology Socrates describes his practice of philosophy as a response to the Delphic oracle’s famous pronouncement that “No one is wiser” than he (Ap.21a–23b).1 Socrates at first regards the oracle’s utterance as a riddle, since its prima facie meaning contradicts his image of himself: “What is his riddle? I am very conscious that I am not wise at all; what then does he mean by saying that I am the wisest?” (Ap.21b). After investigating the meaning of the oracle by examining those in Athens with a reputation for wisdom, Socrates comes to interpret the riddle as an affirmation of his “human” wisdom, the knowledge that he knows little or nothing and that his wisdom is worthless. It is because Socrates understands that he knows little or nothing that he is wiser than the politicians, poets and craftspersons; these latter groups, in one fashion or another, all believe themselves to have wisdom which they lack and hence are self-deceived. Socrates is the wisest of the Athenians, not by virtue of any substantive knowledge of virtue (which he calls “more than human wisdom”—20d-e), but due to his humble self-understanding. Having come to understand the oracle in this fashion, Socrates undertakes a mission on behalf of the god to show those who think themselves wise, but are not, the error of their ways (Ap. 23b, d). This, he insists, is the true origin of the slander against him (Ap.20d, 21c-23e).
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Calef, S.W. (1996). What Good is Human Wisdom?. In: Lehrer, K., Lum, B.J., Slichta, B.A., Smith, N.D. (eds) Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2022-9_3
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