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Why von Neumann Rejected Carnap’s Dualism of Information Concepts

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John von Neumann and the Foundations of Quantum Physics

Part of the book series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [2000] ((VCIY,volume 8))

Abstract

In a private discussion in Princeton in 1952, von Neumann argued against Carnap’s view that epistemological concepts like information should be treated separately from physics or from any natural science. For Carnap, such a separation had been taken so much for granted that he was very nonplussed and he consequently withheld from publication — out of apprehension it did not sufficiently clarify important points — a study on information.

Positivists ... have too narrow a notion of experience. Kurt Gödel in Wang (1996, p. 173)

Early versions of this paper were presented at a conference on “John von Neumann and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics” at Lóránd Eötvös University in Budapest, 23–25 Feb. 1999, and at the conference “Logica ’99” at Liblice castle organized by the Czech Academy of Sciences in 22–24 June 1999. I am grateful for discussionsnon the topic of this paper with Abner Shimony, Michael Stöltzner and Miklös Rédei.

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  1. Department of Business Administration, University of Vienna, Brunner Straße 72, A-1210, Vienna, Austria

    Eckehart Köhler

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  1. Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary

    Miklós Rédei

  2. Institute Vienna Circle, Vienna, University of Salzburg, Vienna, Austria

    Michael Stöltzner

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Köhler, E. (2001). Why von Neumann Rejected Carnap’s Dualism of Information Concepts. In: Rédei, M., Stöltzner, M. (eds) John von Neumann and the Foundations of Quantum Physics. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [2000], vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2012-0_8

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