The Structural Reform of the ILO: Rationale and Parameters

Abstract

Since its initial drafting within the framework of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the ILO Constitution has been amended several times: in 1922, 1945, 1946, 1953, 1962, 1972 and 1986. In most cases the amendments aimed at increasing the number of seats of the Governing Body but actually introduced no great changes. The first substantial reform took place in the aftermath of World War II. In 1945–46, a thorough reshaping of the Constitution was undertaken in order to free the ILO from its legal, administrative and financial ties with the League of Nations as well as to clear the way for its institutional association with the emerging UN System. The next fundamental reform process came 40 years later in 1986. Although it seems, from a technical point of view, structural rather functional in nature, the 1986 reform is, by any standard, a far reaching one. The developing countries view it as a landmark in ILO’s “democratization.” The developed countries, those belonging to the IMEC caucus, do not agree with such a conclusion; but generally consider the reform to be a contribution towards the rejuvenation of the ILO and, more particularly, towards the curtailment of the adverse effects of politicization within the organization. In any event, with the formal adoption of the 1986 amendment instrument, the ILO now stands as the only UN specialized agency which has been able to achieve political consensus on its own reform and function since the upsurge of the so called “crisis of multilaterism.” The purpose of this paper is to analyze the rationale for the structural reform within the ILO system.