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Sense and the Psychological

  • Maurita J. Harney
Chapter
  • 82 Downloads
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 94)

Abstract

When objective reference is characterised relative to a two-levelled semantical framework, serious problems arise for a theory of intentionality. This was particularly evident in Chapter III, where we examined a theory of objective reference based explicitly on Russell’s theory of names. At the same time, as we saw at the end of the last chapter, this way of characterising objective reference is one that successfully avoids mentalism and, in this respect, fulfils an important requirement for a theory of intentionality.

Keywords

Natural Kind Term Mental Entity Abstract Noun Mentalistic Theory Psychological Consideration 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maurita J. Harney
    • 1
  1. 1.Australia

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