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Antitrust Enforcement: Where it has been; Where it is Going

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Industrial Organization, Antitrust, and Public Policy

Part of the book series: Middlebury Conference Series on Economic Issues ((MCSEI))

Abstract

Antitrust, which once enjoyed widespread support, has come under withering attack from a variety of quarters recently. Many of the critics regard antitrust as an anachronism, and openly counsel that it be abolished. But some hold the opposite view. They urge that antitrust enforcement be strengthened, and recall the Warren Court years with nostalgia.

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Authors

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John V. Craven

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© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Williamson, O.E. (1983). Antitrust Enforcement: Where it has been; Where it is Going. In: Craven, J.V. (eds) Industrial Organization, Antitrust, and Public Policy. Middlebury Conference Series on Economic Issues. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1874-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1874-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-017-1876-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1874-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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