Abstract
Merleau-Ponty defines an institution as an “internal circulation between the past and the future”.1 The concept of institution is modeled after time and conceived on the basis of the dialectical relation between Stiftung and Sedimentierung, between langue andparole.2 So it is a temporal movement and signifies a certain historicity. According to Merleau-Ponty, it is “a historicity of life” which, for example, “lives in the painter at work when in a single gesture he links the tradition that he recaptures and the tradition that he founds”.3 The institution as a temporal and historical movement is called “institutionalization”.4
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Notes
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History” inIn Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. John Wild, James Edie, John O’Neill ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970 ), p. 111.
Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, trans. John O’Neill (London: Heinemann, 1974 ), p. 37n.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”, inSigns, trans. Richard C. McCleary ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 ), p. 63.
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, ( Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976 ), p. 65.
Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World,op. cit. pp. 60, 128.
Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit.,p. 112.
“Mentogether produce a human environment, with the totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations”. Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., p. 69.
Cf. Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit., p. 108.
Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., p. 65.
Ernst Cassirer, AnEssay On Man ( New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953 ), p. 41.
“The psycho-physiological equipment leaves a great variety of possibilities open, and there is no more here than in the realm of the instinct a human nature finally and immutably given”. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962 ), p. 189.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. Alden L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 162, 176.
Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., p. 70.
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes ( London: Methuen, 1957 ), pp. 510–511.
Habitus originates in the Greek word hexis, the meaning of which is a habit of body. Marcel Mauss named the manner in which man uses his body in a traditional mode `techniques of body’ and called these techniques collectively Habitus. Cf. Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et Anthropologie (Paris: P.U.F., 1950), pp. 365ff. “Consciousness projects itself into a physical world and has a body, as it projects itself into a cultural world and has its habits (habitus):because it cannot be consciousness without playing upon significances given either in the absolute past of nature or in its own personal past, and because any form of lived experience tends towards a certain generality whether that of habits (habitus) or that of our `bodily functions”’. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 137.
Cf. Sartre, op. cit., pp. 513, 523.
Ibid., pp. 519–520, 523.
Ibid., p. 520. What constitutes the meaning and essence of the concrete techniques is called “structures”. Cf., ibid., p. 513.
Ibid., p. 518.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow”, in his Signs, op. cit., p. 170.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, trans. William Cobb, in hisThe Primacy of Perception ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 ), p. 117.
It is notable that the concept of institution includes animality. Cf. Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit., p. 109.
Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children, trans. Margaret Cook (New York: International University Press, 1969 ), p. 25.
Cf. Richard M. Zaner, The Problem of Embodiment ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971 ), pp. 169–171.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, trans. Hugh J. Silverman ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 ), p. 35.
Ibid., pp. 43–48.
Ibid., p. 33.
Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, op. cit., pp. 115–116.
Ibid., p. 145.
Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, op. cit., pp. 118.
Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, p. 43.
“The Child’s Relations with Others”, p. 146.
Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, op. cit., p. 47.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid., p. 48.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 356.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eye and Mind, trans. Carleton Dallery, inPhenomenology, Language and Sociology ( London: Heinemann, 1974 ), pp. 284–285.
Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, op. cit., p. 119.
Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow”, op. cit., p. 175.
Ibid., p. 174.
Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others”, op. cit., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 123.
“Wallon himself writes that the already surpassed forms of activity are not abolished. Syncretic sociability is perhaps not liquidated in the third-year crisis. This state of indistinction from others, this mutual impingement of the other and myself at the heart of a situation in which we are confused, this presence of the same subject in several roles - all are met with again in adult life”. Ibid., pp. 153–154.
Ibid., p. 151.
Ibid., p. 153.
Sartre, op. cit., p. 222.
Ibid., p. 410.
Ibid., p. 429.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 355.
Merleau-Ponty, The Philosopher and His Shadow, op. cit., p. 169.
Ibid., p. 172.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Literary Use of Language”, in his In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, op. cit., p. 82.
Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, op. cit., p. 140.
Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 140ff.
“Speech… would interrupt this fascination”. Merleau-Ponty, “Introduction”, in his Signs, op. cit., p. 17.
Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit., p. 109.
Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit., p. 109. S7 Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, op. cit., p. 140.
Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History”, op. cit., p. 108.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “On the Phenomenology of Language”, in Signs, p. 96.
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit., p. 167.
Ibid., p. 170.
Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence”, op. cit., p. 73.
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, op. cit., p. 129.
Ibid., p. 94.
Ibid., p. 95.
Cf. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, op. cit., p. 28.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, op. cit., p. 349.
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Abe, F. (1998). Others in Institutions. In: Tymieniecka, AT., Matsuba, S. (eds) Immersing in the Concrete. Analecta Husserliana, vol 58. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1830-1_12
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