Abstract
While the phenomenological movement is certainly one of the most significant philosophical currents of the twentieth century,1 it is nonetheless only natural to raise the question whether phenomenology involves any definite link with science or any aspiration to philosophize scientifically. It is in fact not uncommon to associate it with existentialism or with one of the explicitly anti-scientific tendencies which prevail nowadays. Historically speaking, such associations are quite understandable. There are, after all, prima facie compelling reasons to see Edmund Husserl, indisputably the central figure of the phenomenological movement, as one of the main forces behind contemporary anti-scientific philosophy. Most notably, he was the one responsible for advancing the career of Martin Heidegger, who inspires much of the philosophy of this kind in certain academic circles and beyond.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
For a historical overview of this movement, see Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982 ).
See, for instance, David Bell, Husserl (London: Routledge, 1990); Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995); Leila Haaparanta (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Mathematics: Philosophical Views of Husserl and Frege (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994 ); Richard Cobb-Stevens, Husserl and Analytic Philosophy ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990 ).
See Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Chicago: Open Court, 1994 ). See also the literature cited there.
The name of Kerry might here be somewhat baffling, tòr he is all but unknown. Nonetheless, as will become clear in Chapter Four, there are good reasons for regarding him as a Brentanist and treating his relation to Husserl.
See Georg Misch’s extensive introduction to his edition of Hermann Lotze, Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen ( Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1912 ).
Some of the studies in which there is an exceptional focus on Husserl’s early work are the following: Dallas Willard, Logic and the Objectivity ofKnowledge: A Study in Husserl ‘s Early Philosophy (Athens Ohio: Ohio University, 1984); Karl Schuhmann, “Intentionalität und intentionaler Gegenstand beim frühen Husserl”, Phänomenologische Forschungen 24/25 (1991): 46–75; Karl Schuhmann, “Husserls doppelter Vorstellungsbegriff: Die Texte von 11193”, Brentano Studien 3 (1990/91): 119–136.
See Maria Bruck, Über das Verhältnis Edmund Husserls zu Franz Brentano, vornehmlich mil Rücksicht aufBrentanos Psychologie (Würzburg: Triltsch, 1933); Dieter Munch, Intention und Zeichen. Untersuchung zu Franz Brentanos und zu Edmund Husserls Frühwerk (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993); R.D. Rollinger, “Husserl and Brentano on Imagination”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 75 (1993): 195–210; Herman, Philipse, “The Concept of Intentionality: Husserl’s Development from the Brentano Period to the Logical Investigations”, Philosophy Research Archives 12 (1986/87): 13–33.
Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Masaryk”, in J. Novak (ed.), On Masaryk. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988), pp. 129–156; Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Twardowski”, in F. Conglione et al. (eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 41–58; Jens Cavallin, Content and Object: Husserl, Twardowski and Psychologism ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997 ).
Hans Schermano, Meinong und Husserl. Erne vergleichende Studie (Louvain: unpublished dissertation, 1970); Hans Scheintann, “Husserls II. logische Untersuchung und Meinongs Hume-Studien I”, in Rudolf Haller (ed.), Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein (Graz: Akademische Druck-und Verlagsanstalt, 1972); J.N. Findlay, “Meinong the Phenomenologist”, Revue Internationale de la Philosophie 27 (1973): 161–177; R.D. Rollinger, Meinong and Husserl on Abstraction and Universals: From flume Studies I to Logical Investigations II ( Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993 ).
This goes for much of the literature which has already been mentioned. For some interesting remarks on these relations one may also consult the name index in Elmar Ilolenstein, Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zur Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 ).
Reinhard Fabian, “Leben und Wirken von Christian v. Ehrenfels. Ein Beitrag zur intellektuellen Biographie”, in Reinhard Fabian (ed.), Christian von Ehrenfels. Leben und Werk ( Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1986 ), p. 7.
This work was originally published (Duncker & Humblot: Leipzig, 1874) as the first volume of a more lengthy project which was never realized. It will be the pages from this original edition which will be cited in this study wherever no volume number is mentioned. Wherever Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt II is referred to, the second volume of the edition by Oskar Kraus (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1925), which includes material that had not been published in the 1874 edition, is meant.
Mention should here be made also of the psychologistic logics which appeared in the late nineteenth century, the most outstanding example being Sigwart’s two-volume Logik which first appeared in 1873/78. Of course, the psychological orientation was not shared by all the philosophical schools of the time, for much of the Neo-Kantian movement was emphatically anti-psychologistic. Nowadays one might want to add Frege to the list of anti-psychologistic philosophers of the late nineteenth century and indeed as the most important one, but at the time he did not generate anything like a philosophical movement. Moreover, the range of problems which he treated was much more narrow in scope than the ones treated in some of the psychologistic movements, including the Brentano School, and also in the Neo-Kantian movement. In these schools there are attempts to deal with the entire range of philosophical problems handed down to them by tradition.
Any suggestion here of intention in the sense of purpose should be avoided here, but one must also be careful not to associate this notion too closely with reference from a purely linguistic standpoint. Though the term “intentionality” is often used nowadays, following Husserl, this is not the term which Brentano used. The term “intentional reference” (intentionale Beziehung) is used here, as found in Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1889), p. 14, although the terms “intentional inexistence of an object” (intentionale lnexistenz eines Gegenstandes),“reference to a content” (Beziehung auf einen Inhalt),“direction towards an object” (Richtung auf ein Objekt),and “immanent objectivity” (immanente Gegenstândlichkeit) were used in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1874), p. 115. The question whether the object of intentional reference is somehow contained in the relevant psychical phenomenon, allowing us to speak of intentional inexistence, is an issue to be discussed in the following chapters.
The link with Aristotle is made in footnotes to both of the passages referred to here. In Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (p. 115 f., n) Brentano says, “Already Aristotle has spoken of this psychical inherence. In his books on the soul he says that what is sensed qua sensed is in the sensing entity, that the sense receives the sensed without the matter, that what is thought is in the thinking intellect”. Here there is of course a definite suggestion of inexistence. In loom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (p. 51), however, he maintains that the “first seeds” of intentional reference can be found in Metaphysics,1021 a 29, where it is said: “that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else is related to it”. The suggestion of the inexistence of the object is not to be found in this passage.
See, for example, John R. Searle’s influential hook, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind ( Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983 ).
This has already to some extent been confirmed by David Bell, “A Brentanian Philosophy of Arithmetic”, Brentano Studien 2 (1989): 139–144.
These lectures were again held in the winter semester of 1904/05 under the title Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie and Theorie der Erkenntnis. The topics were perception, attention, imagination, and time-consciousness. The part on time-consciousness was edited by Edith Stein in 1917 and published in 1928 under the ostensive editorship of Martin Heidegger, and is now to be found in Hua X. The part on imagination is to be found in Hua XXIII, which also includes the original text of 1898 that had been intended for the Logische Untersuchungen. One may of course ask to what extent this change in title is significant. In R.D. Rollinger, “Husserl and Brentano on Imagination” it has been argued that no methodological innovations are to be found in the Hauptrtück on imagination. In the one on time-consciousness Husserl does in fact maintain “that Brentano is not aware of the principal importance of strictly separating psychological and phenomenological matters” (Hua X, 401). In spite of this charge, however, and also in spite of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s theory of time-consciousness, it is not made clear how the failure to make the “strict separation” in question leads to error.
While it may accordingly be said that we are primarily concerned here with Husserl’s pre-transcendental philosophy, this does not mean that the division of his philosophical development into a pre-transcendental and transcendental phase is the only one worth using. If it is used, the latter phase should certainly be subdivided in some way since Husserl’s thinking by no means remained static during the very long span of time (about thirty years) which this phase encompasses. It is also clear that that the pre-transcendental phase, which lasted almost twenty years, can be sub-divided into an orthodox Brentanist period and a Platonist period (inspired by Lotze and Bolzano).
Another convenient and recommendable way of dividing up the development of Husserl’s philosophy is by identifying three phases which correspond to his three successive academic affiliations. Accordingly, we may speak of the Halle period (1887–1901), the Göttingen period (1901–1916), and the Freiburg period (1916–1938), as first suggested by Eugen Fink in his preface to “Entwurf einer ‘Vorrede’ zu den Logischen Untersuchungen”, Tydschrtft voor Philosophie 1 (1939): 106–133, 319–339, and elaborated on by Walter Biemel, “Die entscheidenden Phasen der Entfaltung von Ilusserls Philosophie”, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 13 (1959): 187–213. One may also wish to divide the Freiburg phase into the teaching period (191G-1928) and the period of retirement (1928–1938). In light of either the threefold or fourfold division the present study is for the most part — though not exclusively — restricted to the Halle period. While the development of Husserl’s philosophy is discussed according to the fourfold division by J.N. Mohanty in “The Development of Husserl’s Thought” (The Cambridge Companion to Husserl,pp. 45–77), this commentator wrongly ascribes the Logische Untersuchungen to the Göttingen period (pp. 53–56). This work was however written during the years at Halle and even appeared in its entirety before Husserl left for Göttingen.
I add “in philosophy” here, for Husserl had one other important scientific mentor, namely the mathematician Carl Weierstrass. During Husserl’s studies in Berlin (1878–1881) he followed Weierstrass’ lectures. Though his dissertation on variation calculus was completed in Vienna under Leo Königsberger in 1882, he nevertheless returned to Berlin in the summer semester of 1883 to work with Weierstrass. Even late in Husserl’s career he paid tribute to Weierstrass as a significant mentor (Husserl-Chronik,6–9, 11, 345).
Edmund Husserl, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Arithmetic, translated by Dallas Willard (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994 ), pp. 345–387.
Karl Schuhmann, “Husserls Abhandlung Intentionale Gegenstände’. Edition der ursprünglichen Druckfassung”, Brentano Studien 3 (1990/91): 137–176. The numerals in brackets in Appendix One indicate the page numbers of this edition. All footnotes in italics are the translator’s.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rollinger, R.D. (1999). Introduction. In: Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano. Phaenomenologica, vol 150. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1808-0_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1808-0_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5208-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1808-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive