Skip to main content

Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science: Calculation, Thought, and Gelassenheit

  • Chapter
From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire

Part of the book series: Phaenomenologica ((PHAE,volume 133))

Abstract

The reception of Heidegger’s reflections on modern science is shadowed by the question of Heidegger’s competence to utter the judgments he makes concerning science. The question is important because Heidegger offers notoriously tendentious judgments on the sciences, making statements as damning as the provocative claim in Was heißt Denken?, “Science does not think,”1 or emphasizing the “impotence of the sciences”2 to underscore the inability of the sciences to represent their own essence to themselves on scientific terms.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 259.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 329.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Martin Heidegger, Was heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1961). Also “Was heißt Denken?” in Vorträge and Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954). [“Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht,” p. 127.]

    Google Scholar 

  2. Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” p. 176. In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). Cited hereafter in the text as SR.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Patrick A. Heelan, “Heidegger’s Longest Day: Twenty-Five Years Later,” p. 579 above.

    Google Scholar 

  4. William J. Richardson, “Heidegger’s Critique of Science” New Scholasticism, Vol. xlii (4), 1968, pp. 511 – 536.

    Google Scholar 

  5. In contrast to Heelan’s broad and considered review, one of the first responses to Richardson’s essay was produced by a scholar who was manifestly so provoked by the first sentence that he offered an entire essay devoted to an exact refutation: Hans Seigfried, “Heidegger’s Longest Day: Being and Time and the Sciences” Philosophy Today 22: 319–331. Rather than following Richardson’s careful lead, concentrating on Heidegger’s express reflections on science (particularly physics and mathematics in) in “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” “Wissenschaft and Besinnung,” “Die Frage nach dem Ding,” Seigfried refers to the praxical analyses of Being and Time.

    Google Scholar 

  6. The Age of World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology. Cited hereafter in the text as WP.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See my “A Musical Retrieve of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Technology: Cadence, Concinnity, and Playing Brass, Man and World 26: 239–269. 1993. See also my Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Grounds of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 142 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  8. 8. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology,p. 34. Cited hereafter in the text as QCT.

    Google Scholar 

  9. 9. What is a Thing?,trans. W.B. Barton and Vera Deutsch (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery, 1967), p. 70. Cited hereafter in the text as WT.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962). Based on lectures first given in 1935/36.

    Google Scholar 

  11. See the translators’s reference to Kant’s discussion of the mathematical character of a scientific law as Ent-wurf in the Critique of Pure Reason (BXIII), What is a Thing?, pp. 88–89.

    Google Scholar 

  12. 12. Heidegger, The Principle of Reason,trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 126. Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 206. Cited hereafter in the text as PR with page numbers to the German text following a slash.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Cf. the text in What is a Thing?: “nótvtwv xrawdiwv pttpov fatly tIvOptimK, t4v pEv ôvtwv ()Ç,ratty, t4v St ol’JK övtwv obi(=attv,” p. 46.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Through its tarrying (das Verweilen) in company with what presences, the belongingness of the I into the midst of what presences is. This belonging to what presences in the open fixes the boundaries between that which presences and that which absents itself. From out of these boundaries man receives and keeps safe the measure of that which presences and that which absents” (WP 145).

    Google Scholar 

  15. In his preface to The Birth of Tragedy,Nietzsche had argued that “the problem of science cannot be recognized on the ground of science.” Cf. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy ii, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 18.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Babich, B.E. (1995). Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science: Calculation, Thought, and Gelassenheit . In: Babich, B.E. (eds) From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire. Phaenomenologica, vol 133. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1624-6_36

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1624-6_36

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4576-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1624-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics