Abstract
Classical game theory used only objective probabilities (for characterizing random moves and mixed strategies). Subjective probabilities were first introduced in modelling Cames with incomplete information. More recently, Reinhard Selten and the present writer have used subjective probabilities in our solution theory for noncooperative games. The paper will discuss some of the methodological problems associated with this work. It will also comment on the economic meaning of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
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© 1983 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Harsanyi, J.C. (1983). Use of Subjective Probabilities in Game Theory. In: Stigum, B.P., Wenstøp, F. (eds) Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications. Theory and Decision Library, vol 37. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1590-4_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1590-4_16
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