Abstract
In the previous chapter we defined what it means for a secondary theory to be in a correspondence relation to a primary one. We can now investigate whether such a relation is of any explanatory import, that is, whether or in what sense we could say that the former theory can be explained by means of the latter. I shall not make any survey of the complex and intriguing history of the philosophical research of the notion of scientific explanation.1 Instead, I try to point out that the notion of correspondence relation can be used as a first step toward a type of cognitive comparability which is different from the types discussed earlier in the literature, but which is in many ways congenial with Kuhn’s (1970) insights.
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Notes
See, e.g., Salmon (1989) for such an overview.
In particular, the forthcoming references to models must then be replaced by references to worlds or situations.
For a more thorough discussion of pragmatic aspects of explanation see, e.g., Scriven (1962); Tuomela (1973). Sintonen (1984) employs speech act theory and Hintikka’s (1976) question theory in studying pragmatic features of explanation.
That is, K ç ModL(w). Recall the definition of correspondence in Section 5.3.
The constraint actually means that yr is not logically ‘too strong’.
(6.2.2) and (6.2.3) can also be thought of as schemata of problem solving; see Pearce and Rantala (1984c); Pearce (1987).
I neglect here the question whether the transformed theory can be really regarded as a theory in the same sense as T itself, or the transformed law as a law.
The explanatory role of the correspondence relation can be better seen by investigating the case studies to come.
For similar suggestions, see Rott (1987).
See Section 8.4, below.
This is also done in Rantala (1989), (1996).
As we observed in Section 5.5, a limit procedure can be replaced by a limit condition by means of nonstandard analysis.
This view is in fact somewhat contrary to what is maintained in Pearce and Rantala (1985) and Pearce (1987).
See Section 8.4, below.
And it is obvious that the same holds within any other theory of counterfactuals, due to their intensional nature.
It is argued by Lewis (1973) that laws tend to be cotenable since they are so important to us.
That there is follows, in fact, from Section 9.1.
See Section 9.6.
See Section 8.4.
Notice that these assumptions imply that v = co.
See also Sintonen (1984).
This will become evident from the formal treatment of the correspondence in question, in Section 9.1.
For this feature, see Pearce and Rantala (1984a).
What is said here about the explanatory import of correspondence is, mutatis mutandis, applicable to cases where only correspondence sketches can be established between two theories or narratives and to cases where there exist global translations between literary works. Then the first step does not have similar logical difficulties; and if the correspondence (sketch) or translation does not contain counterfactual elements, problems connected with the third step will be lacking.
See Chapter 1.
Recall that they require that meanings be corrected rather than saved.
See, in particular, Section 9.1.
For instance, in a case where T supplants T.
In this book, however, I shall mainly restrict myself to the context of justification.
See Scheibe (1973a), containing an excellent discussion of Bohr’s views.
Kitcher (1983), p. 227.
Ibid., p. 209.
Ibid., p. 218.
Bonevac (1982), pp. 8–9.
See, e.g., Suppe (1974).
See, e.g., Quine (1970); Haack (1974); Briskman (1982).
‘Interpretation’ is often used in logic instead of ‘reduction’.
See Section 6.2.
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Rantala, V. (2002). Intertheoretic Explanation. In: Explanatory Translation. Synthese Library, vol 312. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1521-8_6
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