Abstract
It is difficult to be a biocentrist these days with all the criticism that has come their way. First of all, biocentrists are criticized for failing to state their view in such a way that it is not biased in favor of the human species.1 Secondly, they are criticized for following Ado Leopold and basing their view on an ecology that regards ecosystems as tending toward stability and harmony — an ecology that is now widely challenged with significant implications for the ideal of ecological integrity.2 Accordingly, one might think that it would be best, as critics have urged, to abandon biocentrism altogether in favor a hierarchical or anthropocentric view. In this paper, however, I show how biocentrism can be defended against these two criticisms and, therefore, should not be abandoned. Specifically, I do this by developing a set of environmental principles that 1) are clearly not biased in favor of human species, 2) can adjust to changes in ecological science and still pursue a goal of ecological integrity. If I am right that biocentrists can adequately defend themselves against their critics then the ethical demands of life would appear to be much stronger than many environmental philosophers have thought.
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References
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Shrader-Frechette, K. 1996. Individualism, Holis and Environmental Ethics. Ethics and the Environment 1: 55–69; N. Hettinger, Can Ecocentric Ethics Withstand Chaos in Ethics (forthcoming).
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Ibid., p. 170.
Taylor, P. 1986. Respect for Life. Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 155.
Ibid., pp. 276–277.
Ibid. 1994. From Biocentric Individualism to Biocentric Pluralism. Environmental Ethics 17: 191–207; Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics. Environmental Values, pp. 229–244.
Strictly speaking, not to treat humans as superior overall to other living beings is to treat them as either equal overall, or inferior overall, to other living beings, but I am using equal overall to include both of these possibilities, since neither possibility involves the domination of nonhuman nature, and, moreover, the latter possibility is an unlikely course of action for humans to take.
For a detailed discussion of this argument, see my article From Liberty to Welfare. Ethics (1994), pp. 64–98.
Moreover, this kind of fuzziness in the application of the distinction between basic and nonbasic needs is characteristic of the application of virtually all our classificatory concepts, and so is not an objection to its usefulness.
It is important to recognize here that we also have a strong obligation to prevent lifeboat cases from arising in the first place.
I add the qualification “normally” here because we know, for example, that humans sometimes enter into a relationship of reciprocal altruism with the members of other species such as dogs and horses.
Of course, libertarians have claimed that we can recognize that people have equal basic rights while, in fact, failing to meet, but not aggressing against, the basic needs of other human beings. However, I have argued in “From Liberty to Welfare” that this claim is mistaken.
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For the purposes of this paper, by “moral agent” I simply mean “agents that are capable of understanding and acting on principles like my environmental principles.”
To some extent, it was the difficulty ecologists had in specifying when ecosystems were in equilibrium that led them to endorse the ecology of disequilibrium.
Westra, L. 1994. An Environmental Proposal for Ethics: The Principle of Integrity. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp. 24–25.
Ibid., p. 108.
Similarly, Westra’s Principle of Integrity which prohibits harming the life support systems of the earth will normally operationalize into a requirement to protect this or that particular species.
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Levitan, S. 1985. Programs in Aid of the Poor, 5th ed. Baltimore, pp. 1–5; D. Gordon. 1971. Trends in Poverty. In Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective, D. Gordon, ed. Lexington, MA., pp. 297–298; A. Simon. 1975.Bread for the World, ch. 8.
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For a discussion of these causal connections, see C. Silver. 1990. One Earth One Future. National Academy Press, Washington, DC; B. McKibben. 1989. The End of Nature. Anchor Books, New York; J. Leggett. (ed.). 1990. Global Warming. Oxford University Press, New York; L. Brown, (ed.). 1991. The World Watch Reader. Nelson, New York.
Successes in meeting the most basic needs of the poor in particular regions of developing countries (e.g., the Indian state of Kerala) should not blind us to the growing numbers of people living in conditions of absolute poverty, and how difficult it will be to meet the basic needs of all these people in a sustainable way that will allow future generations to have their basic needs met as well, especially when we reflect on the fact that the way we in the developed world are living is not sustainable at all!
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Sterba, J.P. (1998). Biocentrism and Ecological Integrity. In: Lemons, J., Westra, L., Goodland, R. (eds) Ecological Sustainability and Integrity: Concepts and Approaches. Environmental Science and Technology Library, vol 13. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1337-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1337-5_5
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