Abstract
1.1. The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, it is to give a brief realist account of dispositional concepts and discourse. Secondly, it is to apply this account to clarify some dispositional psychological concepts, such as wanting and believing, assuming that these concepts are introduced as suitable functional states of the agent.
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Tuomela, R. (1978). Dispositions, Realism, and Explanation. In: Tuomela, R. (eds) Dispositions. Synthese Library, vol 113. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1282-8_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1282-8_23
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