Introduction the Puzzle of Singular Existence-Denials

Abstract

Not everything exists. Some things do, others do not. El Salvador exists, but Eldorado does not. Denials of existence form an essential part not only of philosophical, but even of scientific and lay speech. When we declare entire classes of things to be memberless, or report a certain kind — defined by a cluster of features — to be actually unexemplified, we can be said to issue general negative existentials. Neither the use of the grammatical predicate “exists” nor any putatively singular reference to the very item whose existence is denied is essential for making such statements. We can smoothly paraphrase “F’s do not exist” as “There are no F’s” or “Nothing is an F” or “It is false that something is an F.” But we also often catch ourselves picking out specific individuals from a disproved theory, a debunked myth, a broken dream, a dispelled hallucination, a work of fiction, the plot of a film, nonexistent items from a remembered recent past or a projected near future. Each of these alleged individuals, it seems, can first be referred to by a name, a demonstrative or a definite description before one goes on to say that it does not exist. These avowedly singular negative existentials have vexed logicians in ancient, medieval and modern times, in both East and West.

What is that Nature of Things (tattva, knowledge of which liberates us from suffering)? The existence of existents and the nonexistence of nonexistents ... How can the latter be apprehended through a means of knowledge? (Even their nonexistence can be known) through their non-apprehension when existents are being known.

— Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Sūtrabhāsya, Introductory Section, p. 1