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Epilogue: The End of a Conceptual History?

  • Jens Cavallin
Chapter
  • 107 Downloads
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 142)

Abstract

This study started out from the issue of “psychologism” in philosophy. That issue may at first hand look like a problem concerning the content of presentations or other mental phenomena. Nevertheless, the concept in focus soon turned out rather to be “what is presented” in another sense, or more generally the object of “intentional acts”, frequently referred to simply as the “intentional object”. Twardowski made an effort to dispose entirely of that notion, together with the notion of immanent object, by way of his strict distinction between content and object of presentations and his classification of the notion of “intentional” as a modifier. The concept of object was to a certain extent found to be only indirectly connected with the discussion on psychologism, and rather touched another topic, namely the discussion on Twardowski’s “phenomenalism”, raised by Ingarden. Nevertheless tendencies towards psychologism could be found in Twardowski at some interpretations and uses of the notion of content, specifically when the “double function” of content of presentations was including the meaning of names.

Keywords

Immanent Object Intentional Object Mental Phenomenon Double Function Transcendental Phenomenology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jens Cavallin
    • 1
  1. 1.University of StockholmSweden

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